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I. DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION—CONSEQUENCES FOR BREACH
A. Finality of Arbitration Awards: Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight
In Vaca v. Sipes,' the Supreme Court firmly established that an
employee may seek a judicial remedy against both his union and his
employer, where the employee could show that the union had
breached its duty of fair representation by failing to take his grievance
to arbitration. 2 This remedy is available, according to Vaca, despite the
employee's "failure to secure relief through the contractural remedial
procedure." The Vaca Court realized that in such circumstances, the
employer may in fact have done nothing to prevent the exhaustion of
remedies provided by contract. Nevertheless, the Court reasoned that
where an employer may have committed a wrongful discharge in
breach of the collective bargaining agreement, "a breach which could
be remedied through the grievance process .... were it not for the
union's breach of its statutory duty of fair representation," the em-
ployee must not be left without a remedy:
We cannot believe that Congress, in conferring upon em-
ployers and unions the power to establish exclusive griev-
ance procedures, intended to confer upon unions such un-
limited discretion to deprive injured employees of all rem-
edies for breach of contract. Nor do we think that Congress
intended to shield employers from the natural conse-
quences of their breaches of bargaining agreements by
wrongful union conduct in the enforcement of such
agreements.5
By making it clear that unions and employers could be exposed
to damage suits where unions unfairly failed to use the contractural
grievance procedures on behalf of its members, the Vaca court simul-
taneously effectuated two goals of national labor policy. By providing
the individual employee with access to the courts, Vaca provided the
employee's right to fair representation the added clout of a judicial
remedy. In so doing, the Court also reaffirmed the longstanding pol-
icy encouraging final arbitral settlement of labor disputes 6 by present-
' 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
Id. at 185-86.
3 1d. at 185.
Id.
5 1d. at 186.
°This policy is expressed in the Labor Management Relations Act, § 203(d), 29
U.S.C. § 173(d) (1965):
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby
declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes
arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective bar-
gaining agreement.
See also Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965); Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566 (1960); Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363
U.S. 574, 578 (1960); Steelworkers v. Enterprise Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596-99 (1960).
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ing unions and employers with an added incentive to make full use of
contractual grievance procedures.
During this Survey year, in Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight,' the
Court was presented with the question whether a union's breach of its
duty of fair representation would afford the employee a judicial rem-
edy against his employer not, as in Vaca, where the union had failed
to process the grievance, but where the union had already exhausted an
arbitration process defined by the contract to be final and binding on
all parties. Thus, in Hines, unlike Vaca, the interest in preserving fair
representation conflicted with the interest in preserving finality of ar-
bitration decisions, forcing the Court to choose between the policy
favoring a judicial remedy when the union unfairly failed to pursue
an available contractual remedy, 5 and the policy which mandated that,
wherever possible, deference was to be given to the final decisions
reached through the arbitration process.°
In Hines, the original grievance arose when the company dis-
charged several of its drivers on grounds of dishonesty, asserting that
the drivers had presented the company with motel receipts which
overstated the actual expenses while on the road." The drivers, rep-
resented by the union, asserted their innocence and opposed the dis-
charges. Grievance procedures were instituted, at which the employer
introduced into evidence the motel receipts, the motel clerks registra-
tion cards, and the motel owner's affidavit affirming both that the
registration cards were accurate and that inflated receipts had been
given to the drivers." No evidence was submitted either by the union
or by the employees to counter Anchor's case, and, the discharges
were sustained."
Upon retaining their own attorney and covering evidence which
strongly supported their case,' 3 the employees sought a rehearing by
the grievance committee. When the rehearing was denied, the em-
ployees filed suit against both the employer and the union," alleging
first that the discharges were in breach of the collective bargaining
agreement," and second that the union had violated its duty of fair
7 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
"See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 185.
° See note 6 supra.
'° 424 U.S. at 556-57.
" Id.
"Id. at 557-58.
" The motel owner supplemented his original affidavit by stating that he had
no personal knowledge of the events, but that the discrepancy between the receipts and
the registration cards could have been attributable to the motel clerk's recording on the
cards less than was actually paid and retaining for himself the difference between the
amount receipted and the amount recorded." Id. at 558.
14 Suit was brought pursuant to Labor Management Relations Act § 301(a), 29
U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970). 424 U.S. at 561-62.
" 424 U.S. at 558. The collective bargaining agreement provided that discharges
would be made only for 'just cause." It was the employees' position that, although dis-
honesty may have been a just cause, they were innocent of the employer's charges.
Thus, the discharge was erroneous. Id.
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representation "by arbitrarily and in bad faith depriving petitioner of
their employment and permitting their discharge without sufficient
proof."' 6
Both the union and Anchor moved for summary judgment, as-
serting that the employees had been properly discharged for just
cause in accordance with the contract. Further, the defendants con-
tended that the employees were bound by the contract provision stat-
ing that a decision by thegrievance committee was final and binding
on all parties. As such, defendants argued that where the employees
were "diligently and in good faith represented by the union," and
where the resulting decision was adverse, the same employees could
not "relitigate" their grievance in federal court."
The district court granted defendants' motions for summary
judgment on the grounds that the committee's decision was final and
binding on all parties, and that the employees had failed to show facts
from which the court could infer that the union had acted arbitrarily,
perfunctorily, or in bad faith." The Court of Appeals reversed as to
the union, finding that the employees' allegations of bad faith or ar-
bitrary conduct were sufficient to afford them the opportunity to
prove their claims at trial." The court affirmed the district court's
dismissal of the case against Anchor, however, finding that the finality
provision of the contract had to be observed where there was no evi-
dence of misconduct on the part of the employer."
The Supreme Court granted the employees' petition for cer-
tiorari seeking reversal of the circuit court's ruling as to Anchor,"
and held that an employee's section 301 claim against his employer is
permissible—despite a "final," "binding" adverse decision of the griev-
ance committee—where the union has breached its duty of fair rep-
resentation in processing the employee's grievance." Paralleling the
language of Vaca v. Sipes, the Court stated:
[Wle cannot believe that Congress intended to foreclose the
employee from his § 301 remedy otherwise available against
the employer if the contractual processes have been seri-
ously flawed by the union's breach of its duty to represent
employees honestly and in good faith and without invidious
discrimination or arbitrary conduct. 23
In support of its holding, the majority reviewed the public policy
underlying the enforcement of collective bargaining contracts. The
I° Employees claimed that the union could have discovered the falsity of the
charges with a minimum of investigatory effort, but had made no attempt to do so. Id.
"Id. at 558-59.
" 84 L.R.R.M. 2649 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
"506 F.2d 1153, 1156, 87 L.R.R.M. 2971, 2973 (6th Cir. 1974).
3° Id. at 1158, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2973-74.
" 421 U.S. 928 (1975).
:2 424 U.S. at 571.
33 /d. at 570. For the parallel language in Vaca v. Sipes, see text at note 5 supra.
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Court first pointed to the "strong policy favoring judicial enforcement
of collective bargaining contracts" 24 embodied in section 301. 25 The
majority explained that the terms of the collective bargaining agree-
ment which provided for settlement of contract disputes squarely fell
within the type of contract provisions to be enforced under section
301. 26 Yet, despite the policy favoring judicial enforcement of labor
contracts, both Congress and the courts have recognized that where a
grievance arbitration process is available under the collective bargain-
ing agreement, such arrangement is considered preferable to the res-
olution of disputes by resort to the courts.
The majority pointed out that the policy encouraging settlement
of grievance by methods agreed upon by the parties has been long
recognized to depend on the willingness of the courts to give the con-
tractual grievance procedures "full play."" Thus, courts have been
careful "not to usurp those functions which collective bargaining con-
tracts have properly entrusted to the arbitration tribunal." 25 As such,
courts have refused to allow a party to use section 301 in order to
sidestep the grievance machinery set forth in the contract." The Hines
Court stressed, however, that the congressional and judicial encour-
agement of private arrangements for settling contract disputes pre-
sumed "that the contractual machinery would operate with some
minimum levels of integrity." 31
For example, in the case of employee-union relations under the
collective bargaining system, the union as the representative of the
employee is granted broad authority to negotiate and administer the
collective bargaining agreement for the benefit of all of the workers in
the bargaining unit." In return for this increase in individual bargain-
ing power visa vis the employer, the employee, by necessity, is forced
24 Id. at 562.
22 Section 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) provides that:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce . , or be-
tween any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court
of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to
the amount in controversy ....
In Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962), the Supreme Court established
that § 301 allows individual suits against unions and employers by employees seeking to
vindicate "uniquely personal rights" such as wages. hours, and wrongful discharge. Id.
at 198-200. Cf. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 453 (1957).
26
 424 U.S. at 562.
"Id. at 562-63. See also Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-53
(1965); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960).
26 424 U.S. at 562.
" Id. at 562-63, quoting United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564,
569 (1960).
"See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-53 (1965).
3" 424 U.S. at 571.
22 See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 342 (1964); Ford Motor Co. v. Huff-
man, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953).
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to subordinate his individual interests-to that of the bargaining unit. 33
It is because the collective bargaining process involves this subordina-
tion of individual rights that courts have charged the bargaining agent
with a duty of fair representation "equal in scope" to his authority to
negotiate and enforce the contract." Thus the union "as the statutory
representative of the employees [has been) subject always to complete
good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion."35
When the duty of fair representation is not fulfilled, the basic
presumptions underlying the court's deference to contractual griev-
ance procedures are undermined: without good faith and honest
representation by the union, the worker, "stripped of traditional
forms of redress by the provisions of federal labor law,"" has no ef-
fective remedy against his employer or his union for breach of the
collective bargaining agreement. Therefore, courts have held that
where "the union refuses to press or only perfunctorily presses the
individual's claim ..." the employee is not barred from bringing his
grievance to court under section 301. 37
Having examined these basic principles, the Court had little
trouble rejecting the respondents' contention that where grievance
procedures have been pursued through the binding arbitration stage,
an employer not involved in the union's alleged breach of its duty of
fair representation should be protected from the burden of "relitigat-
ing" the contract dispute. The Court reasoned that where the union
has breached its duty of fair representation, the whole process of
grievance arbitration had been tainted," regardless of whether the
employer has been implicated in the union's breach, and regardless of
whether the process has just begun or has entered its final stages.
Where the grievance procedures have been subverted by the union's
conduct in representing its members, the only forum in which the em-
ployee can thereafter fairly present his claim against the employer is a
judicial one. Therefore, the Court determined that
Lae union's breach of duty relieves the employee of an
express or implied requirement that disputes be settled
through contractual grievance procedures; if it seriously
undermines the integrity of the arbitral process the union's
breach also removes the bar of finality provisions of the
contract. 39
33 See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 182; J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338
(1944).
34
 Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 342 (1964). See also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
at 182; Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953).
33 424 U.S. at 564, quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953).
36
 Id., quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 182.
37 Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650. 652 (1965). See also Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Steinman v. Spector Freight System, 441 F.2d 599, 603 (2d
Cir. 1971); Rothlein v. Armour Co., 391 F.2d 574, 578-79 (3d Cir. 1968).
gg
 424 U.S. at 567-68.
39 1d. at 567.
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The Court was aware that as a result of its decision, employers
could be exposed to damage suits for claims which had already been
"litigated" through the grievance procedure. 4 ° The majority was addi-
tionally aware that, in response to this decision, employers could ar-
guably become "far less willing to give up their untrammeled right to
discharge without cause and to agree to private settlement
procedures."'" However, the Court pointed out that its decision makes
a judicial remedy available only in the narrowest of circumstances. In
order to obtain relief, the employee must prove both an erroneous dis-
charge and a taint of the arbitration decision by the union's breach of
its duty of fair representation. In the majority's view, the burden on
employees thus remains a "substantial one." 42 Further, any alternative
result would mean that "[wlrongfully discharged employees would be
left without jobs and without a fair opportunity to secure an adequate
remedy."43
The dissent argued that the union's breach of its duty of fair
representation was an insufficient reason to void an otherwise valid
arbitration decision in favor of the employer. Justice Rehnquist urged
that Vaca v. Sipes allowed an employee to turn to the court only where
the union had prevented him from taking his grievance to arbitration.
According to the dissent, "the existence of a final arbitration decision
is the crucial difference between this case and Vaca."44 Where the em-
ployee had no access to the contractual grievance procedure, the
availability of a judicial remedy "bolstered the consistent policy of this
Court of encouraging the parties to settle their differences according
to the terms of their collective-bargaining agreement."'" Rehnquist
argued that where the grievance is presented to a fair and neutral ar-
bitrator, and the Court allows the decision to be vacated because the
employee did not receive fair representation from the union, it estab-
lishes a "new policy of encouraging challenges to arbitration decrees
by the losing party on the ground that he was not properly
represented." 4° In that the employee has an independent remedy
against the union for breach of its duty of fair representation, the dis-
sent felt that provision for a judicial remedy against the employer in
these circumstances was "anomalous and contrary to the longstanding
policy of this Court favoring the finality of arbitration awards."'"
It is submitted that the majority reached the correct result in ex-
tending a judicial remedy to employees who have been unfairly rep-
resented in the arbitration process. In Hines, The Court was faced
"See Id. at 569.
4 ' Id. at 570.
"Id.
45 1d. at 571.
41 Id. at 575 (Rehnquist, J.. dissenting).
45 1d. at 574. See text at notes 5-9 supra.
'" 424 U.S. at 574.
47 1d.
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with three distinct interests: the employees' interest in obtaining a fair
forum to present breach of contract claims against the employer; the
employer's interest in freedom from multiple exposure to litigation;
and the public interest in maintaining the legitimacy and usefulness of
the collective bargaining process. When all of these interests were ex-
amined in light of the policy encouraging final resolution of labor
disputes through contractual grievance procedures, the majority
properly found the interests of the employer to be the least compel-
ling.
As the majority was well aware, 48 federal labor policy demands
both initial recourse contractual grievance procedures" and limited
appeal from the decisions reached thereby." Yet the national labor
policy does not take this direction in order that employers may be
shielded from the inconvenience of relitigating issues which had al-
ready been raised and decided. Rather, the policy encouraging arbi-
tration has its roots in the notion that the process itself is a "stabilizing
influence" in labor relations." An agreement to submit grievances to
arbitration has been viewed as the quid pro quo for inclusion of a no-
strike clause in the collective bargaining contract." As such, the re-
quirement that employers and employees attempt to resolve labor dis-
putes through contractual grievance procedures is not motivated by
the desire to provide the employer a forum in which claims against
him can be finally resolved, but rather, is set forth as a key to indus-
trial peace and uninterrupted productivity."
The policy mandating judicial deference to arbitration decisions
is equally informed by considerations more compelling than the
employer's exposure to relitigation: Where the grievance machinery
under a collective bargaining agreement is seen to be "at the very
heart of the system of industrial self-government,"" the arbitration
process is viewed as essential to the day-to-day workings of that sys-
tem. It serves both to fill in gaps which may be left by the collective
bargaining agreement and to "make the agreement serve the
specialized needs" of each industry." Courts have realized that "the
ablest judge cannot be expected to bring the same experience and
"See at 562-63.
49 Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-53 (1965).
5° United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co„ 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960).
5i United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960).
32 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 & n.4 (1960); Textile
Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957).
53 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581
(1960); See also Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105 (1962).
54 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581
(1960).
"Id. at 580.81. See also United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960).
1048
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
competence to bear upon the determination of a grievance, because
he cannot be similarly informed."" Thus, appeal from an arbitration
decision is limited—not because the employer would be inconven-
ienced otherwise, but because deference is warranted by the nature of
the process itself.
On the other hand, cases which have considered the issue of
judicial review where the union has perfunctorily or in bad faith pro-
cessed an individual grievances' reveal that an underlying premise of
the collective bargaining system is that employees be afforded a fair
opportunity to settle grievances which arise under the contract. 55
Thus, in light of the purposes underlying the, national policy en-
couraging resolution of labor disputes through final arbitration, it
must be concluded that the employer's interest in freedom from litiga-
tion should not outweigh the employee's interest in an opportunity to
be represented fairly in a claim against the employer, especially where
the claim involves loss of livelihood.
It is only with the confidence that grievances have been fairly
presented and considered that courts have been willing to defer to ar-
bitration awards." Thus, where a final arbitration decision is binding
even though the process was tainted by unfairness, both the decision
and the process lose legitimacy. On the other hand, maintaining a
collective-bargaining system that is conditioned on the fairness of pro-
cess serves to strengthen that system, by promoting confidence in the
decisions it produces.
B. Union Liability for Compensatory Damages under the Railway Labor Act:
Harrison
In the Survey year case of Harrison v. United Transportation
Union,' the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit .
3° Id. at 582. See also United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593, 596 (1950).
57 See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 185-86; Steinman v. Spector Freight System,
441 F.2d 599, 602-03 (2d Cir., 1971); Bieski v, Eastern Auto. Forwarding Co., 396 F.2d
32, 37 (3d Cir., 1968); Rothlein Armour Co., 391 F.2d 574, 578-79 (3d Cir., 1968).
as Steinman v. Spector Freight System, 441 F.2d 599, 603 (2d Cir., 1971); Eiieski
v. Eastern Auto. Forwarding Co., 396 F.2d 32, 37-38 (3d Cir., 1968); Cf. Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. at 185. Cases which deny judicial review do not hold otherwise. For example,
in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965), the Supreme Court reversed
an award of reverence pay granted to an employee who had made no attempt to utilize
the grievance machinery to enforce his aim, but who instead had sued his employer in
state court. The court held that "federal labor policy requires that individual employees
wishing to assert contractual grievances must attempt to use the contract grievance pro-
cedure ...." The Court recognized however, that a different result could obtain where
"the union refuses to press or only perfunctorily presses the individual's claim ... ."
379 U.S. at 652. (emphasis added). Set also, Andrus v. Convoy Co., 480 F.2d 604, 606
(9th Cir., 1973).
" See cases cited in note 58 supra.
1 530 F.2d 558, 90 L.R.R.M. 3265 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), cert. denied, 96 S.
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held that a union which breaches its duty of fair representation2
under the Railway Labor Act3 (RLA) may be held liable for the loss of
an employee's earnings during a suspension. 4 The Fourth Circuit
further - held that such liability would result where the wronged em-
ployee could demonstrate that the loss of his contractual claims against
his employer arising from the employee's failure to exhaust the ad-
ministrative remedies available under the collective bargaining agree-
ment and the RLA° was due to the union's breach of its duty of fair
representation (DFR) and not to the employee's own negligence. 8 In
so doing, the Fourth Circuit sharply increased the consequences of a
union's failure to provide at least a "minimum" fair representation
under the Railway Labor Act.'
Harrison, a railway conductor, was suspended for sixty days
without pay by his employer, the Norfolk and Portsmouth Belt Line
Railway (Belt Line). The reason given for Harrison's discharge was
"insubordination." The United Transportation Union (UTU) rep-
resented Harrison both at the hearing on the charge and at successive
appeals to the Belt Line management.° Thereafter, a meeting oc-
curred where a UTU representative and the Belt Line president a-
Ct. 1739 (1976). Chief Judge Haynsworth and Judge Field formed the majority; Judge
Winter concurred in part and dissented in part.
See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 176-77 (1967); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville
Railroad Co., 323 U.S. 192, 202-03 (1944). See notes 2-3 at p. —.
45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970). The railway union's duty of fair representation
is implied from the sections of the RLA. See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad
Co., 323 U.S. 192, 199-203 (1944).
530 F.2d at 562, 90 L.R.R.M. at 3268.
5 As a general rule of federal labor policy, the federal courts will not hear actions
by an employee against the employer where the employee has failed to exhaust the ad-
ministrative remedies provided in the collective bargaining agreement and the RLA. See
Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co„ 406 U.S. 320, 325-26 (1972). The RLA
procedure is set forth infra at note 11.
° 530 F.2d at 562-63, 90 L.R.R.M. at 3268-69. Specifically, the court stated that if
the union failed to process Harrison's appeals through the appropriate levels such that
his claim against his employer lapsed, then the union "should be responsible to Harri-
son for the value of the right he lost as a direct result of the union's deliberate miscon-
duct." Id. at 562, 90 L.R.R.M. at 3268. The circuit justices all agreed that Harrison
could also recover punitive damages if the fact-finder determined that UTU acted
"wantonly or maliciously or that it acted recklessly or in callous disregard of Harrison's
rights ... ." Id. at 563, 90 L.R.R.M. at 3270. They also held that Harrison could recover
reasonable attorney's fees since his suit against the union served a "common benefit" to
all employees: to insure the right to receive fair representation of individual claims
against the employer. See id. at 564 & n.2, 90 L.R.R.M. at 3270 & n.2, citing Hall v.
Cole, 412 U.S. I, 8-9 (1973). The issues of punitive damages and attorney's fees will not
be discussed herein.
' Traditionally a union which breaches its duty of fair representation is held only
for damages which "flowed" from its own misconduct. See Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S.
25, 29 (1969). In Czaseh the Supreme Court indicated that this liability would include
expenses incurred by the employee in collecting his claim from the union, but not the
employee's actual lost wages. Id. See notes 33-36 and accompanying text infra.
° 530 F.2d at 559-60, 90 L.R.R.M. at 3266-67.
a Id. at 560, 90 L.R.R.M. at 3267.
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greed that the union would halt "progress" on Harrison's claim in re-
turn for the reinstatement of another employee." In accordance with
this agreement, UTU did not follow the statutory appeals procedure
under the RLA" of filing Harrison's claim with the local National
Railroad-Adjustment Board (NRAB)." Further, in violation of its con-
stitution and by-laws, UTU did not inform Harrison of its agreement
with Belt Line or of its failure to file a claim with the NRAB." Subse-
quently, the mandatory period provided in the collective bargaining
agreement for 'bringing grievances before the NRAB passed and
Harrison's right to pursue the claim individually or through the UTU
Thereafter, Harrison commenced an action in federal district
court against UTU and Belt Line alleging that in handling his griev-
ance, they had illegally conspired to deprive him of his right to pur-
sue that grievance." The district court directed a verdict for Belt Line
"Id. The Belt Line president wrote of the meeting: "Conductor Howard J. Cray,
Jr., will be reinstated ... provided the UTU does not further [any] progress ... [on] the
claim in favor of S.D, Harrison. It was agreed by those in attendance that they [the
claims] would not be progressed until too late to do so account time limit." Id.
(Emphasis added by Court). There is no indication in the opinion as to what is meant
by "time limit." The collective bargaining agreement between Harrison and UTU may
have provided a mandatory period for bringing grievances before the NRAB,
" The RLA requires that employer-employee disputes which are not settled
through the grievance mechanisms provided in the collective bargaining agreement he
submitted to a division of the National Railroad Adjustment Board for settlement. See
3, First (i), 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i) (1970) which states:
The disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or
carriers growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or applica-
tion of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions,
including cases pending and unadjusted on [the date of approval of this
Act] shall be handled in the usual manner up to and including the chief
operating officer of the carrier designated to handle such disputes; but,
failing to reach an adjustment in this manner, the disputes may he re-
ferred by petition of the parties or by either party to the appropriate divi-
sion of the Adjustment Board with a full statement of the facts and all
supporting data bearing upon the disputes.
An important feature of the RLA is that employees have the right to petition the
NRAB themselves, even where their union refuses to process their grievance. See § 3,
First (j), 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (j) (1970). The NLRA contains no similar provision
guaranteeing to employees the right to process grievances without the support of their
union. Under the NLRA, the right of the indivdual to involve the higher stages of the
grievance processes may be eliminated by the collective bargaining agreement between
the union and the employer. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185 (1967).
" 530 F.2d at 560, 90 L.R.R.M. at 3267.
is
' 4 Id. Apparently, the collective bargaining agreement between Belt Line and
UTU provided a mandatory period for bringing grievances before the NRAB. See note
10 supra. The RLA does not specify a time limit for filing grievances with the NRAB.
See note 11 supra.
15 The jurisdictional bases of' Harrison's claim are unclear. Harrison did not sue
Belt Line for wrongful discharge. See 530 F.2d at 565, 90 L.R.R.M. at 3271 (judge
Winter dissenting in part). Such a claim, absent alleged violation of the RLA, would be
a state daim, and would be brought in state court or, if there is diversity and the requi-
site amount in controversy, in federal court.
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because of the legal insufficiency of the evidence of conspiracy but
submitted the case against UTU to the jury, apparently on the theory
that UTU may have breached its duty of fair representation.' 6 The
jury found against UTU and awarded Harrison back pay and punitive
damages.' 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
unanimously affirmed the district court's directed verdict for Belt
Line on Harrison's conspiracy claim, largely because it agreed that
Belt Line had no knowledge of UTU's duty to inform Harrison of its
decision not to "progress" his rights.' 6 In a split decision,' 9 the Fourth
Circuit also upheld the jury finding that UTU breached its duty of
fair representation either by "arbitrarily" giving up Harrison's griev-
ance to further the grievance of another employee, or by intention-
ally failing to inform Harrison that it would not "progress" his claim
to the NRAB.2 ° More importantly, the circuit court held that Harri•
son could recover from UTU the value of his contractual rights
against Belt Line 2 ' where he could demonstrate that the loss of such
See Cunningham v. Erie Railroad Co., 266 F.2d 411, 414-15 (2d Cir. 1959). Harrison
also did not allege that Belt Line "acted in concert with UTU with the joint motive to
discriminate" against him. 530 F.2d at 531, 90 L.R.R.M. at 3267. Such a claim would
involve federal law under the RLA, see Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co.,
393 U.S. 324, 328-29 (1969), and would properly be brought in federal court with
jurisdiction existing under 28 U.S.C. H 1331, 1337 (1970). See Cunningham, 266 F.2d at
414. However, whether Harrison's claim against his employer arose under federal or
state law, he would still have to exhaust the administrative remedies provided in the col-
lective bargaining agreement and the relevant statutes or else demonstrate why such
exhaustion was not necessary. Id. at 414-15.
Harrison seems simply to have based his action on a straight civil conspiracy
claim with federal jurisdiction existing either under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970), assuming
diversity and the requisite $10,000 minimum claim, or 28 U.S.C. § 1331, assuming the
presence of a federal question and a $10,000 minimum claim. This strategy may have
been utilized as an attempt to provide Harrison with his monetary relief without having
to confront directly the mandatory features of Belt Line's grievance machinery with
UTU, see text at note 14 supra, or the basic merits of his wrongful discharge claim.
1 ° Although the circuit court's opinion is ambiguous here, Harrison does not
seem to have claimed specifically that UTU breached its duty of fair representation. See
530 F.2d at 559, 90 L.R.R.M. at 3266. However, the court clearly treated Harrison's
complaint as such. See id. at 561, 90 L.R.R.M. at 3268. DFR claims are implied under
the RLA, see Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 323 U.S. 192, 199-203 (1944),
and federal jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337 (1970). See Cunningham
v. Erie Railroad Co., 266 F.2d 411, 414-15 (2d Cir. 1959).
" 530 F.2d at 559, 90 L.R.R.M. at 3266.
" Id. at 560-61, 90 L.R.R.M. at 3267-68. The court stated that without proof that
the railroad knew of the union's duty to notify Harrison of its decision not to "prog-
ress" his rights, it could not conclude "that Belt Line conspired to accomplish the lawful
objective of sustaining discipline against Harrison by the unlawful means of denying
him fair representation of his grievance claims." Id. at 561, 90 L.R.R.M. at 3268.
'° See note I supra.
'° 530 F.2d at 561-62, 90 L.R.R.M. at 3268. On either theory, the circuit court
clearly contemplated some intentional conduct by UTU. See id. at 562, 90 L.R.R.M. at
3268 where the court refers to UTU's "deliberate misconduct."
" The circuit court also awarded Harrison punitive damages and attorney's fees.
Id. at 563-64, 90 L.R.R.M. at 3269-70. See note 6 supra.
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rights was not the result of his own failure to pursue an appeal to the
NRAB, but rather resulted from the deliberately misleading conduct
of the union in failing to inform him of its decision not to appeal to
the NRAB. 22 In so holding, the circuit court sustained the jury's find-
ing that the value of Harrison's lost rights against Belt Line was the
"economic loss suffered by Harrison as a result of the suspension." 23
The majority's decision turned on a strict reading of the Su-
preme Court's decision in Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad
Co." In Andrews, a railroad employee sued his employer in state court
for wrongful discharge without pursuing the RLA appeals procedure
through the NRAB. 25 Analogizing to cases arising under the National
Labor Relations Act," the Supreme Court found a strong federal
labor policy favoring the settlement of disputes through the statutory
arbitration process." As a result, the Court held that an aggrieved
employee must exhaust the NRAB grievance and arbitration proce-
dures provided in the Railway Labor Act before seeking a judicial de-
termination of his claims." In Harrison, the majority interpreted
Andrews to mean that the NRAB procedures constituted an employee's
"exclusive remedy" against his employer. 25 The court reasoned that
"Id. at 562-63, 90 L.R.R.M. at 3268-69. The Court found that UTU's failure to
notify Harrison of its agreement with Belt Line denied Harrison the "fair opportunity"
to process the grievance himself or to obtain counsel to represent him. Id. at 562, 90
L.R.RM. at 3269. In a sense, the court's reasoning may be understood to rest on a no-
tion of detrimental reliance: it found that Harrison had reasonably relied to his detri-
ment upon UTU to process his claim to the NRAB, and that as a result, he lost his
right to appeal because of the lapse of time. In this manner, the court distinguished
F1arrison's situation from cases where the aggrieved employees knew of their union's
refusal to process their claims and could thus appeal to the NRAB individually. See
Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25 (1970). In these cases, employees in successful DFR ac-
tions against their unions could recover only their costs, such as attorney's lees, in
bringing their claims to the NRAB. Id. at 29. See notes 33.36 and accompanying text
infra.
as 530 F.2d at 561, 90 L.R.R.M. at 3269. The jury had awarded Harrison $1,570
for lost wages, though there is no indication in the opinion whether this amount was
the exact income which Harrison would have earned had he not been suspended. Id. at
559, 561, 90 L.R.R.M. at 3266, 3269. See note 32 infra.
24 406 U.S. 320 (1972). Andrews was a 7-1 decision, Justice Douglas dissenting.
25 /d, at 320-21. The employer removed the case to federal court and then
moved to dismiss the complaint for failing to pursue the remedies provided by § 3 First
(i) of the RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i) (1970).
26 29 U.S.C. ** 151 et. seq. (1970). The Court in Andrews relied heavily on its deci-
sion in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965), where it held that "federal
labor policy requires" that aggrieved employees must First "aitempi use of the contract
grievance procedure agreed upon by employer and union as the mode of redress" be-
fore they can maintain an action for breach of that contract. Id. at 652 (emphasis added
by Court).
" 406 U.S. at 322-23.
" Id. at 326.
"530 F.2d at 562, 90 L.R.R.M. at 3268. A similar interpretation of Andrews was
reached by the Fourth Circuit several years earlier in Dorsey v. Chesapeake and Ohio
Railway Company, 476 F.2d 243, 83 L.R.R.M. 2038 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam). In
Dorsey, the Fourth Circuit held that a railroad employee who was dismissed for violating
a company rule prohibiting the use of intoxicants while on company property was re-
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since Harrison could no longer personally file a claim with the NRAB
within the allowable time limits, and since UTU had failed to progress
the claim, Harrison was precluded from pursuing his "exclusive
remedy."" However, the majority did not believe that Harrison
should lose his right of action where the loss was not the result of his
own negligence or misconduct. Instead, insofar as it was the union's
own deliberate misconduct which caused Harrison to lose this right,
the court held that the union should respond "to the extent of the
value" of the right lost." In order to so respond, the court concluded,
a union must be responsible for the value of what an employee would
have recovered had he not been foreclosed from pursuing his con-
tractual claim. 32
In reaching this conclusion, the court greatly expanded the po-
tential liability of a union that breaches its duty of fair representation.
Previously, the Supreme Court in Czosek v. O'Mara, 33
 had stated that a
union which 'lad discriminatorily refused to process employee griev-
ances based on wrongful discharge could not be held responsible for
lost wages unless it was somehow implicated in instigating the wrong-
ful discharge." Instead, the Czosek Court asserted that a union's liabil-
ity would be limited to those damages which "flowed" from its own
conduct and would not include damages resulting solely from the
employer's misconduct. 35
 In this context, the Court indicated that a
union could be held liable only for wronged employees' difficulty and
expense of recovering from their employer. 3 °
The Harrison majority distinguished Czosek on the facts: The
Czosek employees knew of the union's refusal to process their claims
and could therefore appeal to the NRAB themselves or through in-
dependent counsel. Under these circumstances, the Fourth Circuit
stated it would indeed be unfair to "visit" the total economic loss upon
quired to exhaust his remedies with the NRAB before bringing his suit in federal court.
Id, at 244-45, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2038-39. The court reached this conclusion notwithstand-
ing the employee's contention that Andrews did not require exhaustion where his
wrongful discharge complaint alleged constitutional violations of his due process rights.
Id. at 245, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2038-39.
3° 530 F.2d at 562, 90 I..R.R.M. at 3268.
3 ' Id. at 563, 90 L,R.R.M. at 3269.
" The court indicated that it would be for the fact-finder to determine the
"value" of the right lost. Id. Thus, the Fourth Circuit opinion seems to contemplate that
the jury determine the merits of both a DFR claim against his union and his contractual
claim against his employer, since in order for a jury to determine the value of an
employee's lost "right" of action, it would have to come to some conclusion regarding
the merits of the employee's contractual claim against his employer. See note 23 supra.
33 397 U.S. 25 (1970).
31 1d. at 28-29. See note 7 supra. Where the employer is implicated in the wrong-
ful conduct, such as where it acts jointly with the union to discriminate against em-
lop yees, see ,  e.g., Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co., 393 U.S. 324, 325
(1969), both the union and employer may be held jointly and severally liable for back
pay. Sec Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 197 n.18 (1967) (dictum).
35
 397 U.S. at 29.
" Id.
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the union, insofar as "the loss of the right to enforce the contract
claim was as much the fault of the individuals as the union's." 37 Harri-
son on the other hand, was denied the opportunity to process his
claim individually by the union's own misconduct in not informing
him of its inaction. These circumstances, the Fourth Circuit believed,
justified extending Grosek to include union liability for compensatory
damages since "the union's conduct ha[d] not simply put Harrison to
additional trouble and expense; it ha[d] extinguished his right of
en forceme nt."38
An important aspect of the Fourth Circuit's opinion was its con-
clusion that Harrison's right of action was "extinguished" by his fail-
ure to pursue the administration procedures of the NRAB. In so con-
cluding, the Fourth Circuit expressly rejected a holding by the Second
Circuit in Schum v. South. Buffalo Railway Co. 3 " that "extinguishment"
did not occur in such circumstances. 4 ° In Schum, the employee, like
Harrison, had been denied his right to appeal his discharge to the
NRAB because of his union's failure to file a timely appeal."
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit found that the aggrieved employee
could still sue his employer for wrongful discharge in the same fed-
eral district court action as that of his DFR suit against his union. 42
Unlike the Harrison court, the Schum court did not believe an
employee's failure to exhaust the NRAB procedures always "extin-
guished" his claim against his employer. Instead the Second Circuit,
relying on cases which held that "exhaustion" is not always required, 43
37
 530 F.2d at 562, 90 L.R.R.M. at 3269.
33 Id. at 563, 90 L.R.R.M. at 3269. Under Harrison, plaintiff recovers back pay to
the extent of his "right" lost. See id. at 562, 90 L.R.R.M. at 3269. This allows the fact-
finder a certain discretion in valuing that right. See note 32 and accompanying text
supra.
496 F.2d 328, 331-32, 86 L.R.R.M. 2459, 2461-62 (2d Cir. 1974).
"The Harrison court stated that: "Schum, however, appears to us to be inconsis-
tent with the whole theory and purpose of the [Railway Labor] Act as construed in
Andrews." 530 F.2d at 563, 90 L.R.R.M. at 3269.
" 496 F.2d at 329-30, 86 L.R.R.M. at 2459-60. However, Schum's union was
merely negligent while Harrison's union intentionally relinquished his claim. Compare
Schum, 496 F.2d at 331-32, 86 L.R.R.M. at 2461, with Harrison, 530 F.2d at 560, 562, 90
L.R.R.M. at 3267-68.
47
 496 F.2d at 331-32, 86 L.R,R.M. at 2461. The Court did not specifically state
that Schum could maintain actions against both his employer and his union in the same
suit. However, this result can be implied from the Second Circuit's removal to the dis-
trict court whereby the employee's wrongful discharge action against his employer
would stand along with the DFR claim against his union. Id. As noted in Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 171, 197 (1967), the employee may sue the employer and the union in sepa-
rate actions or join both parties as defendants in the same lawsuit.
'' The Schum court relied mainly on Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185.86 (1967),
where the Court stated with regard to the exhaustion requirement:
It is true that the employer in such a situation may have done nothing to
prevent exhaustion of the exclusive contractual remedies to which he
agreed in the collective bargaining agreement. But the employer has
committed a wrongful discharge in breach of that agreement, a breach
which could be remedied through the grievance process to the
employee-plaintiff's benefit were it not for the union's breach of its statu-
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concluded that the aggrieved employee must merely make a good-
faith "attempt" to exhaust the administrative procedures provided in
the RLA or the collective bargaining agreement before seeking a judi-
cial resolution of his grievances. 44
 Such an "attempt," the court stated,
could be demonstrated by Schum's reasonable reliance on his union to
prosecute his grievances. 45
 Thus, in effect, the Schum court found that
an employee could be excused from the exhaustion requirements of
the RLA when the employee's failure to exhaust was the result of his
reasonable reliance on his union to prosecute his claim. The Second
Circuit, therefore, would not have viewed Harrison's claim against
Belt Line as "extinguished" and consequently, would not have held
Harrison's union liable for compensatory damages. Instead, it would
have allowed Harrison to attempt to recover his lost wages in the
same or in a separate action against Belt Line; as a result, Harrison's
federal DFR action against his union would be limited to recovering
his "costs of suit." 46
That the Second and Fourth Circuits reached different results in
Schum and Harrison rests on the two circuits' differing interpretations
of the requirements of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine enun-
ciated in Andrews. The Second Circuit relied on cases under the RLA
and the NLRA which held that exhaustion of remedies was not re-
quired when either the employer repudiates the private grievance
machinery; the union breaches its duty of fair representation; or the
tory duty of fair representation to the employee. To leave the employee
remediless in such circumstances would, in our opinion, be a great injus-
tice. We cannot believe that Congress, in conferring upon employers and
unions the power to establish exclusive grievance procedures intended to
confer upon unions such unlimited discretion to deprive injured em-
ployees of all remedies for breach of contract. Nor do we think that Con-
gress intended to shield employers from the natural consequences of their
breaches of bargaining agreements by wrongful union conduct in the en-
forcement of such agreements.
Id. Vaca v. Sipes was an action arising under the NLRA. Nevertheless, the Schum court
found it appropriate to apply the rationale of Vara and related NLRA cases to actions
commenced by railroad employeei pursuant to the provisions of the RLA, reasoning
that the principles enunciated in this line of cases had been applied to RLA actions in
similar contexts. 496 F.2d at 330, 86 L.R.R.M. at 2460. The Second Circuit also relied
greatly on Clover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co., 393 U.S. 324, 329-31 (1969),
wherein it was recognized that a railroad employee would be excused from the exhaus-
tion requirements in certain circumstances. See text at note 47 infra.
" 496 F.2d at 332, 86 L.R.R.M. at 2461-62. The Second Circuit's reference to an
"attempt" should be read in light of Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652
(1965). See note 26 supra.
"496 F.2d at 332, 86 L.R.R.M. at 2462.
" See notes 33-36 and accompanying text supra. Harrison could aim.) recover
punitive damages from his union if he proved it acted with "malice." See note 6 supra.
The Schum court did not clearly indicate whether it would allow the employee to con-
solidate his claims against his employer and union into one action, though this seems to
be the case. See note 42 supra. Judge Winter, dissenting in Harrison, would allow the
employee's claim against. his employer to be treated as "pendent" to his DFR claim
against his union. See note 61 infra. The jurisdictional bases of Harrison's claims are set
out at note 15 supra.
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employee's pursuit of the administrative remedies would be futile." It
should be noted, however, that under the NLRA, the union can retain
the sole power to pursue the various steps in the grievance procedure,
while the RLA allows the employee to appeal to the NRAB as an
individual." Because of this distinction, the railroad in Schum argued
that the exception to the exhaustion requirement that generally ap-
plies when a union breaches its duty of fair representation" should
not apply in RLA actions. The railroad argued that even if the union
did wrongfully fail to process a claim, the employee could still techni-
cally process his own claim through the grievance mechanisms pro-
vided in the collective bargaining agreement and the statute." How-
ever, the Schum court found that this difference in the two statutory
schemes was insignificant, because it did not believe that an employee
acting without the support of his union would have the knowledge,
experience, or political clout to process his claim successfully before
the NRAB. 51 In effect, the Schum court found that the employee's
right under the RLA to petition the NRAB individually was meaning-
less because it seldom could be exercised in a fruitful manner. It
therefore rejected the railroad's argument that this right of individual
appeal eliminated the DFR exception to the exhaustion requirements
in the RLA area. In so doing, it allowed the aggrieved employee to
maintain his action for wrongful discharge against his employer and
thus prevented the union from being held for compensatory
damages. 52
The Harrison court, on the other hand, interpreted the exhaus-
tion requirements of Andrews strictly. In so doing, it rejected the no-
tion that in RLA cases, there is an exception to the exhaustion re-
quirements when an employee proves that his union breached its duty
of fair representation towards him in handling his claim. The Harrison
majority attributed controlling significance to the fact that there was
an RLA provision allowing employees to file their own claims indi-
vidually with the NRAB regardless of union conduct. Unlike the
" See Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co., 393 U.S. 324, 329-31 (1969);
notes 43-44 and accompanying text supra. See also Nemitz v. Norfolk & Western Railway
Co., 436 F.2d 841, 849-50, 76 L.R.R.M. 2340, 2347 (6th Cir. 1971).
4 ' See note 11 supra.
'w See text at notes 43-44, 47 supra.
" 496 F.2d at 331, 86 L.R.R.M. at 2461.
"/d. The court stated:
As a general rule, grievances do not succeed without the full support of
the union. Normally, employees do not have the expertise, knowledge or
experience to interpret the complicated substantive and procedural provi-
sions of a collective bargaining agreement. In addition, specialized skill
and insight are required at the higher levels of the grievance procedures
to investigate and marshal] the relevant facts and law, to prepare adequate
petitions and brief's, to comply with the intricate limitations.periods com-
mon to all labor contracts, and to present persuasive arguments to the
board of arbitration.
Id.
52 Id. at 331-32, 86 L.R.R.M. at 2461-62.
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Schum court, the Harrison court believed that the existence of this pro-
vision was not insignificant: it was seen to give employees under the
RLA a remedy against their employers without the necessary partici-
pation of a union. As such, the Harrison court found justification for
the elimination of the exhaustion of remedies exception that exists
when an employee shows a DFR breach by his union. 53
Judge Winter, in a persuasive dissent, 54 asserted that a union
could not be held responsible for the lost wages of its members unless
it was somehow implicated in the employer's wrongful conduct. 55 He
believed that the majority erred when it construed the exhaustion re-
quirements in Andrews" as essentially overruling the Czosek finding
that a union can be held only for damages which "flowed" from its
own misconduct." First, Judge Winter found no mention in Andrews
of an intent to limit or overrule Czosek." Second, he believed that it
was the employer's own breach of the contract of employment and
not the union's failure to process the claim properly which gave rise
to the employee's lost earnings." Essentially, Judge Winter did not
find that Harrison's lost earnings "flowed" from UTU's failure to
represent him fairly. Therefore, Judge Winter, following Schum,
found that Harrison would not be prevented from suing Belt Line for
wrongful discharge" and UTU for breach bf its duty of fair rep-
resentation, where Harrison's failure to pursue the NRAB procedure
was due to the union's breach of its duty of fair representation. 6 '
Judge Winter therefore found that UTU should not be held for dam-
" The Harrison court also rejected the Schum approach for policy reasons. The
Harrison court emphasized that the "theory and purpose" of the RLA required submit-
ting grievances founded upon contract claims to the NRAB. The court found that the
employee should not in fairness suffer the loss of his right of action if the loss was not
the result of his own conduct. The court believed it more appropriate to hold the union
for the consequences of a loss resulting from its own misconduct, than to "stretch the
statute" by allowing the employee to maintain his original cause of action against the
railroad. 530 F.2d at 563, 90 L.R.R.M. at 3269.
J udge Winter dissented only on the issue of compensatory damages but con-
curred in all other respects. See 530 F.2d at 564, 90 L.R.R.M. at 3270 (Winter, J. con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
"Id. at 565-66, 90 L.R.R.M. at 3271-72 (Winter, J. dissenting in part).
" See text at notes 24-29 supra.
" See text at notes 33-36 supra.
38
 530 F.2d at 565, 90 L.R.R.M. at 3271 (Winter, J. dissenting in part).
" Id. at 564-65. 90 L.R.R.M. at 3271 (Winter, J. dissenting in part), citing Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 197 (1967).
°° Harrison would be able to sue his employer in state court if his cause of action
was based on state law. See note 15 supra. However, federal court would be the proper
forum for grievances arising under the RLA. See Cunningham v. Erie Railroad Co., 266
F.2d 411, 414-15 (2d Cir. 1959). Note that in Andrews, the employer successfully re-
moved the employee's action for wrongful discharge under the RLA from state court to
federal court. 420 U.S. at 320-21. See note 25 supra.
" 530 F.2d at 565, 90 L.R.R.M. at 3271 (Winter, J. dissenting in part). Judge
Winter would allow a wronged employee to bring all his claims in one federal court ac-
tion, treating the employee's action against his employer as "pendent" to his federal
DFR action against his union. Id. at 566, 90 L.R.R.M. at 3272. The jurisdictional bases
of such claims are set out at note 15 supra.
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ages for wrongful discharge. 62
It is submitted that the analysis of both the dissent in Harrison
and the Second Circuit in Schum is the correct resolution of the inter-
play between the exhaustion requirements of Andrews and the liability
language of Czosek." The Harrison majority read Andrews as eliminat-
ing, at least in the RLA area, the well-established exception to the ex-
haustion requirement that exists when the employee can demonstrate
that his union breached its duty of fair representation." However, the
facts of Andrews are significantly different from the facts of Harrison
and Schum in terms of the employee's responsiblity for failing to
satisfy the exhaustion requirements. In Andrews, the employee went
directly to the courts in his action against his employer for wrongful
discharge. 65 There was neither an attempt to utilize the NRAB proce-
dures nor a concurrent OFR claim against the union." Thus, there
was reason to require the employee to exhaust his remedies before the
NRAB, since there was no possibility that his claims had been prej-
udiced by union misconduct. In contrast, the employees in both
Harrison and Schum actively attempted to utilize the grievance machin-
ery provided in the collective bargaining agreement. In both in-
stances, the employees' failure to exhaust the administrative remedies
of the NRAB was due solely to their union's misconduct in failing to
notify them within the time limit provided in their collective bargain-
ing agreement of the decision not to prosecute their claims. In short,
as the Schum court seems to recognize, Andrews is simply not control-
ling authority in situations where the employee can demonstrate that
he attempted to follow the statutory procedures but was prejudiced by
his union's misconduct.° 7
Further, the Harrison majority flatly ignores the language in
Czosek that a union will not be held for compensatory damages." The
result is that the union is held liable for damages arising from a dis-
charge for which it was not initially responsible, while the employer,
the actual wrongdoer, escapes liability merely because of the union's
subsequent misconduct. It is submitted that Congress could not have
intended that an employer evade the natural consequences of his
67 530 F.2d at 566, 90 L.R.R.M. at 3272 (Winter, J., dissenting in part).
" The Czosek court indicated that a union can be held only for "damages that
flowed from tits) own conduct." 397 U.S. at 29.
"See notes 43-44, 47 and accompanying text supra.
66 406 U.S. at 320-21.
66 Id. at 321. It may have been that the plaintiff in Andrews was not a union
member.
67 The Schum court cites Andrews merely for the general proposition that a rail-
road employee must exhaust the administrative remedies of the RLA, noting that there
are exceptions. 496 F.2d at 330, 86 L.R.R.M. at 2460. The exceptions are set Forth in
the text at note 47 supra.
The Schum position is fortified by the post-Harrison Supreme Court . decision of
Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976). In Hines the Court reaf-
firmed the exception to the exhaustion requirement that exists under the NLRA when
the employee's"union breaches its duty of fair representation. Annual Survey of Labor
Law, see 17 B.C. END. & Cost. L. Rtiv. 1042 (1976).
es
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breach of contract by so fortuitous a circumstance." The better result
in these cases is to follow Schum and to eliminate the exhaustion re-
quirements when it is the union's misconduct or negligence which is
the reason for the employee's failure to exhaust the NRAB proce-
dures. The employee's claim against his employer, whether based on a
federal or state cause of action, could be treated as pendent to his
DFR claims against his union. 7° In this manner, all issues can be han-
dled conveniently in one trial, multiplicity of suits is avoided, and re-
sponsibility for damages is more easily apportioned."
The one welcome effect of Harrison may be to put strong pres-
sure on unions to exercise due diligence in informing their members
of decisions not to "progress" their grievances. In additon, "closed-
door" deals with employers will be more scarce. On the other hand,
Harrison will have one unwelcome effect: once each union has
recognized and accepted its responsiblity to notify each member
of its refusal to prosecute claims, cases like Harrison will be rare. Then
the employee whose union refuses to process his claim will be forced
to go before the NRAB alone with all the attendant difficulties to
which the Schum court rightly pointed. 72
 Further, the employee will
have the added burden of maintaining a second action in federal
court against his union to recover his legal costs and expenses. It is
probable that there will be few employees with the determination and
financial ability needed to pursue this multiple litigation, especially in
cases where the employee wishes to work for the same employer and
to remain a member of the same union.
Harrison also fortifies the exhaustion doctrine enunciated in
Andrews. After Harrison, an employee bringing suit against his em-
ployer cannot avoid the exhaustion requirements merely by suing his
union in federal court for breach of its duty of fair representation."
"See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171. 195-98 (1967). In Vaca, an employee sued his
union for breach of its duty of fair representation. The employee sought back pay as
damages. Id. at 195. Although the Court dismissed the DFR claim on the merits, id. at
193-95, with regard to the damages issue it stated in dictum that it did not think "an
award against a union [should] include ... damages attributable solely to the employer's
breach of contract." Id. at 197. The Court also stated that although the "union has vio-
lated a statutory duty in failing to press the grievance, it is the employer's unrelated
breach of contract which caused this portion [lost wages] of the employee's damages."
Id.
"This is the view of Judge Winter, dissenting in part in Harrison. See note 61
supra.
" If the employee's state cläims against his employer are not treated as pendent
to his federal DFR claims against his union, then the employee would have to sue his
employer in state court unless he could show some independent basis for federal juris-
diction such as diversity with $10,000 in controversy under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
See note 15 supra.
72 See note 51 supra.
" In fact, if the Schum view were followed, the employee, to survive an
employer's motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, would
merely have to make sufficient allegations of a breach by the union of its duty of fair
representation. See Czosek, 397 U.S. at 27. In Cwsek, the Court also stated that com-
plaints against a union for breach of the duty of fair representation should be con-
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Instead, he must proceed against his employer before the NRAB;
otherwise his sole remedy for lost wages is against his union.
Harrison should please RLA employers who, under Schum, would
lose their right to the arbitration procedures of the NRAB 14 even
though they were in no way implicated in the union's breach of its
duty of fair representation. Nevertheless, Harrison's shift of liability to
the union works a windfall for the employer who can now escape the
legal consequences of his wrongful acts merely because the union fails
to represent the wronged employee fairly.
There appears to be no way to reconcile the different analyses
and conclusions of the Second Circuit in Schum and the Fourth Circuit
in Harrison. However, both courts share the same concern in making
certain that aggrieved employees receive a minimum fair representa-
tion and a complete remedy for the wrongs they suffer.
II. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Sex-Segregated Locals: Glass Blowers
In NLRB v. Local No. 106, Glass Bottle Blowers Association,' the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed a Board
decision which found that a union breaches its duty of fair represen-
tation under section 8(b)(1)(A) 2 where it (1) maintains two locals which
strued liberally to avoid dismissals and that plaintiffs should be allowed to file supple-
mental pleadings unless it is clear that they cannot state a good cause of action. Id.
" Employers would seemingly prefer the arbitration procedures of the NRAB to
a direct action in federal court in that half of the NRAB arbitrators are selected by the
carriers, See §§ 3, First (a) and (b), 45 U.S.C. §.§ 153 First (a) and (h) (1970).
520 F.2d 693, 89 L.R.R.M. 3020 (6th Cir. 1975).
2 Section 8(b)(l)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act provides that it is an unfair
labor practice for a labor organization or its agents "to restrain or coerce . . . employees in the
exercise of rights guaranteed in section 7." 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(1)(A) (1970). Section 7 in turn
provides that:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the
right to refrain from any or all of such activities
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
Under section 8(b)(1)(A), the Board and the courts have imposed upon unions the
duty to represent fairly all employees both in negotiating and enforcing collective bargain-
ing agreements. See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 1048, 1056-57 (1976);
Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 51 L.R.R.M. 1584 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d
172 (2d Cir. 1963). This duty includes the obligation to represent the interests of all of its
employees "without hostility to any" and its powers are "subject always to complete good
faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion." Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,
345 U.S. 330, 337-38 (1953). In Miranda Fuel, supra, a split Board held for the first time that a
union's breach of its statutory duty of fair representation constitutes an unfair labor practice
under section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA. 140 N.L.R.B. at 185, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1587. The
Board's majority held that section 7 of the NLRA:
[Glives employees the right to be free from unfair or irrelevant or. invidious
1061
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
are segregated on the basis of sex; or (2) processes employee griev-
ances in a segregated manner. 3 'The :circuit ,court further found that
in ordering a merger of the two segregated locals, the Board had
acted within the scope of its discretion in formulating the appropriate
remedy.'
The facts in Glass Blowers are quite simple. In 1949, Glass Bottle
Blowers Association, AFL-CIO, was certified by the Board as the col-
lective bargaining representative of a unit consisting of the production
and maintenance employees of Owen-Illinois, Inc. 5 This "parent"
union maintained two different locals at Owen-Illinois which were
segregated on the basis of sex. 5 Representatives of both locals partici-
pated with the "parent" in negotiating the collective bargaining
agreement. However, in practice, the two locals administered the
agreement separately: the "male" local investigated and handled only
male grievances, while its "female" counterpart investigated and han-
dled only female grievances.' Additionally, the "male" local refused to
admit female employees who sought membership in that local.°
With respect to the employer, the male and female locals were
treated equally.° Seniority lists were merged. All jobs were open to
bidding by all employees without regard to sex. Further, neither the
collective bargaining agreement nor the union constitution discrimi-
nated on the basis of sex."'
Acting on an individual complaint," the NLRB Regional Direc-
tor filed unfair labor practice charges against the two locals, alleging
that by maintaining separate locals, by separating the processing of
grievances of male and female unit members, and by refusing to pro-
cess employee grievances on the basis of sex, both locals violated sec-
treatment by their exclusive bargaining agent in matters affecting their
employment .... and we conclude that section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act ac-
cordingly prohibits labor organizations, when acting in a statutory rep-
resentative capacity, from taking action against any employee upon consid-
erations or classifications which are irrelevant, invidious, or unfair.
Id. Although the Board'sMiranda Fuel decision was denied enforcement by a divided Second
Circuit, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963), the Supreme Court has approved the Board's holding.
See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182, 186 (1967). The Fifth Circuit has also followed the
Board's Miranda Fuel doctrine. Local 12, Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12, 19-20, 63
L.R.R.M. 2395, 2400 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
520 F.2d at 696, 89 L.R.R.M. at 3022.
id. at 697, 89 L.R.R.M. at 3022-23. In reaching its holding the court cited Fi-
breboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 307 U.S. 203, 216 (1964).
5 520 F.2d at 694, 89 L.R.R.M. at 3020.
"Id. The reason that the unions maintained segregated locals does not appear in the
opinions of the Board or the Court of Appeals. The population involved included approxi-
mately 800 male employees and approximately 370 female employees.
Id. at 695, 89 L.R.R.M. at 3021.
° id. at 696, 89 1...R.R.M. at 3022.
9 See id. at 695, 89 L.R.R.M. at 3021. The Administrative Law Judge found that the
male and female employees received equal, through separate treatment. Id.
Id. at 694-95, 89 L.R.R.M. at 3020-21.
" See the decision of the full Board, Local No. 106, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 210
N.L.R.B. 943, 86 I..R.R.M. 1257 (1974)
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don 8(b)(1)(A)." The Board, in a split decision, agreed with the Re-
gional Director on all three charges.' 3
All five members of the Board agreed that both the refusal to
process grievances due to the sex of the employee and the separate
processing of grievances violated the union's duty of fair representa-
tion under section 8(b)(I)(A) by interfering with the employees' sec-
tion 7 rights to have a voice in the settlement of grievances." They
reasoned that the employees whose local did not process the grievance
had been denied their section 7 right to participate in the resolution
of matters affecting the terms and conditions of their employment
since the settlement of a grievance can affect the working conditions
of both male and female employees, regardless of which local proces-
ses the grievance.
Four members of the Board also found that the maintenance of
separate locals on the basis of sex in itself constituted a violation of
section 8(b)(1)(A). 15 Chairman Miller viewed the violation as a breach
" Id., 86 L.R.R.M. at 1258. The complaint also alleged that the union violated §
8(b)(2) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(2) (1976), by attempting to cause the employer to
discriminate against its em ployces solely because of their sex. Id. at 943 & n.l, 86 L.R.R.M. at
1258 & n. 1. Four members of the Board dismissed this charge with little discussion stating
merely that the union's discrimination "did not cause or attempt to cause the employer to
engage in any activity, much less to discriminate against its employees." Id. at 944, 86
L.R.R.M. at 1269 (Chairman Miller and Member Fanning). See id. at 945, 86 L.R,R.M. at
1260 (Member Penello concurring and Member Kennedy concurring). Member Jenkins,
who dissented on this point alone, argued somewhat circuitously that the employer's role in
entering into a collective bargaining agreement with the separate locals was a form of
discrimination against the employees. Therefore, the locals violated § 8(b)(2)"by causing the
Employer to discriminate against its employees." Id. at 945, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1260 (Member
Jenkins dissenting). The section 8(b)(2) issue was not raised in the circuit court.
The Board considered an analogous issue in Bell & Howell Co., 213 N.L.R.B. 407, 87
L.R.R.M. 1172 (1974). In Bell & Howell, a split Board refused to entertain an employer's
precertification complaint of union sex discrimination. Id. at 408, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1174.
Member Kennedy, writing the pivotal opinion in Bell & Howell, did not believe that a
post-election precertification investigation of union sex discrimination was constitutionally
mandated. Id., 87 L.R.R.M. at 1174-75 (Member Kennedy concurring). He argued that
since the Supreme Court has not found sex to be a 'suspect' classification the Board should
"not view an allegation of unlawful sex discrimination in a precertification proceeding." Id.,
87 L.R.R.M. at 1174 (Member Kennedy concurring). Member Kennedy also refused to
sanction what he termed an attempt to "litigate the lawfulness of an alleged discriminatory
hiring hall in a representational proceeding." Id. at 409, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1174.
It would appear that since the employer is under a statutory duty to bargain with the
union under § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(5) (1970), and would not be able to refrain from
such bargaining merely because it believes the union engages in sex discrimination against
the unit employees, see Bell & Howell Co., 213 N.L.R.B. at 408, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1172-73, he
cannot be said to have participated in the unions' discriminatory practices. Bell& Howell is
surveyed in 1974-75 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 16 B.C. IND. & Com. L.
REv. 991-94 (1975).
13
 210 N.L.R.B. at 944, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1259.
	 •
"Id. at 944, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1259 (Chairman Miller and Member Fanning); id. at
945-46, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1259-60 (Members Penello, Jenkins, and Kennedy concurring
separately).
" See id at 944, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1259 (Chairman Miller and Member Fanning); id.
at 945, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1259-60 (Members Penello and Jenkins concurring separately)
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of the locals' duty of fair representation." He found that "separate
but allegedly equal representation" is not the fair representation estab-
lished by the Board in its Miranda Fuel Co." decision."
Members Fanning and Jenkins likewise found that the mainte-
nance of separate locals on the basis of sex is a per se violation of sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(A)." However, in finding that the locals breached their
duty of fair representation, they pointed to factors traditionally dis-
cussed in equal protection cases. Citing Brown v. Board of Education,"
Member Fanning stated that "separate but equal treatment on the
basis of sex is as self-contradictory as separate but equal on the basis
of race."21 He determined that this type of segregation necessarily
created feelings of inferiority among females as to their work status."
Chairman Miller and Member Fanning pointed to the existence of
separate grievance mechanisms to substantiate their claims that sepa-
rate locals are inherently unequal. 23
 However, it seems clear that they,
along with Member Jenkins, would find that segregated locals
inherently interfere with employees' section 7 rights, even where griev-
ances were not processed separately. 24
Member Penello, the fourth Board member to find a violation of
section 8(b)(I)(A), differed with the above reasoning and stated that
there must be an "actual nexus between the discriminatory conduct"
and the "interference with, and restraint of, employees in the exercise
of rights protected under the Act" before an 8(b)(1)(A) violation can
be found." Since Member Penello found such a nexus between the
separate grievance mechanisms and an interference with employees'
section 7 rights, he concurred in the result reached by the Board. 28 It
is clear however, that without prior proof of an impact upon em-
ployees' section 7 rights, Member Penello would not be willing to find
that the fact of segregation itself violates section 8(b)(1)(A).
Only Member Kennedy dissented. Member Kennedy agreed
with Member Penello that the employee must demonstrate a "nexus"
16 See id. at 944 & n.5, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1259 & n.5 (Chairman Miller). Chairman
Miller and Member Fanning formed the majority. However, Chairman Miller also sets
out his personal position separately. See id. at 944 n.5, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1259 n.5.
Member Penello wrote a concurring opinion. Id. at 945, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1259-60. Mem-
bers Jenkins and Kennedy wrote separate opinions wherein each concurred in part and
dissented in part. Id. at 945-46, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1260-61.
" 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 51 L.R.R.M. 1584 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172
(2d Cir. 1963). See note 2 supra.
1 " 210 N.L.R.B. at 944 n.5, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1259 n.5 (Chairman Miller).
' 9 /d. at 944, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1259 (Member Fanning). Id. at 945, 86 L.R.R.M. at
1260 (Member Jenkins concurring in part).
20 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
" 1 210 N.L.R.B. at 943, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1259 (Member Fanning).
"Id. at 943-44, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1259 (Member Fanning).
23 Id. (Chairman Miller and Member Fanning).
" See id. at 943-44, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1259 (Chairman Miller and Member Fan-
ning); id. at 945, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1260 (Member Jenkins concurring in part).
23 Id. at 944, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1259 (Member Penello concurring).
2 ° Id. at 945, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1259-60 (Member Penello concurring).
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between the union's discriminatory conduct and the interference with
his section 7 rights. 27 However, Member Kennedy believed that it had
not been adequately proven that the "mere maintenance of separate
locals" adversely affected the "employment relationship". 28 Further,
he did not believe that a nexus between the alleged discriminatory
conduct and an interference with employees' section 7 rights existed.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, quot-
ing extensively from the Board's majority decision, affirmed that hold-
ing in all respects. The court gave the Board decision "its proper
weight" and agreed that the mere maintenance of segregated locals on
the basis of sex interfered with employees' section 7 rights. 29
Significantly, the court rejected the union's argument that seg-
regation by sex is justified if a majority of females preferred a sepa-
rate local." The court stated that such majority preference would not
provide a defense for the refusal of locals to admit.those employees
who desired membership." The court believed that the separation of
workers into different locals defeats a national labor policy which is
based on the notion that employee unity is the best method to achieve
better working conditions. 32
The development in Glass Blowers of a per se rule in sex discrim-
ination cases appears to be both good law and constructive policy-
making. It is submitted first that separate grievance mechanisms per se
offend the employees' statutory right to participate through their exclu-
sive bargaining agent in matters affecting their working conditions.
Further, no legitimate purpose is served by separate grievance process
mechanisms. Such separate processing can subtly create the potential
for disparate treatment by an employer whose willingness amicably to
settle a grievance in favor of an employee may be strongly tempered by
his perception of the political strength of the local which processes the
grievance. 33 Unified processing of grievances guarantees equal treat-
ment of all employees. As is pointed out by the court of appeals, the in-
terests of minority employees are not prejudiced by forced merger
since their rights are protected by the union's statutory duty to repre-
sent fairly all employees in the bargaining unit without discrimination. 34
Second, the elimination of all sex-segregated locals curtails cer-
tain employment practices that are discriminatory and illegal under
"Id, at 946, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1260 (Member Kennedy dissenting in part).
ld. 520 F.2d at 696, 89 L.R.R.M. at 3022.
30
 Id. at 697, 89 L.R.R.M. at 3022.
"Id. Women employees who had requested membership in the male local were
all rejected. Id. at 696, 89 L.R.R.M. at 3022.
33 id. at 697, 89 L.R.R.M. at 3022, citing NLRB v. Ailis.Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 175, 180 (1967).
33
 In fact, the local unions asserted that a majority of the women employees pre-
ferred a separate local because it gave them "clout." See 520 F.2d at 697, 89 L.R.R.M. at
3022.
"See id; see also Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 185, 51 L.R.R.M. 1584,
1587 (1962); note 2 supra.
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federal law. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 clearly prohibits a labor or-
ganization from segregating its membership on the basis of sex where
the segregation adversely affects an employee's work status." Merged
locals help insure that neither sex will be subjected to disparate treat-
ment by the union or the employer. Finally, per se rules such as the
one developed in Glass Blowers generally result from the Board's re-
peated exposure to practices that are rarely, if ever, justifiable." At
some point the Board concludes that a certain rule of practice so
often detrimentally affects statutory rights that a demonstration of
such an effect will no longer be required." It is suggested that the
development of a per se rule in sex segregation cases, based on the
notions that separate is inherently unequal and that the harmful ef-
fects of sex discrimination can be presumed, is quite appropriate. The
Board and the courts should closely scrutinize sex classifications and
strike down per se those which have the potential to impede
employee's section 7 rights."
Further, no legitimate purpose is served by segregating locals on
the basis of sex. Political "clout" or employee preference is not a valid
basis for segregating locals, since inevitably those without "clout" or
those without such a preference are prejudiced in their right to have
the full and fair representation of their exclusive, bargaining agent—a
right which is guaranteed by the Miranda Fuel holding that all em-
ployees must be free from unfair, irrelevant, or invidious treatment. 34
In addition, the federal labor policy seeking to promote industrial
peace and improve wages and working conditions by fostering em-
ployee . organization 40
 is hindered when unions are separated into
" See Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(c)(2), 42 U.S.C.
	
20003(e)-2(c)(2) (Supp.
III, 1973), which provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization ... to
limit, segregate, or classify its membership ... in any way which would de-
prive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities ...
or ... adversely affect his status as an employee ... because of such
individual's . sex ....
"Id. For example, the Board has developed a policy of striking down overly-
broad no-solicitation rules without regard to their actual application and enforcement.
See, e.g., Joseph Horne Co., 186 N.L.R.B. 754, 75 L.R.R.M. 1426 (1970).
37 See Local 357, Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961). In Local 3.57, the Su-
preme Court held that exclusive hiring agreements are not unlawful per se because un-
ions can be presumed to administer hiring halls in an unlawful manner. Id. at 675.
However, the Court also stated that certain conduct could by its very nature contain the
implications of the required intent—and that therefore the existence of discrimination
could at times be inferred by the Board by drawing on its experience in factual in-
quiries. Id., citing Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
an In fact, the courts and the Board have in the past closely scrutinized and
struck down sex classifications. See, e.g., Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). See also
NLRB v. Mansion House Center Management Corp., 473 F.2d 471, 82 L.R.R.M. 2608
(9th Cir. 1973), where it was held that the Board, as an instrument of the federal gov-
ernment, is prohibited from directly or indirectly sanctioning discrimination. id, at 473.
82 L.R.R.M. at 2610.
39
 Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. at 185, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1587. See note 2 supra.
"See National Labor Relations Act, 1, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
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segregated locals. One local's numeric strength may lead to disparate
treatment by an employer, creating divisiveness and animosity be-
tween the locals. It is collective action through consolidation, not sep-
aration, that is more likely to guarantee improved working conditions
for employees.
The ultimate significance of Glass Blowers is still uncertain. Al-
though Members Fanning and Jenkins are willing to find all discrimi-
nation by unions on the basis of sex as violative of section 8(b)(1)(A), 41
Members Penello and Kennedy require proof of a detrimental impact
on section 7 rights.'" Even where such an impact is demonstrated, it
appears that Member Kennedy would apply Board sanctions only so
far as there is an impact but would not rule the mere separation of
the locals as violative of the Act. 43
 The crucial vote in future com-
plaints like the complaint in Glass Blowers will be that of Chairwoman
Murphy. The bare 3-2 majority which found a per se violation in
Glass Blowers was lost when chairman Miller was replaced by Chair-
woman Murphy on the Board. Until her position is made clear, the
status of the per se rule with the Board is very uncertain.
Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit's clear acceptance of the Board's
position in Glass Blowers could have a significant impact on the Board's
future decisions. The ever-growing judicial scrutiny of sex-based clas-
sifications could influence the Board by encouraging it to attempt to
eliminate a union's sexually discriminatory practices.
One area which could be immediately affected by the court's af-
firmance of the Board's per se rule is that involving precertification
examinations when allegations of union sex discrimination are made.
In the period between the Board's decision in Glass Blowers and the
Sixth Circuit's affirmance of that decision, the Board held in Bell &
Howell Co. 44
 that the Board is not required to make a precertification
examination into employer allegations that a labor organization dis-
criminates against its employees on the basis of sex. 45
 Yet the Board
had earlier in the same year held that the Board is required to enter-
tain similar employer complaints of union racial discrimination. 46 Al-
though there may be a reason to scrutinize sex discrimination less
carefully at the precertification level, given the strong labor policy to
begin the bargaining relationship without delay or impediment,'? the
circuit courts should not follow the rationale. The affirmance of the
Board's holding in Glass Blowers both points to the courts' willingness
210 N.L.R.B. at 944, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1259 (Member Fanning); 210 N.L.R.B. at
945, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1260 (Member Jenkins concurring in part).
"Id, at 945, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1259 (Member Penello concurring); id. at 946, 80
L.R.R.M. at 1260 (Member Kennedy dissenting in part).
"Id. at 946, 86 L.R.R.M, at 1260 (Member Kennedy dissenting in part).
" 213 N.L.R.B. 407, 87 L.R.R.M. 1172 (1974).
"Id. at 408, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1174. See note 12 supra.
46
 Bekins Moving & Storage Co,, 211 N.L.R.B. 138, 139, 86 L.R.R.M. 1323, 1325
(1974).
"See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 610-13 (1969).
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to see harmful and invidious effects of sex discrimination, and sup-
ports a rejection of the Board's hands-off policy articulated in Bell &
Finally, the willingness of the Board to strike down sex-based
classifications may encourage Title VII-type litigation before the
Board. It may be said that such a development may not be completely
desirable in light of the Board's relative inexperience in handling
cases which are more typically handled by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission." On the other hand,. where employees
have entrusted the representation of their interests to an exclusive
bargaining agent, the Board should be careful to protect those in-
terests. The Board should not abdicate its responsibility of eliminating
union descrimination against employees merely because it believes
another federal agency is better able to protect those interests. In-
stead, the Board should take the opportunity presented by cases like
Glass Blowers to enforce the federal labor laws in a manner which
complements the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's en-
forcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."
B. Hospital Amendments—Notice Provisions: Lein-Steenberg,/Mercy
Hospitals, Casey & Glass
In extending the coverage of the NLRA to employees of non-
profit health care institutions,' Congress accounted not only for "the
very legitimate rights [of over 1.4 million employees]z to organize and
bargain [collectively]," 5
 but also for the need to maintain uninter-
rupted public access to health care. 4
 To accomplish these two goals,
Congress both extended the protections of the NLRA to non-profit
hospital employees 5
 and developed a special regulatory scheme for
's See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 705, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1970), as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (Supp. III , 1973).
' See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S.
50, 69-70 (1975).
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 0 seq. (1973) as amended by 29
U.S.C. §§ 152 (2), 152(14), 158(d), 158(g) (1974) [hereinafter referred to as the Hospital
Amendments].
▪ 120 Cong. Rec. 522574 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
Id. at S 12945 (remarks of Sen. Taft). See also S. REP. No. 93-766, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 3946, 3949, which states that "the
public interest demands that employees of health care institutions be accorded the same
type of treatment under the law as other employees in our society ...."
• 120 Cong. Rec. S12945 (1974)_(remarks of Sen. Taft). See also S. REP. No.
93-766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 11974] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. News 3946,
3951; 120 Cong. Rec. S22574-75 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Williams); 120 Cong. Rec.
S12940 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits).
'See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2), where the words "or any corporation or association
operating a hospital, if no part of the net earnings inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual," are stricken. See also 29 U.S.C. §152(14), which provides:
"The term 'health care institution' shall include any hospital, convalescent hospital,
health maintenance organization, health clinic, nursing home, extended care facility, or
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settling labor disputes involving health care institutions.°
other institution devoted to the care of sick, infirm, or aged person."
6 The last sentence of 29 U.S.C. 158(d) was amended to read:
Any employee who engages in a strike within any notice period specified
in this section, or who engages in any strike within the appropriate period
specified in subsection (g) of this section, shall lose his status as an em-
ployee of the employer engaged in the particular labor dispute, for the
purposes of sections 8, 9 and 10 of this Act ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) was also amended by adding the following provisions for the regula-
tion of labor relations in the health care industry:
(A) The notice of section 8(d)(1) shall be ninety days; the notice of section
8(d)(3) shall be sixty days; and the contract period of section 8(d)(4) shall
be ninety days.
(B) Where the bargaining is for an initial agreement following certification
or recognition, at least thirty days' notice of the existence of a dispute shall
be given by the labor organization to the agencies set forth in section
8(d)(3).
(C) After notice is given to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
under either clause (A) or (B) of this sentence, the Service shall promptly
communicate with the parties and use its best efforts, by mediation and
conciliation, to bring them to agreement. The parties shall participate fully
and promptly in such meetings as may be undertaken by the Service for
the purpose of aiding in a settlement of the dispute.
Further, 20 U.S.C. § 158 was amended by adding the following provision:
(g) A labor organization before engaging in any strike, picketing, or other
concerted refusal to work at any health care institution shall, not less than
ten days prior to such action, notify the institution in writing and the Fe-
deral Mediation and Conciliation Service of that intention, except that in
the case of bargaining for an initial agreement following certification or
recognition the notice required by this subsection shall not be given until
the expiration of the period specified in clause (B) of the last sentence of
section 8(d) of this Act. The notice shall state the date and time that such
action will commence. The notice, once given, may be extended by the
written agreement of both parties.
In addition, Title II of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. * 171
el seq. was amended by addition of the following provisions: .
CONCILIATION OF LABOR DISPUTES IN THE H Eat:rit CARE INDUSTRY
Sec. 213, (a) If, in the opinion of the Director of the Federal Media-
tion and Conciliation Service a threatened or actual strike or lockout af-
fecting a health care institution will, if permitted to occur or to continue,
substantially interrupt the delivery of health care in the locality concerned,
the Director may further assist in the resolution of the impasse by estab-
lishing within 30 days after the notice to the Federal Mediation and Con-
ciliation Service under clause (A) of the last sentence of section 8(d) (which
is required by clause (3) of such section 8(d)), or within 10 days after the
notice under clause (B), an impartial Board of Inquiry to investigate the is-
sues involved in the dispute and to make a written report thereon to the
parties within fifteen (15) days alter the establishment of such a Board.
The written report shall contain the findings of fact together with the
Board's recommendations for settling the dispute, with the objective of'
achieving a prompt, peaceful and just settlement of' the dispute. Each such
Board shall be composed of such number of individuals as the Director
may deem desirable. No member appointed under this section shall have
any interest or involvement in the health care institutions or the employee
organizations involved in the dispute.
(b)(I) Members of any board established under this section who are
otherwise employed by the Federal Government shall serve without coin-
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One of the elements in this scheme, section 8(g), prohibits a
labor organization from engaging in "any strike, picketing, or other
concerted refusal to work at any health care institution" without first
giving notice both to the health care institution and to the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service.' Failure to give the required
notice constitutes an unfair labor practice remediable under section 10
of the Acts In addition, a worker who violates the notice requirement
by striking within the period specified by 8(g) is exposed to the loss of
"employee" status, and is thereby subject to the loss of the protections
of the Act. 9
The Senate Report accompanying the Hospital Amendments
outlined the objectives of section 8(g)." First, the ten-day notice
period was intended to give the NLRB an opportunity to determine
the legality of any potential strike or picketing activity before it
occurred." Even more importantly, the advance notice was intended
pensation but shall be reimbursed for travel, subsistence, and other neces-
sary expense incurred by them in carrying out its duties under this section.
(2) Members of any board established under this section who are
not subject to paragraph (1) shall receive compensation at a rate pre-
scribed by the Director but not to exceed the daily rate prescribed for
CS-18 of the General Schedule under section 5332 of title 5, United States
Code, including travel for each day they are engaged in the performance
of their duties under this section and shall be entitled to reimbursement
for travel, subsistence, and other necessary expenses incurred by them in
carrying out their duties under this section.
(c) After the establishment of a board under subsection (a) of this
section and for 15 days after any such board has issued its report, no
change in the status quo in effect prior to the expiration of the contract in
the case of negotiations for a contract renewal, or in effect prior to the
time of the impasse in the case of an initial bargaining negotiation, except
by agreement, shall be made by the parties to the controversy.
(d) There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of this section.
These unique procedural requirements were designed "to facilitate the collective bar-
gaining process, reduce the opportunity for negotiation impasses, and provide recogni-
tion of the need for continuity of patient care." 120 Cong. Rec. 522574 (1974) (remarks
of Sen. Williams).
T 29 U.S.C. § 158(g).
8
 29 U.S.C. § 160. In light of the Congressional concern for insuring continuous
public access to health care, § I60(j) was considered particularly significant. S. REP. No.
93-766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 3946,
3949. Under § 160(j), the Board has the power, upon issuance of a complaint, to peti-
tion the district court "for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order."
See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) as amended. There are two situations in which the 10-day
notice requirement of § 8(g) does not apply: S. REP. No. 93-766 points out that a labor
organization will not be required to serve 10 days' notice where the employer has com-
mitted an unfair labor practice. Further, § 8(g) itself specifies that the notice provisions
will not apply where the parties are in the process of bargaining for an initial agree-
ment following certification or recognition. In this case, provisions of § 8(a)( 1 )(B) apply.
29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1)(B).
" See S. REP. No.93-766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& An. NEWS 3946, 3949.
" Id.
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to give the health care institution sufficient warning of a planned
strike, picket, or work stoppage. so that it could make other arrange-
ments for continuing patient care." •
During the Survey year, in Plumbers Local 630 (Lein-Steenberg),"
Laborers Local 1057 (Mercy Hospital of Laredo)," and Casey & Glass,
Inc.," the Board for the first time applied the regulatory provisions of
the Hospital Amendments to determine whether the section 8(g)
notice requirement was to be read literally to apply to any picketing
conducted on the premises of a health care institution, or whether the
notice requirement was intended to apply only to picketing directed
against the health care institution itself." Casey & Glass, Inc. raised the
additional question whether the section 8(d) sanction of loss of em-
ployee status should apply to any employee who had picketed his em-
ployer on hospital premises or whether the penalty applied only to
concerted activities directed against a hospital.' 7
The facts of the three cases presented a similar pattern. In both
Lein-Steenberg and Mercy Hospital, employees of contractors doing con-
struction work on the premises of non-profit hospitals picketed their
employers at their hospital jobsites. The picketing was clearly directed
against the subcontractors,` 8 and did not disrupt the work of the hos-
pital employees." In unfair labor practice proceedings brought both
by the hospitals and by the Board, the Board held that the notice re-
quirement of section 8(g) applied to any strikes or picketing con-
ducted on the premises of a health care institution, even where the
hospital was not a party . to the labor dispute, and where hospital ser-
"Id. See also 120 Cong. Rec. 522574 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
" 219 N.L.R.B. 837, 89 L.R.R.M. 1770 (1975).
" 219 N.L.R.B. 846, 89 L.R.R.M. 1777 (1975).
15 219 N.L.R.B. 698, 89 L.R.R.M. 1779 (1975).
16 Lein -Steenberg, 219 N.L.R.B. at 837, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1772; Mercy Hospital, 219
N.L.R.B. 846, 89 L.R.R.M. 1777; Casey & Glass, Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 698, 89 L.R.R.M.
1779.
" 219 N.L.R.B. 698, 89 L.R.R.M. 1779.
" Lein-Steenberg, 219 N.L.R.B. at 838, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1771; Mercy Hospital,
219 N.L.R.B. at 847, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1778. In Lein -Steenberg, the Board found that the
union limited its picketing activity to the gate reserved solely for the subcontractor's
employees. Further, picket signs included a notice that the union had no dispute with
any other employer, and that the picketing was not intended to stop work or deliveries.
" Lein -Steenberg, 219 N.L.R.B. at 838, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1771; Mercy Hospital, 219
N.L.R.B. at 847, 89 L.R.R.M, at 1778. The Board indicated that although the
Lein-Steenberg picketing was visible to some of the hospital employees, hospital workers
did not use the gate reserved for the subcontractor's employees, and were not required
to cross any picket lines to gain access to the hospital. From time to time, employees of
the general contractor and certain other subcontractors involved in the construction
project honored the picket line established by the union. However, "no hospital em-
ployees engaged in a work stoppage or other refusal to work as a result of the picketing,
and there has been no disruption of any of the services offered by the hospital." 219
N.L.R.B. at 838, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1771. In Mercy Hospital, the Board noted that "[there
was) no allegation that any hospital employees ceased work or that Respondent's picket-
ing had any adverse impact on the Hospital's ability to provide its customary medical
care." 219 N.L.R.B. at 847, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1778.
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vices had not been impaired by union concluct. 2 °
In addition, in Casey & Glass, the contractor involved in Mercy
Hospital challenged election ballots cast by employees whose union had
failed to give advance notice before picketing the hospital construction
site." The Board held that since 8(d) provided that any employee en-
gaged in a strike in violation of 8(g) lost his employee status," such
employee was not eligible to vote in a union representation election. 23
In all three cases, a majority composed of Chairman Murphy
and Members Kennedy and Penello considered three factors in de-
termining that section 8(g) applied to all picketing at a hospital site.
First, the Board examined the literal language of the section prohibi-
ting "any strike, picketing, or other concerted refusal to work at any
health care institution."" According to the majority, the word "at"
necessarily meant "on the premises or any health care institution."
In addition, the majority felt that "any strike, picketing, or other con-
certed refusal to work" referred to all such activity, whether or not di-
rected against the health care institution."
The Board next looked to the legislative history, where it found
"ample support"" for its literal reading. The majority pointed to re-
marks of Senator Taft, who had explained that section 8(g) applied
qn]ot only to bargaining strikes or pickets, but also to any picket or
strike,"2" and of Senator Javits, who stated that the notice requirement
applied to "any strike or picketing, including stranger picketing.""
The Board further relied on Senator Williams' caveat that because the
amendments were the result of compromise, "the Labor Board should
use extreme caution not to read into this act by implication or general
logical reasoning—something that is not contained in the bill, its re-
port, and the explanation thereof."3 °
From these congressional statements, the Board reasoned that
Congress' failure to use language that narrowed the literal scope of
section 8(g) suggested that a broad application of that section was
appropriate." To buttress this conclusion, the Board noted that in
another section of the Hospital Amendments, Congress had carefully
specified that the provision applied only to hospital employees.
"Lein-Steenberg, 219 N.L.R.B. at 839, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1772; Mercy Hospital, 219
N.L.R.B. at 847, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1778.
21 219 N.L.R.B. 698, 89 L.R.R.M. 1779.
22 29 U.S.C. I58(d), set forth in note 6 supra.
23 219 N.L.R.B. 698, 89 L.R.R.M. 1779.
24 29 U.S.C. § I58(g) (emphasis added).
22 Lein-Steenberg, 219 N.L.R.B. at 840, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1772.
26 Id., 89 L.R.R.M. at 1772-73.
"Id., 89 L.R.R.M. at 1772.
"Id., quoting 120 Cong. Rec. S 12945 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Taft) (emphasis
added).
"Lein-Steenberg, 219 N.L.R.B. at 839, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1772, quoting 120 Cong.
Rec. 512939 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits).
"Id., quoting 120 Cong. Rec. 522575 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
Id. at 840, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1773.
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Therefore, the Board reasoned that since Congress indicated from
the language of one section that it knew how to limit the Amend-
ments to hospital employees, Congress could have clearly limited the
notice requirements of section 8(g) to picketing against a health care
institution, had Congress desired such a result. 32
The third element governing the majority's interpretation of 8(g)
was a policy concern involving the Board's assessment of when, in ap-
plying the Hospital Amendments, a general rule of broad applicability
was preferable to an individual, case-by-case approach. The majority
read the legislative history of the Hospital Amendments to indicate
that a crucial concern of Congress was to minimize the possibility of
disrupting necessary health services.33 The-Board pointed out, how-
ever, that the potential disruption of health care was a factor that
necessarily varied with the facts of each case. If section 8(g) were to be
applied narrowly to cover only those labor disputes that involved po-
tential disruptions in health care, the Board feared that the scope of
8(g) would have to be determined on a case-by-case basis after a strike
or picketing on hospital premises had already taken place. The Board
felt that this situation would "set a troubling precedent" and was "not
convinced that such a case-by-case analysis was within the intent of
Congress."34 Rather, the Board majority perceived that, due to con-
gressional fear that any strike or picketing on hospital premises posed
a threat to the health care institution, a general rule of broad applica-
bility was required. The general rule seen by the Board to be most
consistent with legislative intent was one which triggered 8(g)'s notice
requirements whenever any strike or picketing occurred on hospital
premises.
Finally, the majority declared that its reading of section 8(g)
would not impose an undue hardship on labor organizations engaged
in construction work on hospital premises. Rather, "as labor organiza-
tions gain awareness of their obligations in this area, the giving of
notice will become a pro forma procedure ...." 35
Members Fanning and Jenkins in dissent took issue with each
element of the majority's analysis. First, the dissent disagreed with the
majority's conclusion that the phrase "any strike, picketing, or con-
certed refusal to work at a health care institution" necessarily referred
to all such activity conducted "on the premises of a health care
institution." Unlike the majority, the dissent did not give the word
"at" a substantive significance. They read "at" merely as a preposition
necessary for grammatical fluency, and not as an indicator of congres-
sional design to expand the Hospital Amendments to reach disputes
32 Id.
33 See 219 N.L.R.B. at 840, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1772. Accord, S. REP. No. 93-776, 93d
Cong., 2d Seas., reprinted in [19741 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3946, 3948.
34 219 N.L.R.B. at 840, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1773.
33 Id.
" Id. at 841, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1774 (Members Fanning and Jenkins, dissenting).
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not involving hospitals and their employees. 37
Second, the dissenters pointed out that much of section 8(g)
clearly purports to govern only the notice required of hospital em-
ployees who picket or strike in connection with a labor dispute with
the hospita1. 38 Therefore, the dissenters reasoned that the more am-
biguous language in the section should likewise be limited to the ex-
pressed congressional concern with labor disputes between hospitals
and their employees."
In addition, Members Fanning and Jenkins pointed to language
in the Committee Report accompanying section 8(g) from which they
inferred that 8(g) was intended only to apply to a union striking or
picketing against a health care institution. 40 The dissent noted the
Commitee Report's statement that section 8(g) did not apply where the
employer had committed an unfair labor practice.'" The dissent
reasoned that if the term "employer" referred to parties other than
the hospital itself, such a statement would lead to anomalous results.
For example, following the language of the Committee Report as well
as the majority's view of the scope of 8(g), the unions in the present
cases would have been relieved of the section 8(g) requirement had
the contractors committed an unfair labor practice. As such, the
health care institution would have been deprived of the intended ben-
efits of advance notice through the actions of an "employer" working
on hospital premises, but beyond the hospital's control. Accordingly,
the dissent noted that "it ... seems strange that Congress, in its in-
terest to give an added protection to the health care institution's de-
livery capabilities, would allow a construction contractor's unfair labor
37 Id. at 842, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1774-75.
38 1d. at 843, 89 L.R.R.M, at 1775. The dissenters pointed out that the remaining
language in § 8(g), stating that "f wThenever the collective bargaining involves employees of
a health care institution, the provisions of this section shall be modified as follows ...,"
specifically refers only to disputes between health care institutions and their employees.
29 U.S.C. § 158(g). 219 N.L.R.B. at 843, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1775. Therefore, reacting the
phrase in question as applicable to all labor disputes in which striking or picketing oc-
curred on the premises of a health care institution leads to a somewhat anomalous re-
sult:
First, any labor organization, no matter whom it represents or seeks to
represent, must file a 10-day notice before picketing "at" any health care
institution, even though the etnployer being picketed is not a health care
facility or involved in providing patient care. The second part of section
8(g), ... is clearly limited ... to labor organizations representing health
care institution employees. Finally, the third part of section 8(g) applies,
once again, to all labor organizations .... In sum, the majority concludes
that Congress wrote section 8(g) with all labor organizations in mind For
the first 45 and final 14 words of that section, but limited the intervening
59 words to some labor organizations.
Id. at 843, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1775.
" id.
"Id. at 844, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1775-76.
"Id. See S. REP. No. 93-766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [19741 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3946, 3949.
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practices to overcome that design."'"
Furthermore, Members Fanning and Jenkins found significance
in the facts that only the hospital industry had testified before the
Committee and that no mention was made in the legislative history of
the effect of the Amendments on the well-developed rules governing
common-situs picketing: 43
We cannot conceive Congress intended the result reached
here not only without seeking the testimony of the building
trades, but without commenting at all on the Board's Moore
Dry Dock standards, without a mention of the monumental
increase in the workload of the FMCS caused by the result
reached here, and without any indication that Congress in-
tended, practically speaking, to impose a new requirement
on all the labor organizations who represent or seek to rep-
resent employees of the countless employers who might
transact business 'at the premises' of all the 'health care in-
stitutions' across the country. 44
The dissent's strongest disagreement with the majority, however,
turned on a difference in perception of the proper role of the Board
in interpreting statutes imposing conditions or limits upon the rights
of workers to engage in concerted protest activities. The majority read
section 8(g) broadly, refusing to restrict its scope where Congress had
adopted no specific limitations. The dissent, on the other, hand, in-
sisted that the command of section 13 that the NLRA be construed,
wherever possible, to preserve the right to strike, 45 required the Board
to interpret section 8(g) of the Hospital Amendments narrowly."
42 '219 N.L.R.B. at 844, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1776.
43 /d. See also S. REP. No. 93-766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 119741
Com Cow, & An. NEws 3946, 3950-52. In Moore Dry Dock, 92 N.L,R.B. 547, 27
L.R.R.M. 1108 (1950), the Board developed 'four criteria to determine whether legiti-
mate primary picketing may occur on the premises of a secondary employer, where the
situs of the primary employer is ambulatory. In order for such picketing to be valid: (I)
The picketing must be limited to the times when the situs of the dispute was located on
the secondary employer's premises; (2) The primary employer must be engaged in
normal business at the situs; (3) Picketing must take place reasonably close to the situs;
and (4) Picketing must clearly disclose that the dispute was only with the primary em-
ployer. 92 N.L.R.B. at 549, 27 L.R.R.M. at 1110.
In Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 677 (1961), the Supreme Court con-
mentecl upon these standards, noting that they apply 'to limit the picketing effects to
the employees of the employer against whom the dispute is directed, This carries out
the dual congressional objectives of preserving the right of labor organizations to bring
pressure to bear on offending employers in primary labor disputes and of shielding
unoiTending employers and others from the pressures in controversies not their own."
Id. at 679.
44
 219 N.L.R.B. at 844, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1776-77.
" 29 U.S.C. § 163(1973). Section 13 provides: "Nothing in this Act, except as
specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or im-
pede or diminish in any way the right to strike or to affect the limitations or qualifica-
dons on that right."
1° 219 N.L.R.B. at 845, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1777. The dissent viewed § 13 as a rule of
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It is submitted that the dissent's conclusion is based on a sounder
assessment of the structure of the statute, the legislative history, and
the policy considerations involved. It must be noted that neither the
internal structure of section 8(g), nor its placement within the larger
procedural framework of the Hospital Amendments clearly or persua-
sively supports the notion that the phrase "any strike, picketing, or
other concerted refusal to work at any health care institution" was in-
tended to apply outside the context of a dispute between a health care
institution and its employees. Thus, from the literal language of sec-
tion 8(g), the inferences drawn by both the majority and the dissent
may be logically supportable. 47 However, much of section 8(g) itself is
specifically applicable only to labor relations in which the employer is
the health care institution. As such, the appropriateness of a reading
which greatly broadens the scope of only one portion of the statute is
suspect.
Further, section 8(g) was consistently presented on the Senate
floor and in the Committee Reports as only one item in an entire
statutory scheme" applicable to labor disputes involving hospitals and
their employees. Reading a portion of 8(g) to impose requirements on
industrial relations outside of the health care industry not only is in-
appropriate in the context of the entire statutory scheme focused sole-
ly on labor relations between health care institutions and their em-
ployees, but also, as pointed out by the dissent, 49 leads to results in-
consistent with its overall design. If one Congressional concern in
enacting 8(g) had been to prevent disruptions in essential medical
services,90 it is questionable that such a concern could be defeated by
the commission of an unfair labor practice by an employer whose ac-
tions lie wholly outside of the hospital's control.
While these arguments may not in themselves be sufficient to
indicate that the result urged by the dissent was affirmatively man-
dated by Congress, they at least raise serious 9uestions as to the pro-
priety of the majority's "literal" reading of section 8(g). It is a familiar
a statutory construction "cautioning ... against expansive reading ... which would ad-
versely affect the right to strike, unless the Congressional purpose to give it that mean-
ing persuasively appeared either from the structure or history of the statute. Id., quoting
NLRB v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 639 [Curtis Bros., Inc.), 362
U.S. 274, 282 (1960). Accord, NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 655, 673
(1951).
47
 The majority's result may be reached by inferring from the language of 8(g)
that this section addressed generally the problem caused by any disruptive activity at a
health care institution. Thus the provision should be read broadly. The second part of
§ 8(g) which isolates a narrow class of contract renewal strikes is but an exception to the
general rule, and does not define the scope of the general rule. Equally persuasively, the
dissent's result may be reached by inferring from the language of the provision that
Congress was focused solely on hospital labor problems. Therefore, the inadvertently
broad language should be read narrowly.
48 See, e.g., 120 Cong. Rec. 512934 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Cranston); S. REP. No.
93-766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [19741 U.S. Com Cosa:. & Au. News 3946, 3946.
"See text at note 40 supra.
" See text at notes 1-4 .supra.
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rule of statutory construction that where the "plain language" of a
statute is questionable or ambiguous, legislative history shoud be con-
sulted to ascertain congressional intent. In such circumstances, it is the
legislative history, and not merely the literal words of the statute,
which gives meaning to the statute."
The general thrust of the Hospital Amendments' legislative his-
tory seems to indicate that section 8(g) was intended to apply only to
disputes between health care institutions and their employees. First,
the remarks of Senators Taft and Javits on which the majority relied
are inconclusive on the question of the appropriate scope of section
8(g). When put into their original context, 52 these statements could
support the position either of the majority or the dissent. For exam-
ple, Senator Taft's remark cited by the majority indicating that "ftihis
subsection applies not only to bargaining strikes or pickets, but also
... to 'any picket or strike' " is followed in the Congressional Record
by his statement: "As examples, this subsection would apply to recog-
nition strikes, area standard strikes, secondary strikes, jurisdictional
strikes, and the like." 53 Thus, Senator Taft's reference to "any picket
or strike," when placed in context, does not necessarily mean that the
section covers any strike at all, regardless of whether or not the labor
dispute is between the hospital and its employees. Rather, it could
mean that section 8(g) applies to any type of strike in which hospital
employees could engage.
The majority's use of Senator Javits' remarks is equally question-
able. The majority read Javits' statement that Section 8(g) applied to
"any strike or picketing, including stranger picketing" to mean that the
provision governed the labor disputes between any employer and em-
ployee working on the hospital premises. 54 However,' the term
"stranger picketing" has been defined in ways which do not support
this reading. The dissent notes that several sources define stranger pic-
keting as picketing by union members who are not employees of the
company being picketed. 55 Using this definition, Javits may have been
indicating that section 8(g) applied to any employee who pickets the hos-
pital, and not that it applied to any employee who pickets any employer
on the hospital premises. Thus, the statements used by the majority to
support its literal reading of section 8(g) are in no way inconsistent
with a reading of section 8(g) which limits its application to labor dis-
putes within the health care industry.
More significantly, there are statements in the legislative
history—statements not mentioned in the majority opinion—that
strongly support the reading of 8(g) urged by the dissent. For exam-
" 2A STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 95.05 (C. Dallas Sands, 9th ed.,
1973).
"2
	
120 Cong. Rec. S12945.(1974) (remarks of Sen. Taft); 120 Cong. Rec.
S I 2939 (1974) (remarks of Sen. .lavits).
43 120 Cong, Rec. S12995 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Tait).
" See text at notes 27-29 .5qm.
55 See 219 N.L.R.11. at 895, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1776.
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ple, Senator Cranston noted that the objective of the procedural pro-
visions of the Hospital Amendments, including the ten-day notice .re-
quirement, was to "bring about peaceful and just settlements of labor
disputes in the health care industry."" Senator Taft likewise commented
that "these safeguard procedures will substantially aid health care in-
stitutions and their employees settle their disputes responsibly and peaceful-
ly, while not significantly restricting either party's freedom of action." 57
Additionally, the Committee Report clearly indicated that the
scope of 8(g) encompasses only labor disputes between health care in-
stitutions and their employees: "[T]he Committee approved an
Amendment adding a new section 8(g), which generally prohibits a
labor organization from striking or picketing a health care institution
without giving advance notice."" The legislative history also contains
strong language emphasizing the manner in which the Hospital
Amendments should be interpreted by the Board. Senator Williams
warned that the Committee "went as far as it decided to go and no
[further]."56
 As such, the Labor Board should use "extreme caution
not to read into this act ... something that is not contained in the bill,
its report, and the explanation thereof."'"
Although the majority found that the above quoted statement
justified a literal reading of 8(g), it is submitted that the statement is
more accurately read to support the opposite result. Senator Williams
was not urging that the statute be read literally. Rather, his concern
was that the procedural requirements not be applied by the Board "to
intrude upon otherwise protected activity, except as provided by
Congress."'" Senator Williams expressed the hope that "the NLR13
and the General Counsel [will not treat this legislation] as an excuse to
search out and litigate all possible situations, or substitute its will for
that of the Congress." 62
 These statements do not indicate a single-
minded insistence on a literal reading of the statute, regardless of the
result. Rather, the caution urged by Senator Williams was against ap-
plying the Amendments outside the realm specifically considered by
Congress.
The weight of the legislative history supporting the contentions of
the dissent is given even more force by the rule of statutory construc-
tion mandated by section 13 of the Act." Where courts have been
faced with statutory language which, read literally, sweeps broadly over
otherwise protected activities, section 13 has been seen to require that
such language be construed narrowly."
se
	Cong. Rec. 522577 (197,4) (remarks of Sen. Cransti.m) (emphasis added).
' T td. at 522579 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Taft) (emphasis added).
' S. REP, No. 93-766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974) U.S. Cool: Cow. sc
An. News 3946, 3949.
" 120 Cong, Rec. 522575 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
60 a
" Id. at 527576.
62 id.
" 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1973), set forth at note 45 supra.
"See, e.g., National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 627 (1967)
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Finally, a narrow interpretation of section 8(g) which would
apply the section only to labor disputes between hospitals and their
employees does not expose interested parties to the after-the-fact,
case-by-case analysis that troubled the majority. An interpretation
limiting section 8(g) to hospitals and their employees is itself a general
rule which is capable of application any time employees of a hospital
plan to picket or strike as the result of a labor dispute.
In extending 8(g)'s application to all labor unions representing
employees working on the premises of a health care institution, the
Board has insured the institutions, their patients, and the public the
added protection of advance notice of any concerted protest to be
conducted on their premises. In so doing, however, the majority has
dismissed the applicability of well-developed standards governing
common-situs picketing."' Guided by a highly questionable reading of
legislative history, the majority has followed a rule of statutory con-
struction that "fl[ies] ... in the face of the unaltered section 13 of the
Act.""" Moreover, by placing unions representing employees working
on hospital premises on notice that 8(g) will apply to them, the
Board's holding raises the additional question whether and to what
extent other sections of the procedural scheme designed by Congress
for governing labor relations in the health care industry will be ap-
plied to labor disputes arising outside this field.
C. Duty to Bargain — Retroactive Bargaining Orders: Trading Port
The NLRA provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an
employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of
his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9(a)." Section 9(a)
defines such representatives as workers who are "designated or
selected" by a majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for
such purposes.' Although section 9 is entitled "Representatives and
Elections," the provision contains no requirement that representatives .
be selected pursuant to Board election under section 9(c)(1). 3 Thus, in
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 4 the Supreme Court held that a union may
establish majority status by means other than an election, such as by
(construing § 8(b)(4)(B) ); Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 672 (1961) (inter-
preting § 8(b)(4)(A)); NLRB v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 639,
362 U.S. 274, 281-82 (1960) (construing § 8(b)( I)(A) ); Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB,
350 U.S. 270, 284-89 (1956) (construing both a no-strike clause in a collective bargain-
ing agreement and § 8(d) ); NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 673
(1951) (interpreting § 8(b)(4) ).
11 ' Sec note 43 supra.
"" 219 N.L.R.B. at 845, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1777.
' 29 U.S.C. § I58(a)(5) (1970).
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
3 Section 9(c)( I) is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)( I) (1970) and provides in detail
the procedure for a Board election.
395 U.S. 575 (1969).
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possessing cards signed by a majority of the employees authorizing
the union to represent them for collective bargaining purposes. 6 The
Court nevertheless acknowledged that an election is the Board's pre-
ferred route for ascertaining the employees' choice of bargaining
representatives and held that an employer has the right to insist on an
election provided he does not commit unfair labor practices which are
likely to destroy majority strength and impede the election process.'
Under Gissel, however, if the employer is found to have engaged in
such unfair practices, then he forfeits his right to demand an election
and must bargain with the union on the basis of other clear indicia of
employees' desires, such as the union authorization cards'
This Survey year, the full Board broadened the obligations of an
employer under a card based remedial bargaining order. In Trading
Port, Inc.," the Board held that "an employer's obligation under a bar-
gaining order remedy should commence as of the time the employer
has embarked on a clear course of unlawful conduct or has engaged
in sufficient unfair labor practices to undermine the union's majority
status."" As such, the Trading Port decision represents a much needed
and significant departure from•the policies enunciated in the 1974
case of Steel-Fab, Inc.," where a split Board held that such a bargain-
ing order would date as of issuance of the Board's decision that the
S Id. at 596-97, 600. In Gissel, the Supreme Court upheld bargaining orders di-
rected at employers who had rejected union demands for recognition based on authori-
zation cards signed by a majority of employees and had engaged in contemporaneous
unfair labor practices likely "to undermine majority strength and impede the election
process." Id. at 614.
6 Id. at 596 & n.8, citing Aaron Brothers Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077, 1078, 62
L.R.R.M. 1160, 1161 (1966).
395 U.S. at 600.
5 1d. at 614-15. Specifically, the Court stated:
In fashioning a remedy in the exercise of its discretion, then, the Board
can properly take into consideration the extensiveness of an employer's
unfair practices in terms of their past effect on election conditions and the
likelihood of their recurrence in the future. If the Board finds that the
possibility of erasing the effects of past practices and .of ensuring a fair
election (or a fair rerun) by the use of traditional remedies, though pres-
ent, is slight and that employee sentiment once expressed through cards
would, on balance, be better protected by a bargaining order, then such an
order should issue.
Id.
The broad remedial philosophy presented in Gissel was narrowed somewhat in
Linden Lumber Division, Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974). There it was
held that an employer who refrains from interfering with a fair election has an absolute
right to refuse to bargain with a union presenting evidence of majority support and
may instead require the union itself to file a petition for an election under § 9(c)(1)(a),
29 U.S.C. 159(c)(1)(a) (1970). 419 U.S. at 309-10. Further, the employer need not
himself petition for the election. See id.
Linden Lumber is criticized in 1974-75 Annual Survey of Labor Relations and Em-
ployment Discrimination Law, 17 B.C. IND. & Cow L. REv. 1013-18 (1975).
" 219 N.L.R.B. 298, 89 L.R.R.M. 1565 (1975).
'° Id. at 301, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1569.
" 212 N.L.R.B. 363, 86 L.R.R.M. 1474 (1974).
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employer's practices had undermined the union's majority status or
had prevented the holding of a fair election. 12 Trading Port departs
from Steel-Fab by making the bargaining order retroactive to the date
at which the employer commenced his unlawful campaign, where the
union has already presented evidence of majority status. Where ma-
jority status is not ascertained until after the employer commenced
the unlawful campaign, Trading Port makes the bargaining order re-
troactive to the time the union presented evidence of majority status."
In Trading Port, Inc., three employees at a wholesale and retail
grocery business commenced an organizational campaign on behalf of
Teamsters Local 294.' 4 Within a short time thereafter, they succeeded
in persuading 43 employees out of a possible 49 to sign union au-
thorization cards. After the employer refused to recognize the local
on the basis of the signed authorization cards, and declined to petition
for a Board election, 39 of the employees struck, ostensibly for recog-
nition purposes." Prior to, during, and after the strike, the employer
harassed, threatened and interrogated its employees. Subsequent to
the strike, the union lost 25 to 3 in an election held pursuant to its
petition for Board certification as representative of the Trading Port
employees.IG
The Board found that the employer's conduct before, during
and after the strike constituted unfair labor practices under section
8(a)(I)." The Board also found that the "nature and pervasiveness"
of these unfair labor practices had dissipated "the union's overwhelm-
ing majority status among employees" and had rendered impossible
the holding of a fair election.' 8 As a result, the Board set aside the
election and issued a bargaining order "to best protect the employees'
"Id. at 366, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1478.
13 219 N.L.R.B. at 301, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1569.
"See Seeler v. Trading Port, Inc., 517 F.2d 33, 35, 89 L.R.R.M. 2513 (2d Cir.
1975), a related action brought by the NLRB regional director under § 10j of the
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1970). See note 40 infra.
" 219 N.L.R.B. at 298, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1566. However, because the Board found
that the strike for recognition was "prompted", "prolonged", and "aggravated" by the
employer's unlawful practices, the Board found the strike to be an unfair labor practice
strike and not a recognition strike. Id. at 299. 89 L.R.R.M. at 1568.
13 Id. at 298-300, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1566.68. Employer's unlawful pre-strike conduct
consisted of interrogation, threats of job loss, and illegal solicitations to discourage
union activity. Id. at 298-99, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1566-67. Employer's unlawful conduct dur-
ing strike consisted of threats of plant closure, job loss and seniority loss, as well as pro-
longing and aggravating the strike. Id. at 299-300, 89 L.R.R.M.• at 1567-68. Employer's
unlawful post-strike conduct consisted of illegal solicitation to discourage union activity,
interrogation, threats of reprisal, and a coercive inquiry and promise of job benefit. Id.
at 300, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1568.
" Id. at 298, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1566. Section 8(a)(1) provides that it is an unfair
labor practice for an employer to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title." 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1)
(1970). Section 157, better known as § 7, guarantees to employees various organiza-
tional rights. Ste 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
'a 219 N.L.R.B. at 300, 302, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1568, 1570.
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rights."" Although the employer had "embarked on a clear course of
unlawful conduct" several days before the recognitional demand, the
bargaining order was made retroactive to the day at which the union
presented evidence of majority status. 20 In addition, the Board found
that the employer's refusal to "recognize and bargain with the union
as the majority representative of its employees" constituted conduct
violating section 8(a)(5). 21 Because the employer's bargaining obliga-
tion accrued as of the date of the union's recognitional demand, the
Board held that the employer's unilateral changes instituted after the
union's recognitional demand constituted independent section 8(a)(5)
violations. 22
The Board made the bargaining orders retroactive because it
found that its Steel-Fab, Inc. 23 decision failed to meet the suggestion in
Gissel that the only fair way to effectuate employee rights is to "re-
establish the conditions as they existed before the employer's unlawful
campaign." 24 In Steel-Fab, former Chairman Miller joined by Members
Penello and Kennedy refused to make the bargaining order retroac-
tive. They concluded that a retroactive order would penalize the em-
ployer for failing to divine that the Board would later rule that a bar-
gaining obligation existed.25
 As such, the Steel-Fab majority found that
the employer's conduct after the recognition demand could not consti-
tute an 8(a)(5) violation because the Board had not yet determined
that a bargaining obligation existed. 2 ° Significantly, the Steel-Fab
majority announced that it would predicate future remedial bargain-
ing orders only on an 8(a)(1) violation and not on an 8(a)(5)
violation. 27
 This meant that in future determinations as to whether to
issue a bargaining order, the Board would examine only the serious-
ness of the employer's misconduct and its impact upon the election
process,28
 and not the existence or the timing of the union's recogni-
tional demand. If the Board found that the employer's misconduct
had dissipated the union's majority by making a fair election impossi-
"Id. at 300, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1568.
"M. at 301, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1569.
21 1d. For the language of § 8(a)(5), see text at note 1 supra.
:2 219 N.L.R.B. at 302, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1569-70. The post-recognitional demand
conduct that the Board found violative of 8(a)(5) included: employer elimination of
certain jobs, and encouragement of the formation of an independent employee griev-
ance committee to deal directly with the employees. Id.
" In Steel-Fab, Inc. the employer rejected the union's proof of majority status
through authorization cards and then caused the union narrowly to lose the Board elec-
tion by means of extensive unfair labor practices. The employer had commenced its un-
lawful campaign even prior to the union's recognitional 'campaign. 212 N.L.R.B. at 372.
86 L.R.R.M. at 1475..
" 219 N.L.R.B. at 301, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1569, citing Gissel, 395 U.S. at 612. See
text at notes 4-8 supra.
25 212 N.L.R.B. at 364, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1476.
2" Id. at 363, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1476.
57 Id.
2" Gissel criteria determine when a bargaining order is necessary to remedy the
employer's unfair labor practices. See text at notes 4-8 supra.
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ble, it would issue a non-retroactive bargaining order without refer-
ence to the union's recognitional demand." In effect, Steel-Fab would
appear to indicate that where card-carrying majority status was dem-
onstrated prior to the employer's unilateral changes, a bargaining
order would be issued only to counteract the irremediable effects of
the employer's acts upon the union's majority status or upon a fair
election and not to accord the union its right as majority representa-
tive to negotiate changes in wages and working conditions. 3 °
The Board in Trading Port found that the Steel-Fab decision al-
lowed an employer to delay his bargaining obligation by engaging in
unfair labor practices which could cause the union to lose the
election." In the period prior to a Board decision, the employer was
insured a substantial period of time" during which he would not have
to deal with the union. 33 During this period the employer could insti-
tute changes in working conditions which, under the Steel-Fab rule,"
would be left unremedied by a purely prospective bargaining order."
The Board in Trading Port pointed out that under the rule of Linden
Lumber Division, Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 36 an employer forfeits his
right to an election and triggers his bargaining obligation when he
commits unfair labor practices that impede the election process."
Thereafter, he must bargain with the union based on other indicia of
the employees' desires such as the signed union authorization cards."
The Board found that in issuing purely prospective bargaining or-
ders, it was failing to recognize that where the employer has for-
feited his right to an election, the union's majority status is deter-
35 212 N.L.R.B. at 363-65, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1476-78.
" Two separate dissents in Steel-Fab by Members Fanning and Jenkins would
have made the bargaining order retroactive to the date of the union's recognitional
demand. See id. at 366, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1478 (Member Fanning dissenting in part). See
id. at 369, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1482 (Member Jenkins dissenting in part). Further, both
Fanning and Jenkins disagreed with the majority view that 8(a)(5) analysis was un-
necessary. Instead, they would find that the employer violated 8(a)(5) when it denied
recognition to the union after the latter presented proof of majority status through the
cards. See id. at 366, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1478 (Member Fanning dissenting in part) & id. at
369, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1482 (Member Jenkins dissenting in part). Further they would find
that the employer's subsequent unilateral changes constituted additional § 8(a)(5) viola-
tions. See id. at 366-67, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1478-79 (Member Fanning dissenting in part) &
id. at 369, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1482 (Member Jenkins dissenting in part). Any other result,
they believed, would cause these changes to go unremedied. Id. As Member Jenkins
pointed out, failure to so find would alloW the employer "to escape with the fruits of its
unlawful behavior." ld. at 371, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1483 (Member Jenkins dissenting in
part).
31 219 N.L.R.B. at 301, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1569.
33 The Trading Port decision was issued almost two years after the union's recog-
nitional demand. Id. at 298, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1565-66.
33 1d. at 301, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1569.
31 See text at note 12 supra.
35 219 N.L.R.B. at 301, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1569.
36 419 U.S. 301 (1974). See note 8 supra.
"219 N.L.R.B. at 301 & n.8, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1569 & n.8.
35 Id.
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mined by the date the union presents its authorization cards. This
date could precede the Board's decision by a substantial length of
time. 39
 Therefore, only a retroactive order would guarantee the full
bargaining rights that arise upon the union's proof of its majority
status."
The Trading Port decision indicates that the Board has rejected
the view announced in Steel-Fab that a section 8(a)(5) analysis is un-
necessary in defining the appropriate remedy for an employer's un-
fair labor practices.'" Like the Steel-Fab majority, the Board in Trading
Port analyzed the employer's section 8(a)(1) misconduct and its effect
upon the election. It concluded that a bargaining order was necessary
to protect the interests of the union as majority representative of the
employees. 42
 Unlike the Steel-Fab majority, however, the Trading Port
majority went a step further and found that the employer's rejection
of the union's card-based recognitional demand, coming after he had
already forfeited his right to a fair election by engaging in unfair
labor practices, was in itself an independent section 8(a)(5) violation."
This gave the Board aconvenient timing mechanism by which it made
bargaining orders retroactive to the date of the union's recognitional
39 See id.
40 See id. Interestingly, the NLRB regional director also brought an action in fed-
eral district court on behalf of the union for injunctive relief under § 10(j) of the Act,
29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1970), seeking among other things an interim bargaining order to
protect the union in the period before the Board's decision. Seeler v. Trading Port,
Inc., 88 L.R.R.M. 3293 (N.D.N.Y. 1974). The district court granted an injunction re-
straining the employer's unfair labor practices but refused to issue the bargaining order
because it felt that, under Cissel, the Board should first determine whether the
employer's unfair labor practices were sufficient to undermine the election. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the
interim bargaining order and in language substantially identical to the Board's language
in Trading Port held that such a bargaining order would issue where the NLRB regional
director could prove that the union at one point had a "clear majority" and that the
employer then engaged in "such egregious and coercive unfair labor practices as to
make a fair election virtually impossible." Seeler v. Trading Port, Inc., 517 F.2d 33, 40,
89 L.R.R.M. 2513, 2517 (2d Cir. 1975). The Circuit Court thus remanded the case to
the district court For a factual determination of whether the employer's unfair labor
practices were "so serious as to warrant the issuance of an interim bargaining order."
Id.
The "egregious and coercive" standard of the Second Circuit may be more dif-
ficult to meet than the Board's conduct "sufficient to undermine the union's majority
status" standard. In addition, the "clear majority" specified by the Second Circuit may
contemplate more than a showing of a simple or "bare" majority.
41
 Note the distinction between those § 8(a)(5) violations which consist of ,an
employer's outright refusal to recognize the union, 219 N.L.R.B. at 301, 89 L.R.R.M. at
1569, and those which consist of an employer instituting unilateral changes in working
conditions. 219 N.L.R.B. at 302, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1569-70. Both can occur only after a
bargaining obligation arises—either through a Board election or through presentation
of evidence of majority support. Yet each involve different substantive acts by the em-
ployer.
42 Compare Steel-Fab, 212 .
 N.L.R.B. at 363-64, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1476, with Trading
Port, 219 N.L.R.B. at 301, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1569.
" 219 N.L.R.B. at 301, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1569.
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demand. This timing mechanism served two purposes. First, the
Board fully protected the union's interests by granting it bargaining
rights from the date it proved majority status. Second, the Board did
not grant the union bargaining rights :; for a period in which it had not
proved its majority status----a result which would have followed if the
bargaining order were made retroactive to the pre-recognitional de-
mand date on which the employer commenced his unlawful
campaign. 4 4
In the Steel-Fab and Trading Port situations, the employer's un-
lawful campaign commences prior to the union's presentation of evi-
dence of majority status.45 In these situations, the employer has for-
feited his right to an election and must bargain with the union on the
basis of the cards." His refusal to so bargain violates section 8(a)(5). A
slightly different situation is presented where the employer under-
mines the election by the commencement of an unlawful campaign
after the union's presentation of majority status. The strict holding of
Trading Port would make the bargaining order in the latter situation
retroactive only to the date upon which the employer "embarked on a
clear course of unlawful conduct" and not to the date upon which the
union presented evidence of majority support. 47 In addition, under
these circumstances, the employer's • prior refusal to recognize the
union would not violate section 8(a)(5), since at that time the em-
ployer had not forfeited his right to, an election. 48 In this situation,
the result of the Trading Port decision would be that in the time be-
tween the union's show of majority status and the commencement of
the employer's unfair labor practices, the employer would still be free
to undermine the union's position by instituting unilateral changes.
Thus, while the rule in Trading Port serves to guarantee the full bar-
gaining rights that arise when the union's proof of its majority status
is made after the commencement of the employer's unlawful practices,
it does not fully protect the union which proves its majority status
before the employer's unlawful campaign. This result seems contrary' to
the policy enunciated in Gissel that when an employer makes a fair
election impossible, the union's majority status is determined by its
presentation of the authorization cards. 49 The better view would be to
broaden the rule in Trading Port so that bargaining orders are made
retroactive to the date the union presented evidence of majority sup-
port, and not to the date the employer commenced his unfair labor
" This analysis is supported by a subsequent Survey decision, Ann Lee
Sportswear, 220 N.L.R.B. No. 153, 90 L.R.R.M. 1352 (1975), where the Board inter-
preted Trading Port as 'substantially" modifying the Steel-Fab rule that it is unnecessary
to find a violation of § 8(a)(5) as a predicate to ordering bargaining. Id. at 1353 n.6.
46 Steel-Fab, 212 N.L.R.B. at 372, 86 L.R:R.M. at 1475; Trading Port, 219 N.L.R.B.
at 298, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1565.
46 See Linden Lumber, 419 U.S. at 309-10. See note 8 supra.
47 219 N.L.R.B. at 301 , 89 L.R.R.M. at 1569.
4" Linden Lumber, 419 U.S. at 309-10. See note 8 supra.
49 See Gissel, 395 U.S. at 614-15. See text at notes 4-8 supra.
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practices. This result would have the beneficial effect of eliminating
the problem of defining the exact point at which the employer's un-
fair labor practices sufficiently undermined the election once the
Board determines that the totality of the unfair labor practices was
sufficient. 50 This approach would not seem unduly unfair to an em-
ployer who has been put on notice of the union's majority status yet
nonetheless proceeds to undermine the Board's election machinery by
committing unfair labor practices.
Notwithstanding the difficulties that may arise by limiting re-
troactive issuance of a bargaining order to the date as of which an
employer commences an unlawful course of conduct, the Board's de-
cision in Trading Port, viewed in its remedial sense, is essentially cor-
rect. From a remedial viewpoint, purely prospective bargaining orders
do not sufficiently protect the union. An employer can freely under-
mine the union by instituting unilateral changes throughout the
period before the Board's decision. Given the Board's slow-working
adjudicative process, this period could last as long as two years." As
the Supreme Court in.Gissel pointed out, by, the time the Board makes
its decision, the employer may see no need to engage in further un-
lawful activity.52 At this point the damage will have been done. Giving
retroactive effect to a bargaining order may not be a complete remedy
in itself, but it does go a long way towards redressing any unfair ad-
vantages an employer may obtain while the union seeks its remedy be-
fore the Board. It allows the Board to apply its broad remedial
machinery to offset as far as possible the employer's unilateral
changes in working conditions." Also, it could have the type of deter-
rent effect on future employer misconduct contemplated by the Gissel
Court."
The practical application of the Trading. Port decision will proba-
bly faIl short of the caveat in Gissel that "perhaps the only way to ef-
fectuate employee rights is to re-establish the conditions as they ex-
isted before the employer's unlawful campaign." 55 As the Senate Re-
port stated in regard to the need for effective remedies:
Time is usually of the essence in these matters, and conse-
55 Gissel contemplates that the Board evaluate the totality of the employer's unfair
labor practices to determine whether a bargaining order is appropriate, 395 U.S. at
614, and recognizes that there could be less extensive unfair labor practices which, be-
cause of their minimal impact on the election machinery, would not sustain a bargain-
ing order. Id. at 615. The Trading Port decision contemplates determining the exact
date when the employer's unfair labor practices reached the point when the bargaining
order must issue, 219 N.L.R.B. at 301, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1569, so that the bargaining
order can be made retroactive to that date. Making the order retroactive to the date of
the union's recognition demand obviates the need for such a determination.
" In Trading Port, the union presented the cards on September 4, 1973. The
Board decision was issued July 18, 1975. See 219 N.L.R.B. at 298, 89 L.R.R.M. at
1565-66.
52
 395 U.S. at 612.
53 See 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1970). See Gissel, 395 U.S. at 612 n.32.
54 395 U.S. at 612.
55 Id.
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quently the relatively slow procedure of Board hearing and
order, followed many months later by an enforcing decree
of the circuit court of appeals, falls short of achieving the
desired objectives—the prompt elimination of the obstruc-
tions to the free flow of commerce and encouragement of the
practice and procedure of free and private collective bargaining."
By the time a union gains a retroactive bargaining order, the
employer's unfair labor practices may have undermined the majority
status of the union and its ability to act prospectively as the em-
ployees' bargaining representative in an effective manner." If the
union is so undermined, the employer might succeed in a decertifica-
tion petition after the union's guaranteed one year bargaining period
expires." The Trading Port remedy also lacks complete effectiveness,
since a union can not realistically seek to remedy those unilateral
changes that have benefited employees such as wage increases and
promotions. However, this type of deficiency is inherent in all Board
remedies. That a remedy is incomplete is no basis for its rejection,
particularly where even incomplete remedies can have a deterrent ef-
fect upon future employer misconduct. Therefore, notwithstanding
some deficiencies in the decision, Trading Port represents a significant
and much needed departure from the policies enunciated in prior
Board decisions.
D. Super-Seniority: Dairylea Cooperative, Inc.
It is well-recognized that "Cblecause a labor agreement assumes
the proper adjustment of grievances at their source, ..."' union
chairmen, or stewards, play a crucial rote in the process of collective
bargaining. 2 In order to protect the grievance procedure from the po-
" S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1947) (emphasis added) (in regard to
the Board's injunction remedies under § 10(j), 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1974)
"See Gissel, 395 U.S. at 611 n.31, where it was pointed out how interest in the
union wanes over time.
" 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1970), A proMising avenue to more complete relief is
foreshadowed in the Circuit Court version of Trading Port. See Seeler v. Trading Port,
Inc., 517 F.2d 33, 89 L.R.R.M. 2513 (2d Cir. 1975). See note 40 supra. The district
court opinion in Seder came only nine months after the union's recognitional demand
and seven months after the election. See Seeler v. Trading Port, Inc., 88 L.R.R.M. 3293.
3294 (N.D.N.Y. 1974). In the future, speedy action by the NLRB regional director to
obtain a preliminary injunction against the employer's unfair labor practices and an in-
terim bargaining order will help protect the union in the period before the Board's de-
cision.
See Aeronautical Indus, Dist. Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521, 528 (1949).
2 Id. Although grievance pt2ocedures, and hence the role of the union steward,
differ from one labor contract to another, the position of union steward may be de-
scribed generally as follows: As a representative of employees in his bargaining unit, the
union steward handles the initial steps in process of grievance adjustments. If disputes
between employee and supervisor cannot be settled by the parties themselves, it is the
union steward's responsibility to attempt settlement and, if no agreement is reached, to
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tential discontinuity caused by layoffs and recalls of union stewards,
many collective bargaining contracts grant top seniority status to indi-
viduals serving as union chairmen, irrespective of the time they have
served on the job.
The Supreme Court legitimized the use of "superseniority7 pro-
visions in Aeronautical Industrial District Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 3 reason-
ing that:
One of the safeguards insisted upon by unions for the ef-
fective functioning of collective bargaining is continuity in
office for its shop stewards or union chairmen. To that
end, provision is made against laying them off merely
on the basis of temporal seniority. Because [these
employees] are union chairmen, they are not regarded as
merely individual members of the union; they are in a spe-
cial position' in relation to collective bargaining for the
benefit of the whole union. To retain them as such is not
an encroachment on the seniority system but a due regard
of union interests which embrace the system of seniority
rights."
During the Survey year, the Board faced the problem of defining
the point at which this legitimate manipulation of the union steward's
seniority status becomes discriminatory encouragement of union activ-
ity violative of sections 8(a)(l), 8(a)(3), 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the
Act. 5
submit the grievance to higher levels in the grievance arbitration process. See Neil W.
Chamberlain, SOURGEBOOK ON LABOR, ch. 9 (1964); Neil W. Chamberlain, COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING, ch. 5 (1951). Chamberlain describes the grievance procedure as one which
is to most unionists, the heart of collective bargaining. The day to day ap-
plications of the terms of the agreement determine whether a person re-
ceives the wage rate to which he is entitled, is given first refusal of a job
opening to which his seniority gives him claim, is not laid off out of turn,
can call his foreman to account for discriminatory treatment or unwar-
ranted discipline. Any "gripe" over his treatment can have its outlet in a
recognized process in which his union representative takes the matter up
with his supervisor. If the issue is unresolved at this stage and if the union
believes his complaint is well founded, management people at several
higher levels can be required to reexamine the matter in conferences with
union officials. If these bilateral discussions fail to produce agreement on
whether the employee has been fairly treated, the union may demand ar-
bitration. For John Jones, the man at the bench, the grievance process is
the subject's right to dispute the king; it is the means by which
management's exercise of power can be made reasonable and responsible.
Chamberlain, SoURcE.BooK ON LABOR at 191.
3 Campbell, 337 U.S. at 528.
' Id. at 527.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1),(a)(3),(b)(1)(A),(b)(2) (1973). Section 158 provides in perti-
nent part that:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer —
(1) To interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of' employment or
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In Dahylea Cooperative, Inc., 5 a collective bargaining agreement
granted top seniority to union chairmen, or stewards, regardless of
their length of service.' Pursuant to this superseniority provision,
however, the union steward obtained top seniority status not only with
respect to layoff and recall, "but also with respect to all contractual
benefits where seniority is a consideration." 8 With top seniority, the
union chairman received such on-the-job advantages as preference in
the assignment of overtime; the opportunity to select shifts, hours, va-
cation periods, and days off; and preference on assignment to various
desirable positions in the plant."
In Dairylea, the dispute arose after the company had invited em-
ployee bids for a new driver route. After the bidding had occurred,
the company awarded the route to the union steward, even though an
employee who was senior in length of service had also submitted a
bid. Both parties agreed that were it not for the steward's supersenior-
ity status, the route would have been awarded to the employee who
had served the company the longest.'"
In unfair labor practice charges filed against the employer and
the union, it was asserted that since selection for the union steward
any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization	 ;
and that:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157 of this title ...
(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against
an employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) of this section or to discrimi-
nate against an employee with respect to whom membership in such or-
ganization has been denied or terminated on some ground other than his
failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly re-
quired as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership.
§ 157 provides that:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also
have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the ex-
tent that such a right may be affected by an agreement requiring member-
ship in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in
section 8(a)(3).
219 N.L.R.B. 656, 89 L.R.R.M. 1737 (1975), affd sub. nom. NLRB v. Milk Driv-
ers & Dairy Emp., Local 338, 531 F.2d 1162:91 L.R.R.M. 2929, 2d Cir,, 1976. The
Board's decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on the
grounds that the inferences drawn by the Board when deciding the case were reason-
able. See 531 F.2d 1162, 1165, 91 L.R.R.M. 2932 (2d Cir., 1976).
The provision in question required that "the steward shall be considered the
senior employee in the craft in which he is employed." 219 N.L.R.B. at 657, 89
L.R.R.M. at 1737.
A 219 N.L.R.B. at 657, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1737 (1975) (emphasis added).
ld.
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position was based on the degree of involvement in union activity,"
the broad superseniority clause discriminated against those employees
choosing to refrain from active union involvement." The union coun-
tered that the superseniority clause was valid, regardless of the pur-
pose it served, because it was a provision created by the collective bar-
gaining contract and ratified by union employees. Further, the union
argued that before the Board could reach the issue of discrimination,
it had to find that the superseniority clause was written into the con-
tract in order to effectuate some discriminatory design."
A majority of the Board agreed with the General Counsel and
held that the superseniority clause constituted an unlawful encour-
agement of union activism." The Board found that under the ar-
rangement in Dairylea, actual seniority was not enough to afford an
employee the opportunity to acquire the wide range of on-the-job
benefits and privileges accorded stewards. It was noted that, realisti-
cally, the only way to become a union steward and gain such on-the-
job benefits was to be "a good, enthusiastic unionist," whereby the
employee could "[recommend] himself to the union hierarchy for ap-
pointment to the office of steward."" An employee who refrained
from union activity would permanently preclude himself from obtain-
ing the broad benefits available to the union steward through super-
seniority. Since the superseniority provision thus made the availability
of certain job rights and benefits dependent upon union activities, the
Board found the clause to violate sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), 8(b)(1)(A),
and 8(b)(2) of the Act.' 6 The majority saw in the superseniority provi-
sion an "inherent tendency ... to discriminate against employees for
union-related reasons, and thereby to restrain and coerce employees
with respect to the exercise of their rights protected by section 7 of
the Act." 17
"Id.
1!
	Following the mandate of § 7 of the NLRA set forth in note 4 supra, courts
have been watchful of the manner in which employers and unions maintain a separa-
tion between the grant of on-the-job benefits and preferences, and union involvement.
In Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954), for example, the Court sustained a
Board order directing the union to reimburse an employee who had lost his seniority
benefits for delinquency in the payment of his union dues. The Court explained that:
The policy of the Act is to insulate employees' jobs from their organiza-
tional rights. Thus, 11§ 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) were designed to allow em-
ployees to freely exercise their right to join unions, be good, bad, or indif-
ferent members, or abstain from joining any union with imperiling their
livelihood.
Id. at 40. See also NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 231 (1963); Jones v.
TWA. 495 F.2d 790, 86 L.R.R.M. 2086 (2d Cir. 1974); Steelworkers Local 1070, 86
L.R.R.M. 2086 (2d Cir. 1974); Steelworkers Local 1070, 171 N.L.R.B. 945, 946-47, 68
L.R.R.M. 1215, 1216-17 (1968).
13 219 N.L.R.B. at 657, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1738.
"Id.
" The Board found that: "There is nothing a unit employee can do, apart from
being a steward, to acquire such preferences for himself." Id.
" 219 N.L.R.B. at 657, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1738. See note 11 supra.
" 219 N.L.R.B. at 658, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1739.
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In so holding, the majority dismissed the union's suggestion that
because the clause had been ratified by the whole unit, the provision
was purely a matter of contract, and as such, should be free from the
Board's scrutiny as to purpose and effect:" "Because seniority affects
conditions of employment, there can be no real question but that it
must conform to the requirements of the Act."" The majority also re-
jected the argument that the clause served the lawful purpose of rec-
ognizing and encouraging service as a union steward. 2° It viewed the
encouragement of employees to serve as stewards to be the union's
problem, pointing out that there were other ways to encourage union
service short of "requiring that rank-and-file employees, whether or
not they support the union, subsidize its stewards by surrendering to
them certain job benefits or privileges in return for the steward's
union activity. ',21
According to the majority, the only acceptable justification for
maintaining a superseniority clause lay in the narrow circumstance in
which the grant of top seniority status was clearly related to the
steward's duties as an adjustor of employee grievances. The majority
found that such a view was mandated by Campbell, where the union
stewards were insulated from layoffs only because job continuity was
necessary for the proper discharge of their responsibilities as stew-
ards, which in turn was necessary for the enforcement of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement." The Board recognized that a supersen-
iority clause that is limited to layoff and recall may be proper "even
though it, too, can be described .as tying ... anon-the-job benefit to
union status."23 It reasoned, however, that where superseniority
privileges have no relation to the effective functioning of the union
steward in his role in the collective bargaining process, there is no jus-
tification for maintaining such seniority. Thus, the board concluded
that superseniority clauses which were not expressly confined to layoff
and recall were presumptively invalid. The presumption of invalidity
may be rebutted only by showing how a broader clause is necessary
for the performance of the union steward's job. 24
Member Fanning, in dissent, took issue with the manner in
which the majority presumed a violation of the Act from the existence
" Such an argument was suggested in Campbell, where the Court found that:
... seniority rights derive their scope and significance from union
contracts.... There are great variations in the use of the seniority
principle ... bearing on the time when seniority begins, determination of
the units subject to the same seniority, and the consequences which flow
from seniority. All these variations disclose limitations upon the dogmatic
use of the principle of seniority in the interest of the ultimate aims of col-
lective bargaining. 337 U.S. at 526.
"219 N.L.R.B. at 659, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1739.
sold.
21 id.
"Id. See Campbell, 337 U.S. 521, 527-29 (1949).
" 219 N.L.R.B. at 658, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1738.
"Id. at 658, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1739.
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of the superseniority clause. Fanning pointed out that there was no
evidence in the record that stewards were selected on the basis of
union involvement or support. He also asserted that no evidence dem-
onstrated any relationship between - the , benefits associated with stew-
ard service and employees' choices to support or refrain from sup-
porting the union. 25 This lack of evidence, according to the dissent,
should have resulted in a dismissal of the claim:
To find a violation of the law when both the apparent
purpose and effect of the act are lawful, it is not enough
that there could be some hidden and unlawful purpose or
possible unlawful effect. That hidden purpose must be
bared, the likelihood of that conjectured effect be
proven.... lilt is unjust and unreasonable to clothe out-
wardly lawful conduct with a semblance of illegality woven
wholly from conjecture and supposition."
Fanning also differed with the majority on the significance of
Campbell. 27 Fanning read Campbell as illustrating the importance of the
role of union steward in effectuating the policies of the NLRA. Ac-
cording to the dissent, "service as a steward is a 'public service' in the
context of the NLRA."29 Encouraging such service encourages and
fosters the collective bargaining process. Therefore, the dissent ar-
gued that:
As there is no evidence of any discrimination in the selec-
tion of stewards, and no basis for concluding that measur-
ing seniority, in the first instance, by service to the union as
a steward violates the Act as a matter of law ... there is
clear failure of proof of any violation of the Act. 29
In sum, Member Fanning would give controlling weight to the public
interest in fostering the collective bargaining process by encouraging
service as a union steward, and would thus place a presumption of
validity upon superseniority clauses. Further, Fanning would place the
evidentiary burden on the challenging party to prove that the provi-
sion has the purpose and effect of encouraging or rewarding union
activity.
It is submitted that the differences between the majority and the
dissent turned on their respective willingness to perceive the issue of
discrimination as operative in this case. In Dairylea, the majority found
that it was called upon to balance Iwo competing policies presented by
the superseniority issue. One is the policy mandating that, where pos-
sible, the collective bargaining process should be encouraged and
"Id. at 662, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1740.
"Id.
" See Id. at 662.63, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1740-41.
"Id. at 663, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1741,/diming Campbell, 337 U.S. 521 (1949) and
Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 945 U.S. 330 (1953).
" 219 N.L.R.B. at 663, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1741.
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fostered." To the extent, then, that the role of union steward is a
necessary part of that process, public policy demands that the position
of union steward be maintained and encouraged. The second policy
consideration is that expressed by section 7, which demands that the
fact of union activity or non-activity be completely irrelevant to the
decision to grant or withhold on-the-job benefits. 3 '
According to the dissent, however, Dairylea raised issues concern-
ing only one of these policies: that of fostering the collective bargain-
ing process. Member Fanning refused to consider the possibility of
discrimination on the basis of union involvement unless a discrimina-
tory motive and effect were alleged and proved.32
It is submitted that the dissent's perspective on the issues pre-
sented by the case is an unnecessarily narrow one. In previous cases in
which an employer's or union's intent to discriminate in a section
8(a)(I), 8(a)(3), 8(b)(1) or 8(b)(2) claim was placed in issue,33 it has
been recognized that "specific evidence of such subjective intent is not
an indispensable element of proof." 34 For example, in NLRB v. Erie
Resistor Corp.," the Supreme Court explained that
some conduct may by its very nature contain the implica-
tions of the required intent; the natural and foreseeable
consequences of certain action may warrant the
inference.... The existence of discrimination may at times
be inferred by the Board, for it is permissible to draw on
experience in factual inquiries."
Aside from the fact that the Board's inference of discrimination
was legally permissible in light of Erie Resistor, it is also clear that the
inference is logically supportable. Where access to a wide range of
on-the-job benefits and preferences is preconditioned upon top
seniority, where top seniority is granted to union stewards alone, and
where selection as a union steward is based upon the quality and
amount of union involvement, a simple process of deduction suggests
that a clause granting top seniority to union stewards is actually a
30 See id. at 658, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1738. Cf. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. U.S. 171 (1967);
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939).
31 219 N.L.R.B. at 658, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1738. See also cases cited in note I 1 supra.
32 See 219 N.L.R.B. at 662, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1740.
33 E.g., NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 224 (1963); Radio Officers v.
NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 45 (1954).
34
 NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 227 (1963). This reasoning was
crucial to the court of appeals' affirmance. NLRB v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Emp., Local
338, 531 F.2d 1162, 1165-66, 91 L.R.R.M. 2929, 2930-31, 2d Cir. (1976), aff g Dairylea
Corporation, Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 656, 89 L.R.R.M. 1737 (1975).
32 NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
" Id. at 227, quoting Teamsters Local v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 675 (1961). See also
Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954), where the Court indicated that "an
employer's protestations that he did not intend to encourage or discourage must be un-
availing where a natural consequence of his action was such encouragement or discour-
agement." Id. at 45.
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provision which reserves job preferences to a small group selected on
the basis of union involvement. Therefore, it appears to have been
entirely proper for the Board to reach the issue of the discriminatory
effect of the superseniority clause and to attempt to strike a balance
between the conflicting policies of allowing employers and unions to
make provisions insuring the effectiveness of the union steward and
of maintaining a distinct separation between an employee's opportun-
ity to receive job benefits and hig or her union involvement.
It is further submitted that the result reached by the Board con-
stitutes a flexible balance of the two competing interests involved.
Employers and unions may still include broad superseniority clauses
in their contracts. Further, such clauses may be as broad as is neces-
sary to insure the proper functioning of a union steward within a
bargaining unit. It is only where the benefits received are unnecessary
to the maintenance of the union steward's role that the clauses be-
come an encroachment upon the section 7 rights of other employees.
III. ENFORCEMENT OF LABOR INJUNCTIONS—MUNIZ; PARTIN
Section 11 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act insures a jury trial to
any person charged with contempt "[i]n all cases arising under this
Act."' The provision was enacted in response to the wide-spread judi-
cial practice of citing strikers for contempt rather than prosecuting
them for criminal violations, thereby circumventing defendants' right
to trial by jury. 2
 In 1948, pursuant to a revision of the criminal code, 3
section 11 of Norris was repealed. It was replaced by 18 U.S.C.
§ 3692, which provides that:
In all cases of contempt arising under the laws of the
United States governing the issuance of injunctions or re-
straining orders in any case involving or growing out of a
labor dispute, the accused shalt enjoy the right to a trial by
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the con-
tempt shall have been committed. 4
In this revision, specific references to the Norris-LaGuardia Act con-
tained in section 11 were deleted, and the protection of a jury trial
was made to cover "all cases of contempt ... in any case involving or
growing out of a labor dispute."
Despite the broad language of the recodification, section 3692
was construed very narrowly in two cases decided during the Survey
year. In Muniz v. Hoffman, 5
 the Supreme Court refused to apply sec-
1
 29 U.S.C. § 111 (1947), repealed and recodified as 18 U.S.C. § 3692 (1970).
2 See A. Cox & D. BOK. LABOR LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 75 (7th ed. 1969). See
also Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1970).
Criminal violations of federal law are codified generally in Title Eighteen of the
United States Code.
18 U.S.C. § 3692 (1970).
5 422 U.S. 454 (1975).
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tion 3692 where the criminal contempt citation arose from disobedi-
ence of an injunction issued under section 10(1) of the NLRA. 9 Fol-
lowing Muniz, the Fifth Circuit further narrowed the scope of section
3692' by denying the defendant a jury trial where the criminal con-
tempt involved violation of an injunction allowable under section 301
of the Labor Management Relations Act. 9
A. Muniz v. Hoffman
In Muniz, the Board, pursuant to its injunctive powers under
section 10(0, 9 sought to enjoin secondary picketing by a typographers'
union against a newspaper publishing plant."' When two successive
temporary injunctions failed to halt this activity, the district court
cited several union officials and the local for civil contempt." Subse-
quently, however, the proscribed activity increased, as other unions,
including that of the petitioner, participated. In response to this addi-
tional activity, various unions and officials were ordered to show cause
why they should not be held in civil and criminal contempt." On the
basis of section 3692, the defendants requested a jury trial in the
criminal contempt proceeding. The district court denied the request
and found the defendants guilty." The court of appeals affirmed."
In affirming the judgment of the court of appeals on the issue
of whether the defendants' had a right to a jury trial, the Supreme
Court narrowly applied section 3692 and HELD: The provision af-
fords defendants no statutory right to a jury trial upon citation for
criminal contempt of a 10(1) injunction."'
6 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1970). This section provides, in pertinent part, that if, after
preliminary investigation of certain unfair labor practice charges, there exists "reasona-
ble cause to believe such chargels are] true, 'the investigator shall,' on behalf of the
Board, petition any U.S. district court ... for appropriate injunctive relief pending the
final adjudication of the Board." Id.
United States v. Partin, 524 F.2d 992, 90 L.R.R.M. 3299 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied,—U.S.-9I L.R.R.M. 2794 (1976).
" Labor Management Relations Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (197W. Section 301(a)
provides that:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce ... may be
brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
parties, without respect to the amount in controversy ....
In Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U.S. 235, the Supreme Court established
that despite the strong language of § 4 of the Norris LaGuardia Act prohibiting federal
courts from issuing injunctions "in any case involving or growing out of any labor dis-
pute," 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970), the policies underlying § 301 required that injunctive re-
lief be available to implement the arbitration process as a peaceful method of settling
labor disputes. Id. at 249-53.
" The pertinent sections of 10(1) are set forth in note 6 supra.
10 422 U.S. 454, 456 (1975).
'' Id. at 457.
la Id.
" Id.
" 492 F.2d 929, 931, 85 L.R.R.M. 2353, 2353. (9th Cir. 1974).
la 422 U.S. at 461. Defendants also raised issues concerning their constitutional
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The majority found two factors to be controlling in its interpre-
tation of section 3692. First, the Court found pivotal significance in
the fact that section 3692 was a recodification of pre-existing law
rather than a new enactment with its own independent substance."'
Second, the Court found it necessary to "accommodate" the broad
language of section 3692 with the enforcement provisions of the
Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts in order to preserve the remedial
powers granted to the courts by these statutes."
As a recodification of pre-existing law, section 3692 was seen to
require the application of two special rules of statutory construction.
The first of these rules mandated that a revision was not to be consid-
ered a change in substantive law, but rather was to be considered
the result of "substitution of plain language for awkward terms, rec-
onciliation of conflicting laws, omission of superseded sections, and
consolidation of similar provisions."' Accordingly, the Court read sec-
tion 3692 simply as a restatement of section 11 which, in the
majority's opinion, provided the procedural protection of a jury trial
only where the contempt involved injunctions arising under the
Norris-LaGuardia Act."' The Court then pointed to a second rule stat-
ing that no change in law or policy was to be presumed from the
plain language of the revision unless there appeared in the legislative
history an explicit intention to do so. 2° Thus, in that the legislative
history and the Revisors' Notes accompanying section 3692 were very
sparse, containing no discussion of an intention to broaden the scope
right to a jury trial in a criminal contempt proceeding. The Court applied the well-
established common law rule that the constitutional right to a trial by jury does not ex-
tend to criminal contemnors where the penalty imposed is "light" enough to charac-
terize the contempt as a "petty offense." See id. at 475-77, following Codispoti v. Penn-
sylvania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974); Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974); Baldwin v. New
York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970); Frank v. United States 395 U.S. 147 (1969); Bloom v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 194 (1968). The court was reluctant to determine the point at which the im-
position of a One without a prison sentence becomes serious enough to warrant the
procedural safeguard of a jury trial, but found in this case that "although the fine is not
insubstantial, it is not of such magnitude that the union was deprived of whatever right
to jury trial it might have under the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 477.
le 422 U.S. at 468-69.
" Id, at 458-67. In so doing, the court evidently assumed that the ability to
punish violations of Board orders by criminal contempt without a jury trial gave these
orders a force which they would not . otherwise have.
'" Id, at 469, quoting H.R. REP. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1947). See also C.
DALLAS SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 28.10 (4th ed. 1972). Cf.
Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 256 (1952).
" 422 U.S. at 463-64.
"M. at 470, quoting U.S. v. Ryder, 110 U.S. 729, 740 (1884). See also C. DALLAS
SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 28.10 (4th ed. 1972); Tidewater Oil
Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 162 (1972); Fourco Glass v. Trans mirra Corp., 353
U.S. 222, 227 (1957). Cf. Ex Parte Colletti, 337 U.S. 55, 70 (1948); Western Pac. R.R.
Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 255 (1952). The Court further noted that
as an exception to the "historic rule" that a jury trial was not required in the case of
either civil or criminal contempt, section 3692 was to be read no more broadly than was
specifically indicated. 422 U.S. at 462.
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of section 11, 2 ' the majority refused to read the reenactment as hav-
ing any applicability broader than its predecessor, section 11. Viewing
the instant case as one "arising under" the NLRA, and not under the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Court found section 11 to be
inapplicable."
The Court's second ground of decision, its "accommodation"
theory, was based on the general observation that in certain circum-
stances, "exceptions to the applicability of a statute's otherwise all-
inclusive language [which] are not contained in the enactment itself
[may be] found in another statute dealing with particular situations to
which the first statute might otherwise apply." 23 To illustrate, the ma-
jority pointed to Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, where the Court
implied an exception to Norris-LaGuardia's strict limitations on the
power of federal courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes in order
to effectuate the policies of section 301 of the Labor Management Re-
lations Act. 24
In Muniz, as in Boys Markets, an exception to Norris-LaGuardia's
strict limitations on the power of federal courts was not explicit in the
later statute. While section 10(1) of the NLRA clearly presumes that
Norris's jurisdictional anti-injunction provisions do not apply to Board
orders, the section does not so presume as to Norris-LaGuardia's
procedural safeguards." Thus, the Court faced the question "whether
in enacting the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts, congress not only in-
tended to exempt injunctions they authorized from Norris-
LaGuardia's limitations, but also intended that civil and criminal
contempt proceedings enforcing those injunctions were not to afford
contemnors the right to a jury trial." The Court asserted that such an
exception could be so implied.
The Court first examined section 10(h) of the National Labor
Relations Act, which provides, in pertinent part, that: "when granting
appropriate temporary relief ... enforcing ... an order of' the Board
the jurisdiction of the courts sitting in equity shall not be limited
by 29 U.S.C. §§. 101-115 (Norris-LaGuardia)." Although arguably
the section 10(h) exemption of the Norris-LaGuardia Act applies only
to questions of federal court jurisdiction in enforcing a Board order, 27
the Court read the provision as intending to exclude all of the provi-
sions of Norris, including its procedural protections, when enforce-
ment of a Board order was involved.
I n support of this reading of 10(h), the Court cited legislative history
" See H.R. REP. Nu. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1947).
22 422 U.S. at 463.
23 /d. at 458.
2 ' Id. at 459-61. See note 8 supra for a discussion of the Boys Markets analysis of §
301.
25 See note 6 supra, where the text of 10(1) is set forth.
'° 422 U.S. at 461.
37 See id. at 486 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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which strongly suggested that. Congress intended to make inapplicable all
of the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in such enforcement
proceedings."
Additionally, the Court asserted that an exception to section 11
could be implied from a common understanding of the mechanics of
each statute." The majority pointed out that, historically, no serious
argument could be made "that, at the time of enactment of the
Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts, civil or criminal contempt charges
arising from violations of injunctions authorized by those statutes
were to be tried by jury." 3 ° First, the historic rule at the time of the
enactment of Wagner and Taft-Hartley was that "absent contrary
provision by rule or statute, jury trial was not required in the case of
either civil or criminal contempt." 3 ' Second, section 11 was limited by
its own terms and by case law to contempts arising under the Norris-
LaGuardia Act," According to case law, injunctions issued under the
authority of the Wagner or Taft-Hartley Acts were not issued
"under," but rather, "in spite or Norris-LaGuardia." Therefore, sec-
tion 11 was, on its face, inapplicable to 10(/) injunctions. 34
The dissenters in Muniz took issue both with the Court's reading
of section 3692 in light of its legislative history, and with its efforts to
" For example, the majority pointed to language in the House Conference Re-
port on the Taft-Hartley Act which indicated that section 10(h) effectively made the
Norris LaGuardia Act ''inapplicable." 422 U.S. at 464, quoting H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1947). The majority further noted statements in the congressional
debates on the Taft Hartley Act which, in their view, illustrated a general understand-
ing that "the ... Norris-La Guardia Act is completely .suspended ... in the current Na-
tional Labor Relations Act whenever the Board goes into court to obtain an enforce-
ment order for one of its decisions." 93 CONG. REC. 4835 (1947) (remarks of Sen. Ball)
(emphasis added).
IP See 422 U.S. at 462-64.
30 422 U.S. at 462.
31 Id.
"Id. at 463. The Court accurately states that the language of section 11 limits
that provision to cases arising under the Norris LaGuardia Act. However, the majority
then assumes that this statutory language refers only to injunctions arising under the
Act. This may be a safe assumption, since many cases which invoke the Norris LaGuar-
dia Act do so in order to question the propriety of the issuance of a labor injunction.
See, e.g., United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947). It is submitted
however, that this assumption views too narrowly the scope of the Norris LaGuardia
Act. The Norris LaGuardia Act is protective legislation designed to foster union organi-
zation and activity "for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or pro-
tection." 29 U.S.C. 102 (1970); United Slates v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 231, 234-36
(1941). Its provisions have been invoked not only to shield organized labor from un-
warranted injunctions but also to protect it from judicial intrusion generally. United
States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 234-36 (1941). To determine whether these general
protections apply, courts have looked not to the nature of the injunction involved, but
to the nature of the underlying labor dispute: A case is found to "arise under" Norris
when it grows out of a "labor dispute" as defined by 13 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. * 113
(1970). Cf: United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 298 (1947), United
States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 239-36 (1941). See text at notes 60-65 infra.
33
 422 U.S. at 463. But see note 32 supra.
"Id.
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"accommodate" section 3692 to the policies of other labor statutes.
Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Powell asserted that the repeal of sec-
tion 11, and its subsequent reenactment as section 3692, was not with-
out substantive significance. 38 The dissenting Justices argued that ac-
cording to the plain language of the statute, section 3692 "encompas-
ses all cases of contempt arising under any of the several laws of the
United States governing the issuance of injunctions in cases of a 'labor
dispute, -38 including cases arising under 10(1). Justice Douglas, agree ,
ing with this conclusion, stressed in a separate dissent that section
3692 simply reaffirmed the original purpose of section 11, which was
"to shield the organized labor movement from the intervention of a
federal judiciary perceived by some as hostile to labor."'"
The dissent perceived nothing in the legislative history which
was inconsistent with a literal reading of section 3692. They pointed
out that the section 3692 Revisors' Notes simply indicated, without
more, that the section was "based on" section 11. 38 By contrast, where
the revisors had intended recodifications to simply restate prior law,
they explicitly stated their intent by noting that changes in phraseol-
ogy did not signify changes in substance." Accordingly, the dissent
inferred that a literal reading of section 3692 was preferable.
The dissent also reasoned that it was unnecessary to read section
3692 more narrowly in light of sections 10(1) and 10(h), because the
provisions in question were "entirely compatible."'" The dissent
pointed out that section 10(1) provides a jurisdictional basis for a dis-
trict court to grant injunctive relief, notwithstanding any other provi-
sion of law.'" The requirement of providing a contemnor with a jury
trial is, by contrast, a procedural right which in no way limits the juris-
diction allowed under 10(1). Like 10(l), 10(h) was also seen as con-
cerned merely with the jurisdiction of the federal court, and not with
the procedural rights granted by Norris." Thus, a literal reading of
section 3692 was viewed by the dissent as consistent with the National
Labor Relations Act's authorization of injunctions in certain cases."
Further, according to the dissent, there was no persuasive policy
33 Id: at 481 (Stewart, .1., dissenting).
33 Id. at 482.
37 Id. at 478. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
38 Id. at 484. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
39 Id. See, e.g., Revisors' Notes on the Recodifiction of 18 U.S.C. § 406, H.R. RI.P.
No. 304 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
41'422 U.S. at 485.
It Id. at 496. For the text of §10(1), 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1970), see note 6 supra.
42 422 U.S. at 486. The dissent posited two reasons for this interpretation of §
10(1). First, the dissenters argued that in denominating all of the sections of' the Norris
LaGuardia Act in 10(h), Congress did not intend to suspend the entire Act. This listing
was merely intended as a means to identify the Act. Second, the dissenters pointed out
that in cases where Congress had intended to exempt the entire Norris-LaGuardia Act,
it did so not by stating that the subsequent enactment "should not be limited by Norris,"
but by affirmatively providing that, with respect to the subsequent enactment, all of the
provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act were inapplicable. Id.
43 Id. at 485.
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argument for a limited reading of section 3692. The guarantee of the
right to a jury trial in cases of criminal contempt arising out of a 10(1)
injunction does not restrict the ability to obtain the injunction and
does not interfere with the enforcement power of the district courts to
issue strong civil contempt sanctions. Criminal sanctions are still avail-
able as well. According to the dissent's reading of section 3692, the
statute "would only require that prior to the imposition of criminal
punishment for violation of a court order the necessary facts must be
found by an impartial jury, rather than by the judge whose order has
been violated." 44
Lastly, viewing 18 U.S.C. § 3692 as part of the Criminal Code,
the dissent pointed out that where any ambiguity existed, canons of
statutory construction indicated that the ambiguity was to be resolved
in favor of the defendant. 45 Thus, the dissent concluded that section
3692 should be read literally to protect the contemnor in all cases aris-
ing out of a labor dispute.
It is submitted that the weight of authority supports the
majority's conclusion that section 3692 must be read as co-extensive
with its predecessor." Since the Revisors' Notes did not specifically de-
lineate the reach of section 3692, the canons of statutory interpreta-
tion cited by the Court clearly suggest that section 3692 should not be
applied any more broadly than section 11 would have been. 47 How-
ever, in limiting the scope.of section 3692 to the scope of its predeces-
sor section 11, there is the additional question of the appropriate in-
terpretation of section 11. 48 It is submitted that the Court's analysis of
the reach of section 11, both standing alone and in the context of sub-
sequent labor statutes, is open to question for two reasons.
First, as a restatement of section 11 of Norris, the legislative his-
tory of section 3692 indicates that an attempt was made to preserve
the original intent of Congress. 48 The original intent of Congress in
providing a jury trial to labor injunction contemnors was to place the
institution of a jury between the contemnor and the judge. 8° Argu-
ably, in order to preserve this congressional intent, it is necessary to
require a jury trial in criminal contempts of labor injunctions gener-
ally. The fact that the injunction was sought under the authority of
the Norris, Wagner, or Taft-Hartley Acts is irrelevant in effectuating
the original purpose of section 11. 5 '
"Id. at 488.
"Id. at 487, citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971); Rewis v.
United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971); Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. I, 9 (1959).
4° See authority cited in notes 18 and 20 supra.
47
 Ibid.
"See text at notes 49-67 infra.
" See S. REP. No. 1620, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1948).
" See text and note at 2 supra. Cf. United States v, Hutcheson, 3l2 U.S. 219,
324-36 (1941). See also In re Union Nacinal de Trabajadores, 502 F.2d 113, 120 87
1..R.R.M. 2237, 2241-42 (1st Cir. 1974), where the court discussed the dangers of a
non-jury trial in criminal contempt proceedings.
5 ' This reasoning formed the basis of Douglas' dissent. 422 U.S. 478-79 (Douglas,
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This view was adopted by the First Circuit in In re Union Na-
cional de Trabajadores,52 where contemnors of a 10(1) injunction were
found to have a right to a jury trial under section 3692. The court in
Union Nacional pointed out that "since a section 10(h) injunction may
be obtained without the high threshold of a showing of harm re-
quired by [section 7 of Norris], we fail to see why the need for a jury
to decide criminal contempt issues arising out of such proceedings is
diminished."53 According to the First Circuit, "reposing sole diaposi-
tive power in the judge seems as inappropriate as ever. The Judge,
who granted the injunction at the request of the Board, would • be
asked to mete out punishment if he finds that his order has been de-
liberately flouted." 59 Thus, in Union Nacional, the First Circuit found
that even when an injunction was sought by the Board acting on the
basis of public rather than individual employer interests, the policy
considerations underlying the necessity for the protections of a jury
trial were still present.
Second, the Court's willingness to imply a complete exception to
the Norris-LaGuardia Act by statutory accommodation stretches the
accommodation process beyond its legitimate scope. This process was
originally developed in response to the realization that:
"As labor organizations grew in strength and developed to-
ward maturity, congressional emphasis shifted from protec-
tion of the nascent labor movement to the encouragement
of collective bargaining and to administrative techniques for
the peaceful resolution of industrial disputes. This shift in
emphasis was accomplished, however, without extensive re-
vision of many of the older enactments, including the anti-
injunction section of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Thus it be-
came the task of the courts to accommodate, to reconcile
the older statutes with the more recent ones."
The Court recognized in its Boys Markets decision that this process in-
volved the consideration of the "total corpus of pertinent law and the
policies that inspired ostensibly inconsistent provisions."" In so doing,
however, the Court viewed its responsibility as "seek[ing] out that ac-
J., dissenting). It should be noted that in other cases where limitations or exceptions to
Norris have been found, the Court was not faced with the task of preserving the
original intent of the Congress. For example, in Boys Markets, Inc., v. Retail Clerks, 398
U.S. 235 (1970), the Court held that injunctive relief could be obtained under § 301 of
the L.M.R.A., 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970), dispiie the anti-injunction provisions of Norris.
In so doing, it explicitly departed from the original intent of the Act, stating that "the
Norris-LaGuardia Act was responsive to a situation totally different from that which ex-
ists today." 398 U.S. at 250. See also id. at 251-53.
52 502 F.2d 113 87 L.R.R.M. 2237 (1st Cir. 1979).
" Id. at 119.20, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2241.
34 Id. at 120, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2241.
55 Boys Markets lnc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U.S. 235. 251 (1970).
" ld. at 250.
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commodation of the two [conflicting statutory provisions] which will
give the fullest possible effect to the central purposes of both." 57
In Muniz, the Court faced the task of accommodating the policy
that labor injunction contemnors must have the procedural protection
of a jury trial, with the policy that the courts must have the power to
enforce Board orders and collective bargaining agreements. It is sub-
mitted that both the language and the policies of the sections "ac-
commodated" in Muniz are compatible, for it is possible to construe
section 1I of the Norris-LaGuardia Act as operable even when the
labor dispute involves an injunction issued under section 10(/) or sec-
tion 10(h) of the NLRA.
First, as the dissent suggests, 10(1) and 10(h) deal with the equity
jurisdiction of the federal courts." Strictly speaking, in criminal con-
tempt proceedings brought against a contemnor of a labor injunction,
the court does not proceed in equity." Therefore, the exceptions to
Norris which are contained in sections 10(1) and 10(h) may not apply.
Second, the language of section I 1 which states that the protec-
tion of a jury trial is afforded to contemnors in "cases arising under
this Act" need not be limited to situations in which injunctions are im-,
posed under the Norris-LaGuardia Act." To determine whether cases
"arise under" Norris it is appropriate to look to section 13 of that Act
which defines the type of labor dispute to which its various protec-
37 See Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 216 (1962) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added), upon which the decision in Boys Markets was based. 398
U.S. 235, 249 (1970).
38 422 U.S. at 486 (Stewart, J., dissenting),
38
 It has been generally recognized that even though a contempt proceeding may
"sound in" equity, a criminal contempt proceeding stems from the inherent power of
the court to vindicate its authority. Therefore, it is neither legal nor equitable but is sui
generis. See Gree,n v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, (1958); United States v. Barnett, 346
F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 1965); In re Manufacturers' Trading Corp., 194 F.2d 948 (7th
Cir. 1952).
" The majority disposes of this theory in a footnote, where it cites several cases
which, according to the Court, dismiss the possibility that the Norris LaGuardia Act has
any sphere of operation at all except in cases where the injunction is imposed pursuant
to Norris. 422 U.S. 463, n.5, and cases cited at 422 U.S. 474, n.12. It is submitted that
the cases cited by the Court do not authoritatively decide this question. For example, in
United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947), the Court did find that
none of the provisions of Norris applied where the injunction was issued outside the
framework of the Act. Id. at 289, 298. However, the crucial finding supporting the in-
applicability of Norris was not the fact that the injunction was issued outside the
framework of Norris, but rather, that the dispute in issue was not a labor dispute within
the meaning of § 13. Therefbre, the pivotal factor in determining whether or not a case
"arises under" the Norris LaGuardia Act is whether the case is a labor dispute within
the meaning of § 13.
The same rationale was used in two of the cases cited by the majority in note 12:
United States v. Robinson, 449 F.2d 925 78 L.R.R.M. 2663 (9th Cir. 1971). Mitchell v.
Barbee Lumber Co„ 35 F.R.D. 544 (S.D. Miss. 1964). Additional cases cited, such as
Schauffer v. Local 1291, 189 F. Supp. 737 47 L.R.R.M. 2171 (E.D. Pa. 1960) and
Brotherhood of Local Firemen & Enginemen v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R., 380 F.2d 570
65 L.R.R.M. 2246 (D.C. Cir. 1967), § 3692 was found not to apply where strikers were
held in civil not criminal contempt.
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tions against undue judicial intervention apply." For example, in
United States v. United Mine Workers, the Court found Norris to be en-
tirely inapplicable where the injunction which was violated by defen-
dants was issued outside of the framework of Norris." In so holding,
the Court looked beyond the source of the injunction and examined
the nature of the underlying labor dispute. In Mine Workers, Norris
was found inapplicable not because the injunction was not issued
under Norris, but because the labor dispute in question did not fall
within the terms of section 13." Thus when an injunction is issued
under 10(/), that injunction is properly considered to issue not "under,"
but "in spite or Norris. 64 However, the underlying labor dispute might
still be considered to "arise under" the Norris-LaGuardia Act for the
purposes of insuring its procedural protections. Even where the in-
junction was imposed pursuant to a statute other than Norris, the
procedural protections afforded by Norris might still be applicable, as
long as the dispute falls within the terms of section 13.
Finally, it could be argued that Norris-LaGuardia is totally inap-
plicable because it was aimed at the abuses which occurred when
private individuals resorted to the courts to squelch labor organization.
In this situation, the Board is acting in the public interest," and as
such, should have enforcement powers extending beyond those af-
forded by Norris. However, as the Muniz dissent suggests, the grant
of a jury trial in criminal contempt proceedings does not undercut the
jurisdiction of the courts to issue temporary restraining orders, in-
junctions, or civil or criminal contempt sanctions." Enforcement
power is retained. A proper accommodation, then,would be to give the
fullest possible effect to both provisions. Such a result would
. leave to the Board full power to request temporary re-
lief, and, in the event of noncompliance, to coerce obedi-
ence through civil contempt proceedings, without delay or
interposition of a jury. But it also leaves available, for rare
cases when punitive measures are after the fact deemed
necessary, the historic protection of a jury trial.""
B. United States v. Partin
In United States v. Partin," the Fifth Circuit faced the issue of
whether the Muniz holding could be extended to deny a jury trial to a
contemnor of a privately-sought injunction. In Partin, a union busi-
"' See note 32 supra. See also United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258,
289 (1947); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 234-36 (1941).
42 330 U.S. 258, 289 (1941).
63 Id.
" 4 The majority makes this suggestion at 422 U.S. at 463.
" See S. REP. No, 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1947).
418 422 U.S. at 487-88 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
" In re Union Nacional De Trabajadons, 502 F.2d 113, 121 87 L.R.R.M. 2242
(1st Cir. 1974).
6" 524 F.2d 992, 90 L.R.R.M. 3299 (5th Cir. 1975).
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ness agent was cited for criminal contempt for disobeying a temporary
restraining order issued by the district court under section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act." The defendant claimed the right
to a jury trial on the basis of section 3692. 7° Contending that the in-
junction and subsequent contempt charged arose out of a labor dis-
pute within the meaning of section 3692, the appellant argued that
Muniz should be limited to its facts. He asserted first that the Muniz
decision was appropriate only where the injunction was sought by the
Board, a governmental body obligated to act in the public interest,
and not where it was sought by a private individual." Secondly, the
appellant argued that the Muniz Court, deciding in the context of aloo injunction, relied heavily on section 10(h) in order to find an ex-
ception to section 3692. In Partin, the source of the injunction was sec-
tion 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, to which section 10(h) is
"clearly inapplicable." 72 The court found appellant's distinctions to be
valid, yet it found that the Muniz decision rested upon grounds which
were equally applicable to a section 301 injunction.
First, the court stated that the most compelling reason against
applying section 3692 in Muniz was not that the injunction had been
issued by the Board, but that section 3692 was a re-enactment of sec-
tion 11. As such, it was explicitly limited to injunctions "arising under"
Norris. 73
 As the injunction in question in Partin was issued under sec-
tion 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, the protections af-
forded in section 3692 could not apply.
Second, the court considered the importance of section 10(h) to
the Muniz analysis. Although the Fifth Circuit recognized that the
Court in Muniz relied heavily on section 10(h) to conclude that all of
the provisions of Norris were suspended in a 10(1) injunction, it sug-
gested that even without section 10(h), the Court would have reached
the same result. 74
 The critical factor, according to the Fifth Circuit
was the Court's reading of legislative intent in enacting exceptions to
the jurisdictional provisions of Norris. 73 Citing Mine Workers, the
Partin court concluded that where the injunction arose outside the
framework of Norris, the entire Act was to be viewed as inapplicable. 76
Further, the court rejected the argument that a jury trial for
contemnors of a section 301 injunction would be compatible with na-
tional labor policy. Such a view would, according to the court,
"amount to an unjustified encroachment on the power of the federal
courts to enforce injunctions issued under the Labor Management
Relations Act."
'31' 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970). 524 F.2d at 994-95, 90 L.R.R.M. at 3300.
TO 524 F.2d at 995, 90 L.R.R.M. at 330.
"1d. at 996, 90 L.R.R.M. at 3301.
"Id.
73 Id.
" Id. at 996 -97, 90 L.R.R.M. at 3301 -02.
"Id.
"Id. at 997, 90 L.R.R.M. at 3302.
" Id.
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It is submitted that the court's extension of Muniz to a contempt
of a section 301 injunction is improper. The majority's holding in
Muniz relied heavily on the statutory interplay of 10(1), 10(h), and sec-
tion 11. The conclusion that the Norris-LaGuardia Act was suspended
in Muniz was reached by examining the language and the legislative
history of 10(1) and 10(h). 78 There is no comparable language or legis-
lative history in section 301. 79 Thus, the argument that the entire
Norris-LaGuardia Act is suspended where a 301 injunction has been
violated is tenuous.
Further, the Fifth Circuit itself recognized that parts of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act do remain applicable, even where the source of
the injunction arises from section 301. 9 " The question for the courts
has been to determine which sections of the Act may be operative,
consistent with maintaining the effectiveness of collective bargaining
agreements." Thus, even according to its own terms, the Fifth
Circuit's exemption of section 11 in a section 301 injunction is not the
inevitable result of Muniz.
CONCLUSION
In deciding that section 3692 did not apply to injunctions sought
under section 10(1) or under section 301, the courts essentially made a
policy decision that the effectiveness of national labor statutes would
be furthered by protecting the injunctive powers of the courts rather
than by protecting the criminal contenmor. Therefore, the underlying
rationale of Muniz and Partin is based on a policy decision that the
10(1) and section 301 injunction should have the added clout of a
non jury contempt process, in spite of the plain words of section 3692
and the central purpose of section 11. As a result of this policy choice,
the courts have totally exempted the protections of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act where enforcement of a 10(1) or a 301 injunction is at
issue. As such, they have confined the right to a jury trial to cases
where an "obsolescing kind of injunction," 92
 available only under the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, is violated.
IV. ORGANIZATION AL RIGHTS. --DEFINITION OF "EMPLOYEES" UNDER
THE NLRA: Cedars Sinai
The question of who is an "employee" within the meaning of the
NLRA' is a crucial one. Workers who are considered "employees"
78
 422 U.S. at 461-67. See text at notes 27-34 supra.
78
 For the text of § 501, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970), see note 8 supra.
" 0
 524 F.2d at 997, n.12, 90 L.R.R.M. at 3302, n.12,
81
82
 In re Union Nacional de Trabajadores. 502 F.2d 113, 119 87 L.R.R.M. 2241
(1st Cir. 1974).
I See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970) which defines "employee" as including:
tAiny employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular
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under the Act have the statutory right to organize and bargain collec-
tively, while those who do not fall within the definition have no such
statutory protection.' Instead, they may exercise only such rights of
self-organization as their employer may wish to allow them.'
The NLRA definition of "employee," at the outset, includes "any
employee ... unless [the Act] explicitly states otherwise."' The Act
then quite explicitly lists those categories of workers who are not to be
considered "employees:" agricultural laborers, domestic servants, in-
dependent contractors, supervisors, and those employed by employers
subject to the Railway Labor Act. 5
 Furthermore, the term "employee"
is limited not only by the express statutory language of the NLRA;
both the courts and the NLRB, in interpreting the Act, have also de-
veloped certain common law exclusions which, for example, bar cer-
tain "managerial" and "confidential" employees from the Act's
protection!' The courts and the Board have reasoned that the in-
employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise, and shall in-
clude any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in
connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor
practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially
equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual employed as
an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person
at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any
individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any indi-
vidual employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an em-
ployer subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time, or
by any other person who is not an employer as herein defined.
2 See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
a 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1970) gives supervisors the right to join a labor organization
but states that "no employer subject to this subchapter shall be compelled to deem indi-
viduals defined herein as supervisors as employees for the purpose of any law, either
national or local, relating to collective bargaining." Id. The Act merely seeks to regulate
those who fall within its terms; those who do not fall within the terms of the Act handle
their labor affairs on a voluntary basis.
' 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970). Whether an individual is an "employee" is deter-
mined primarily from the "history, terms and purposes" of the NLRA. See NLRB v.
Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S.C, I I1, 124 (1944). Ciintrary to the position taken by
the respondents in Hearst, the definition of employee is not a matter of state law. Id. at
122-24.
5 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970). Persons employed by any other person who is not an
"employer" within the meaning of § 2(2). 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970), are also not "em-
ployees." Additionally, § 2(2) defines "employer" by a method of exclusion: the United
States or any wholly owned Government corporation, any Federal Reserve Bank, any
State or local government, and several other minor exceptions are not included within
the definition of 'employer.' Id.
See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 283-89 (1974); Ford Motor Co.,
66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322, 17 L.R.R.M. 394, 395 (1946). See also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1947).
"Managerial employees" are those who formulate and effectuate management
policies by expressing and making operative the decisions of their employer." Bell Aero-
space, 416 U.S. at 288, citing Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 N.L.R.B. 320, 323
n.4, 21 L.R.R.M. 1039 n. 4 (1947). "Confidential employees" are those "who receive
from their employers information that not only is confidential but also that is unavail-
able to the public, or to competitors, or to employees generally." H.R. REP. No. 245,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1947). "Confidential employees" are not, however, merely
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[crests of such employees, like the interests of "supervisors" who are
specifically excluded by the terms of the Act itself, align too closely
with the interests of management to warrant the protection of the
Act. 7
This Survey year, the NLRB again considered the proper defini-
tion of "employee" under the NLRA. In Cedars-Sinai Medical Cenler, 8
the Board addressed the issue of whether medical residents, interns,
and certain "clinical fellows" associated with a hospital ["housestaff"]
came within the Act's definition.° Cedars-Sinai came before the Board
as a petition for certification under section 9(c)(1)(A)." The petition
was brought by the Cedars-Sinai Housestaff Association, an organiza-
tion which sought to represent a unit of the medical center's house-
staff for the purposes of' collective bargaining." The employer-
medical center opposed the petition, claiming that the association was
not a "labor organization" within the meaning of the Act because it
did not purport to represent "employees." 12 A split Board agreed with
the employer" and dismissed the petition.'"
The majority concluded that the housestaff members were not
"employees" because it found that the housestaff were "primarily stu-
dents" engaged in graduate educational training." The majority ad-
those who work in the employer's labor relations departments. See Bell Aerospace, 416
U.S. at 283.84 & n.12. For a discussion of NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., sec 1974-1975
Annual Survey of Labor Relations and Employment Discrimination Law, 16 B.C. INn, &
Cont. L. REV. 977.82 (1975),
' These non-statutory exclusions reflect Congressional intent to assure manage-
ment of "faithful agents" who are "not subject to influence or control of unions" in per-
forming their work. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1947).
8 223 N.L.R.B. No. 57, 91 L.R.R.M. 1398 (1976).
The Board stated that an intern is a "medical school graduate serving his first
period of graduate medical training in a hospital." 91 L.R.R.M. at 1399. A resident is a
"physician who has completed an internship and serves a period of more advanced •
training, lasting from one to live years, in a speciality." Id. A clinical fellow is a "physi-
cian who has completed an internship and a residency" and is taking additional courses
to "qualify for certification in an identifiable sub-specialty of medicine." Id.
" 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(I)(A) (1970).
" 91 L.R.R.M. at 1398. The petitioner presumably sought to represent a unit of
professional employees under NLRA § 2(12), 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1970).
" 91 L.R.R.M. at 1398. A "labor organization" is defined as "any organization of
any kind . „ in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose ... of
dealing with employers ...." 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1970).
18 91 L.R.R.M. at 1400. The Board decided the case 4-1, with Member Fanning
dissenting.
"Id. Under § 9(c)( I), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1970), whenever a petition for cer-
tification is filed with the Board by an employee, employer, or "labor organization," the
Board, absent a consent election, will investigate the petition to determine whether a
"question of representation affecting commerce exists." If, after a hearing, the Board
finds that such a question of representation exists, it will direct an election. Id.
In Cedars-Sinai, the Board determined that no "question of representation" ex-
isted because it found that the party filing the petition, the Housestaff Association, was
not a "labor organization" under the NLRA since it did not represent "employees." 91
L.R.R.M. at 1400.
" 91 L.R.R.M. at 1399.
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mitted that the housestaff possessed certain "employee char-
acteristics:"'" the housestaff performed duties normally performed
by professional medical personnel such as direct patient care;
further, the housestaff received employee-like compensation consist-
ing in part of an annual stipend graduated according to each
member's tenure at the hospital." However, the Board found that the
patient care activities constituted "an integral part of a physician's
educational training"" and as such, were merely the "means by which
the learning process is carried out"—not the means by which these
members of the housestaff earned a living."' Further, the Board
found that the compensation received was more in the nature of a
scholarship or living allowance than compensation for services
rendered. 2° In reaching these conclusions, the majority attached great
importance to the fact that these patient care activities constituted
prerequisites to the licensing and certification requirements for
specialities and subspecialities in the practice of medicine." On the
basis of these factors, the majority concluded that the housestaff were
"primarily students," "not employees," and thus dismissed the petition
for certification."
In a lengthy and well-documented dissent, Member Fanning
took issue with the majority's conclusion that the categories of "stu-
dent" (or "primarily student") and "employee" are mutually
exclusive.23 First, the statutory definition of "employee" does not ex-
plicitly exclude students as it does other groups." Second, the policy
"Id. at 1399-1400. These patient care activities consist of "taking medical his-
tories, performing examinations, preparing medical records and charts, and developing
diagnostic and therapeutic plans." Id. at 1399. In general, according to a study initiated
by the Association of American Medical Colleges, approximately 80% of a housestaff
member's time is spent on direct patient care activities. See id. at 1403 (Member Fanning
dissenting). The housestaff receive graduated stipends, annual vacations, and paid holi-
days, as well as free health care. The housestaff also receive such fringe benefits as un-
iforms, free meals while on duty, and malpractice insurance. Id. at 1400.
" Id. at 1399-1400.
"Id. at 1400.
"Id. In making these findings, the Board relied heavily upon manuals entitled
ESSENTIALS OF AN APPROVED INTERNSHIP and ESSENTIALS OF APPROVED RESIDENCIES. These
manuals, prepared by the Council on Medical Education and approved by the AMA,
prescribe the standards for internships and residencies. Id. at 1399. They indicate that
the primary function of the housestaffs duties is educational, and characterize the
housestaff member's compensation as a scholarship. See 91 L.R.R.M. at 1400.
" Id. at 1399, 1400. The Board majority also emphasized the short tenure of
most of the members of the proposed unit at the medical center, finding that the aver-
age stay of residents and interns at Cedars-Sinai was less than two years. "Only a few
interns, residents, or clinical fellows can expect to, or do, remain to establish an em-
ployment relationship with Cedars-Sinai." Id. at 1400.
25 1d. at 1400.
"Id. at 1401-03 (Member Fanning dissenting). Member Fanning stated that the
simple fact that "an individual is learning while performing ... cannot possibly be said
to mark that individual as 'primarily a student and, therefore, not an employee' for
purposes of our statute." Id. at 1403, quoting id. at 1400.
"Id. at 1401 (Member Fanning dissenting). See text at note 4 supra.
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reasons underlying the nonstatutory exclusions do not apply, since
presumably the employment interests of students would not be
aligned with those of management. 25 Finally, Member Fanning
pointed out that by excluding students, the Board was deviating from
its previous decisions which had included students in a bargaining
unit. 2 ° Member Fanning therefore concluded that housestaff members
could be considered "employees" under the NLRA, even if they were
also students. 27
Member Fanning then set forth three reasons why he believed
that these particular 'students' were "employees" under the Act. First,
he found that the housestaff members were "employees" in a defini-
tional sense. Member Fanning pointed out that the Congressional def-
inition of "employee" implicitly includes "someone who works or per-
forms a service for another from whom he or she receives
compensation."38
 Member Fanning interpreted this definition literally,
and found that the nature of the consensual arrangernent between the
hospital and the housestaff, whereby housestaff members received
salaries, vacations, and other benefits while performing prescribed
duties for specified periods, denoted a sufficient employment status to
dispel any inference that their relationship with the hospital was solely
educational. 2" In effect, while Member Fanning did not deny that
there was a certain educational aspect to the housestaff's relationship
with the hospital, he believed that the "exhaustive indicia" of em-
ployment status were sufficient to find that the housestaff members
were also "employees" under the NLRA. 3 °
Secondly, Member Fanning also felt that the language of the
NLRA and its accompanying legislative history supported his conclu-
sion that the housestaff members were employees. Section 2(12) of the
" See text at notes 6-7 supra.
"Id. at 1401 (Member Fanning dissenting) citing Macke Company (II), Case 2
RC-16725 (unreported). The Macke II students were those originally excluded from the
unit found appropriate in Macke Company, 211 N.L.R.B. 90, 86 L.R.R.M. 1404 (1974).
22 1d. at 1401 (Member Fanning dissenting).
1 " Id. at 1402. To support this proposition, Member Fanning cited LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Aar 309 (1947) wherein "employees"
are defined as those who "work for wages or salaries under direct supervision." Con-
gress explicitly instructed the courts to interpret "employee" according to the "ordinary
meaning" of the word. See id.
25 91 L.R.R.M. at 1402-04.
"' See id. Member Fanning also found it significant that the housestaff members
voluntarily paid a federal income tax on their stipend. See id. at 1402-03 & n.17. Under
if 117 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as interpreted in Bingler v. Johnson, 394
U.S. 741, 75I-54 (1969), Member Fanning noted, housestaff members would not have
to pay a tax on stipends that are "relatively disinterested, 'no strings' educational
grants." 91 L.R.R.M. at 1403 n.17 (Member Fanning dissenting). The fact that the
housestaff members did pay this tax, Member Fanning argued, indicated that a certain
quid pro quo was involved in their compensation for services rendered. Therefore, he
believed that their stipend was not a taxfree, "no strings" scholarship, but a regular sal-
ary. Id.
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Act defines a "professional employee" as:
(a) any employee engaged in work ... (iv) requiring know-
ledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning
customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized
intellectual instruction and study in an institution of higher
learning or a hospital ... or (b) any employee who (i) has
completed the courses of specialized intellectual instruction and
study described in clause (iv) of paragraph (a), and (ii) is perform-
ing related work under the supervision of a professional person to
qualify himself to become a professional employee as defined in
paragraph (a). 31
The House Conference Report accompanying the 1947 amendments
to the Act stated that the purpose of section 2(12) was to include
"such persons as legal, engineering, scientific and medical personnel
together with their junior professional assistants." 32
Member Fanning found that the express definition of a profes-
sional employee under section 2(12)(b)—one who has completed
courses of specialized instruction and is now performing related work
under the supervision of section 2(12)(a) professionals—"fit precisely"
the housestaff members. He therefore concluded that the definition
of "professional employee" must in part have been "designed to cover
housestaff."33
 In addition, Member Fanning believed that the refer-
ence in the House Conference Report to "junior professional assis-
tants" was intended to refer explicitly to housestaff members."
Having determined that Congress intended housestaff members
to fall within the statutory definition of professional employees,
Member Fanning inferred that Congress must have intended that the
housestaff members fall within the definition of "employees"
generally. 35
 Thus, Member Fanning concluded that section 2(12)
merely clarified the scope of the definition of "employee" itself. It did
not, as the majority apparently thought, 36 operate only after determi-
Member Fanning also pointed out that traditional tests for determining vicarious
liability at common law showed that the housestaff members were "employees" in terms
of the medical center's legal responsibility for their act of negligence. Id. at 1042 & n.16
(Member Fanning dissenting).
31 29 U.S.C. 152(12) (1970) (emphasis added).
32
 I LEG HIST. OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Ac-r 540 (1947) (emphasis
added).
33 91 L.R.R.M. at 1405 (Member Fanning dissenting).
34 Id. See note 32 supra. Member Fanning did not specifically indicate how he
reached his conclusion that the housestaff members were such 'junior assistants,"
though presumably he was referring to the usual medical heirarchy whereby residents
and interns perform their duties at the direction of senior physicians at the hospital.
33 91 L.R.R.M. at 1405 (Member Fanning dissenting).
The majority found "no merit" in the argument that the housestaff were "pro-
fessional employees" under § 2(12). See id. at 1400 n.4. Although the majority did not
set out their reasoning, Member Fanning presumed the majority felt that § 2(12) called
for a two-step test to determine whether proposed unit members were professional em-
ployees. See id. at 1405 (Member Fanning dissenting). The first step required proof that
1110
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
nation was made that such professional personnel were "employees."
A different result, Member Fanning, believed, led to the illogical con-
clusion that Congress explicitly defined professional employees for the
purposes of unit determination even though it believed that such per-
sonnel were to be excluded from the protection of the Act in the first
instance."
Finally, Member Fanning felt that the 1974 Congressional de-
bates regarding proposed amendments to the definition of "super-
visor" contained in section 2(11) indicated a clear and explicit con-
gressional recognition that housestaff personnel were covered under
the Act. 38 Various organizations representing health care professionals
had urged an amendment to section 2(11) which would clearly ex-
clude medical professionals from the definition of supervisor. The
Senate Committee concluded that the proposed amendment was un-
necessary, not because it believed that the health care professionals
were not "employees," but because the Committee already perceived
them as "employees" whose interests were protected by past Board
decisions."
It is suggested that Member Fanning's conclusion that the house-
staff members are "employees" under the NLRA is correct. According
to the legislative history of the 1947 amendments to the NLRA, the
term "employee" is to be defined according to its ordinary meaning.
According to Fanning,
An "employee," according to all standard dictionaries, ac-
cording to the law as the courts have stated it, and accord-
ing to the understanding of almost everyone, with the ex-
ception of members of the National Labor Relations Board,
means someone who works for another for hire [one
working] for wages or salaries tinder direct supervision."
At a minimum, then, the legislative understanding of the term implies
the performance of work in return for compensation.'" The majority
admits that the elements of work and compensation exist but it
characterizes the work performed as "educational" and views the
compensation received as a "scholarship."A 2
 While the term "educa-
tional activities" does imply the attendance of the housestaff members
at seminars, lectures, or lab instructions, it does not seem to include
the members were "employees." Absent such proof, considerations of "professionalism"
would not be required: since the housestaff members were "employees" in the first in-
stance, it was not necessary to consider whether they were professionals. Id.
" Id.
as Id. at 1405.06 (Member Fanning dissenting). Member Fanning relied on S.
REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974).
39 Id. at 1405 (Member Fanning dissenting). The Senate Committee found that
the hoard had in the past refused to exclude medical professionals as supervisors. S.
REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974),
4° LEGISLATIVE HISTORY Or THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT 309 (1947).
ill Id.
" 91 L.R.R.M. at 1400.
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the direct patient care activities commonly performed by the house-
staff for about 80% of their time at the hospital.'" These patient care
activities are services which the hospital "sells" to the public in terms
of providing medical care to patients for a fee. The nature of their
service is the same, whether provided by a housestaff member or a
senior physician of the hospita1. 44
 Activities which are "primarily edu-
cational" do not usually contemplate a process so economically and
contractually oriented.
Similarly, the majority suggests that the stipend received by the
housestaff is a scholarship and not a regular salary.45 Yet a common
understanding of the term "scholarship" would not seem to contem-
plate, in addition to the monetary payment, such accompanying
employee-like benefits as paid holidays, annual vacations, or free med-
ical and dental care." Further, even though the majority indicates
that the "stipends" are given to all housestaff members without regard
to need or merit," "scholarships" are not commonly awarded to all
members of an institution indiscriminately. Finally, most people would
agree that "scholarships" are not usually graduated according to one's
tenure at the institution, yet the majority indicates that this is the case
at the medical center. 48 In sum, mere characterization of activities as
"educational" or stipends as "scholarships" should not negate the ex-
haustive indicia of employment status enjoyed by the housestaff
members.
Another compelling reason supporting Member Fanning's opin-
ion is that a finding that housestaff were employees would further
policies of the NLRA. The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Hearst Publica-
tions, Inc:4" indicated that the proper legal standard to use in deter-
mining whether an individual is an "employee" is to determine
"whether effectuation of the declared policy and purposes of the Act
comprehend securing to the individual the rights guaranteed and pro-
tection afforded by the Act." 5° One of the primary purposes of the
Act is to forestall strikes, pickets, and other disruptions in interstate
commerce." It was believed that by protecting the rights of labor to
organize and elect representatives for the purposes of collective bar-
" See notes 16-19 and accompanying text supra.
" 91 L.R.R.M. at 1402 (Member Fanning dissenting).
44 Id. at 1400. See notes 16-20 and accompanying text supra.
" See notes 16-20 and accompanying text supra.
" 91 L.R.R.M. at 1400.
" See notes 17 and accompanying text supra.
" 322 U.S. 111 (1944). In Hearst, the Supreme Court upheld an NLRB decision
that merchants who purchased newspapers from a publisher and sold them on the
street were "employees" of the publisher under the Act. Id. at 131-32. Although Con-
gress nullified this holding in the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA, see
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT 309 (1947), the Su.
preme Court's approach to interpreting "employee" under the Act is still sound. See
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 274-75 (1974).
5° 321 U.S. at 131-32.
" See 29 U.S.C. 151 (1970).
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gaining, the peaceful adjustment of industrial disputes would be en-
couraged. Employees organized into unions could bargain on an equal
level with employers and would not have to resort to the unsettling
weapons of economic warfare. 52 The national exclusion of housestaff
members from this process of peaceful adjustment will, as Member
Fanning notes, 53 defeat this stautory purpose by insuring that such
health care professionals resort to repeated strikes and picket lines
which could have a debilitating impact upon the delivery of health
care services to the public. The correct approach towards meeting the
directive in Hearst'' would be to bring such medical personnel within
the protection of the Act, so that the procedures and sanctions of the
Act can be utilized to settle disputes peacefully and to minimize the
potential For disruption of health care delivery to the public.
It is unlikely, however, that the Board's decision in Cedars-Sinai
will be reversed. Review of Board decisions with regard to representa-
tion petitions is available in the circuit courts only in the context of an
unfair labor practice complaint where the party charged with the un-
fair practice defends on the grounds that the Board's certification of
the union as bargaining representative is inappropriate. 55 Thus, the
Medical Center could have obtained judicial review of a Board deci-
sion which certified the Housestaff Association merely by refusing to
bargain with the Association. This refusal to bargain would lead to an
unfair labor practice charge against the Medical Center under section
8(a)(5). 56 The center could admit to the refusal to bargain charge at
the Board hearing and contest the Board's petition for enforcement"
at the circuit court level by claiming that the Board's certification of
the Association as bargaining representative was inappropriate be-
cause the Association was not a "labor organization" entitled to act as
bargaining representative. Admittedly the judicial review would be
limited as, under Hearst standards, a circuit court will review the
Board's determination of what constitutes a "labor organization" only
to determine whether it has "warrant in the record" or a "reasonable
basis in law."55
" See id. As stated in Hearst, Congress sought to "bring industrial peace by sub-
stituting, so far as its power could reach, the rights of workers to self-organization and
collective bargaining ror the industrial strife which prevails where these rights are not
effectively established." 322 U.S. at 125.
53 91 L.R.R.M. at 1406 (Member Fanning dissenting).
54
 See text at notes 49-50 supra.
"See 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(c) & (e) (1970).
58 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970). Section 8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice
for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his em-
ployees." ld.
"29 U.S.C. § 160(e).
58 Hearst, 322 U.S. at 130-31 (1944). The Supreme Court stated in Hearst that the
Board has broad authority to make these determinations because that agency has de-
veloped through "everyday experience in the administration of the statute" a "familiar-
ity with the circumstances and backgrounds of employment relationships in various
industries." Id. at 130.
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An association which is denied certification as bargaining rep-
resentative, on the other hand, has no standing under the NLRA to
secure review at the Circuit Court level. Only a "labor organization"
can commit an unfair labor practice under NLRA section 8(b)." Once
the Board concluded that the Cedars Sinai Housestaff Association was
not such a "labor organization," it was statutorily impossible for the
Association to commit the unfair labor practice which would trigger a
process of review. 6 ' Thus it would seem that while an employer can
secure the limited judicial review provided in Hearst for Board deci-
sions allowing certification of a union, an association which is denied
"labor organilation" status cannot." While this anomalous framework
of review seems unfair, the statute, unfortunately, provides no ans-
wer. With avenues to judicial review foreclosed and the likelihood of a
change in the Board's position with respect to residents and interns
slight, 63 those who would seek to overturn the Cedars-Sinai decision
must look to state labor boards, 64 state legislatures, and the Congress
to reach a different conclusion—namely, that national labor policy is
better served by including housestaff personnel within the protection
of the labor laws than by leaving them to their own devices.
V. NLRB OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT: NLRB v. Sears
The Survey Year saw significant judicial development of the law
governing the NLRB's disclosure obligations under the Freedom of
"See Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297, 306 (1943).
"a
 Section 8(b) makes it an unfair labor practice for a "labor organization" to
commit certain acts. 29 U.S.C. H 158(b) et seq. (1970).
" Cf: Adams v. Federal Express Corp., No. 75-2340 (6th Cir. 1976) (uncertified
labor organization does not have implied right of action under Railway Labor Act).
" The justification for the lack of judicial review for an organization whose peti-
tion fur recognition is dismissed by the Board is explained in H.M. HART & H.
VVEcitst.tik, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 344-46 (1973). Professor
Hart indicates that an employee who is denied an "advantage" by the agency created
for his special protection has less of a claim for judicial review than the employer who is
forced to do something to his disadvantage. Professor Hart cites Switchmen's Union v.
National Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297 (1943) for the proposition that Congress in
enacting the NLRA intended to preclude an unsuccessful union in the Board's certifica-
tion proceedings from securing judicial review. Id. at 345.
An unsuccessful union might look to Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 189 (1958)
to secure judicial review in a United States district court if it could show that the Board
ignored a specific prohibition of the NLRA. However, while some may dispute the
Board's factual determination in Cedars-Sinai, the Board's ultimate decision seems to fall
within its statutory discretion. See note 58 supra.
"3 The Board subsequently denied the Housestaff Association's motion for recon-
sideration, Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 224 N.L.R.B. No. 90, 92 L.R.R.M. 1302
(1976). The Board has consistently refused to modify its Cedars-Sinai holding. See
Barne's Hospital, 224 N.L.R.B. No. 83, 92 L.R.R.M. 1366 (1976); St. Clove's Hospital,
223 N.L.R.B. No. 163, 92 L.R.R.M. 1001 (1976).
" However, the Board has indicated that it did intend its decision in Cedars-Sinai
to preempt state labor hoard jurisdiction over representation petitions presented by as-
sociations seeking to represent interns and residents. Kansas City General Hospital, 225
N.L.R.B. No. 14A, 93 L.R.R.M. 1362 (1976),
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Information Act (FOIA).' In NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 2 the Su-
preme Court considered whether certain Advice and Appeals
Memoranda and related documents' prepared by the Board's General
Counsel in deciding whether to file an unfair labor practice
complaint4 were subject to disclosure under the FOIA. The Court
I 5 U.S.C. 552 (1970), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. V, 1975).
3 421 U.S. 132 (1975).
3 1 n order to understand the judicial approach to determining which Board
documents must be disclosed or withheld under the FOIA, an understanding of both
the function that these documents serve and the process by which they are produced is
necessary. The generation of documents begins with the filing of a "charge" with one of
the Board's thirty-one Regional Directors. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1.53(d), 160(b) (1970); 29 C.F.R.
§ 101.2 (1974). See generally Sears, 421 U.S. at 138-42. The Regional Director's office in-
formally investigates the complaints by interviewing witnesses and gathering evidence.
This process eventually generates an investigatory file. 29 C.F.R. § 101.4 (1974). See
Sears, 421 U.S. at 139. Much recent litigation has centered around gaining access to the
materials contained in these files. See generally Samoff and Falkin, The Freedom of Infor-
mation Act and the NLRB, 15 B.C. [NO, & Com. L. REV. 1267, 1278-80 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Samoff & Falkin]. When the investigation is complete the Regional Director will
do one of three things. If the complaint raises novel and unusual legal issues, the direc-
tor may voluntarily or 'at the direction of the General Counsel, submit a memorandum
summarizing the facts and issues in the case and a recommendation to the General's
Advice Branch in Washington. See Sean, 421 U.S. at 141. An Advice Branch staff attor-
ney will research the legal issues and report to an Advice Committee. The Committee
will then form a recommendation which is communicated to the General Counsel along
with any dissenting views. The General Counsel, after considering the recommendation,
will send an Advice Memorandum summarizing the facts and the legal and policy issues
to the director with instructions for the final handling of the case. The Regional Direc-
tor will routinely follow the "advice" of the General Counsel as to whether or not he
should file the unfair labor practice charge. See id. at 142. See Samoff & Falkin, supra at
1273-74.
If the "advice" is not to file the complaint, the charging party may yet appeal the
decision to the General Counsel's Appeals Branch. Samoff & Falkin, supra at 1273.74.
An Appeals Branch staff attorney researches the case and prepares a memorandum
which is called an Agenda Minute. The Minute contains a summary and analysis of the
pertinent law and facts and a conclusion. The Minute then serves as the basis for dis-
cussion by the Appeals Committee, who thereafter issues an Appeals Memorandum
containing its decision and the reasons for it. See Sears, 421 U.S. at 140. The Appeals
Branch in this capacity seldom reverses the Advice Branch's conclusions. See id. at
158-59 n.25. After clearance through the General Counsel, the decision whether to file
a complaint or not is communicated to the Regional Director, who again routinely fol-
lows the decision. See id. at 140.
A different situation is presented when the charge does not raise unusual or
novel legal issues. In these instances the Regional Director will, depending on whether
the charge has merit, himself decide whether to issue or refuse to issue a complaint. See
id. at 139. The charging party may appeal a Director's refusal to issue a complaint to
the Appeals Branch and the same process of producing an Appeals Memorandum is
commenced. See id. at 139-40. 11' the Regional Director is reversed and instructed to
issue a complaint, the Appeals Memorandum will usually offer litigation strategy and
settlement advice. See Samoff & Falkin, supra at 1274,
4 Congress has delegated to the General Counsel the unreviewable authority to
determine whether to file an unfair labor practice complaint. 29 U.S.C. 153(d) (1970).
See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967). This authority may have been limited by
the Survey year decision of Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975). In Dunlop, an ac-
tion arising under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29
U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1970), the Supreme Court held that the Secretary of Labor's refusal
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unanimously held that Advice and Appeal Memoranda explaining the
General Counsel's decision not to file such a complaint must be dis-
closed pursuant to the FOIA's provision for disclosing "final opinions"
made in the "adjudication of cases."5 However, the Court also held
that those memorandal explaining the General Counsel's decision to
file such a complaint are not "final opinions," but rather are protected
from disclosure as part 'of the General Counsel's "work product." 7
A complete understanding of the Court's result requires a short
preliminary exposition of the FOIA and its principal objectives. The
FOIA was enacted July 4, 1966 as part of Congress's broad plan "to
establish a general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless infor-
mation is exempted Under clearly delineated statutory language."°
FOIA section 552(a)" requires federal agencies to make available to
any member of the public'° all documents that are not excluded
to file suit on behalf of an unsuccessful union candidate was reviewable in federal dis-
trict court. 421 U.S. at 566. The Court further held that the scope of review is limited
to determining whether the Secretary's decision was "arbitrary and capricious." Id. at
572-73. However, Dunlop could be read as not limiting the General Counsel's discretion
whether to file an unfair labor practice charge under the NLRA since the LMDRA pro-
vision the Court considered in Dunlop, 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1970), does not specifically
give the Secretary of Labor the `final authority" left to the General Counsel under the
NLRA. See 29 U.S.C.§ 153(d) (1970).
' 421 U.S. at 155-59. The Court found that the memoranda fell within 5 U.S.C, §
552(a)(2)(A) (1970), which provides that the agency shall make available to the public
"final opinions, including concurring and dissenting opinions, as well as orders, made
in the adjudication of cases ...."
The Court also found that such memoranda did not fall within Exemption 5 of
the FOIA. See id. at 158-59. Exemption 5 is codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(6)(5) (1970), and
protects from disclosure matters that are "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums
or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litiga-
tion with the agency."
6
 421 U.S. at 159-60. The Court found that such memoranda are not final dis-
positions of the complaints by the General Counsel who still, by law, must advocate the
charging party's position before the Board. The General Counsel's duty to advocate the
charging party's position before the NLRB is codified in 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1970).
421 U.S. at 160. The Court reasoned that the memoranda are prepared "in
contemplation of the upcoming litigation" before the Board and thus would contain
litigation strategy and settlement advice within the scope of the attorney work-product
privilege. The Court thus found that the memoranda explaining decisions to file a
complaint did fall within Exemption 5, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1970), since this exemption
incorporates the work-product privilege. See 421 .
 U.S. at 160. As the Court stated, the
attorney's work-product privilege was "clearly incorporated" by Congress into Exemp-
tion 5. 421 U.S. at 160. See generally EPA v. Mink. 410 U.S. 73, 85-86 (1973). Exemp-
tion 5 is quoted at note 5, supra.
In addition, the Court held that documents incorporated by reference in the
non-exempt Advice and Appeals Memoranda lost any exemption they might previously
have held as "intra-agency memoranda" under Exemption 5, unless they were covered
by one of the other exemptions of the FOIA. 421 U.S. at 161.
° S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 8131. See
also EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79.80 (1973).
° 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1970), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (Supp. V, 1975).
10
 The Act makes no distinction between members of the public who may or may
not have a special interest in the material sought to be disclosed. See S. REP. No, 813.
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under one of the nine enumerated exemptions." Section 552(b) sets
out the nine exemptions which limit the broad disclosure require-
ments of subsection (a)." In general, the purpose of the exemptions is
to protect from disclosure certain confidential agency records and
processes." The exemptions, which are intended to set up concrete
supra note 8, at 5; H.R. REP, No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1966) [hereinafter H.R.
REP. No. 1497]. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 92 (1973).
" EPA v. Mink, 421 U.S. 73, 79 (1973). 5 U.S.C. 552 (c) (1970) explicitly makes
the nine exemptions exclusive.
In particular, section 552(a)(1) directs that the agency publish certain documents
such as "rules of procedure" in the Federal Register. See generally 5 U.S.C. §§
552(a)(l)(A)-(E) (1970). In addition, subparagraph (a)(2) requires that all "(A) final
opinions ... made in the adjudication of cases; (B) statements of policy and interpreta-
tions ... not published in the Federal Register; and (C) administrative staff manuals
and instructions to staff that affect a member of the public ..." be indexed and made
available to the public on demand. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(2)(A)-(C) (1970). Finally, and
most broadly, subparagraph (a)(3) provides For public access to all records which are
reasonably described by the party seeking disclosure. 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(3) (Supp. V,
1975).
5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(4)(B)-(D) (Stipp. V, 1975), sets out the procedural mechanisms
for private actions in federal district court to compel agency disclosure. In particular, §
552(a)(4)(D) (Supp. V, 1975) gives FOIA cases a precedence on the docket over all cases
except those the district or appeals courts consider of greater importance.
12 5 U.S.C. 552(b) (1970), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (Supp. V, 1975) states
that the Act does not apply to matters:
(1)(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive
order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy
and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an
agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a
person and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not
be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the
agency;
(b) personnel and medical files and similar files the purpose of which
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only
to the extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere with
enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or
an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of per-
sonal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the
case of a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the
course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful na-
tional security intelligence investigation, confidential information furnished
only by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and
procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement
personnel;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports
prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the
regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, con-
cerning wells.
13 S. REP. No. 813, supra note 8, at 3. H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 9, at 6.
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workable standards for determining whether material must be dis-
closed or may be withheld," are narrowly defined and strictly
construed) In addition, the burden is on the agency to demonstrate
that the documents sought may be withheld under any of the exemp-
tions set forth in subsection (b)." The courts' ultimate task when ad-
dressing a section 552 disclosure case is to balance the agency's need
to maintain the confidentiality of certain information against the
public's right to know, playing particular attention to the latter. As the
Congressional Report accompanying the FOIA stated, "success lies in
providing a workable formula which encompasses, balances, and pro-
tects all interests, yet (places emphasis on the fullest responsible
disclosure."'
Against this background, the Supreme Court decided NLRB v.
Sears, Roebuck & C0. 18 In Sears, the respondent had filed an unfair
labor practice charge with the NLRB regional director alleging that
the Retail Clerks' International Union had violated section 8(b)(3) of
the National Labor Relations Act." Prior to the issuance of a com-
plaint, Sears had requested that the NLRB General Counsel make
available all Advice and 'Appeals Memoranda issued over the previous
five years which related to similar unfair labor practice charges. 2 ° The
General Counsel refused, claiming that the memoranda were exempt
from disclosure under Exemption 5, 2 ' which protects agency mem-
oranda or letters that would not be discoverable by a private party in
litigation with the agenCy. 22 Consequently, Sears brought suit under
the FOIA to compel the disclosure of the memoranda and "certain
other materials incorporpted by reference therein." 23
The district court concluded that all Advice and Appeals
Memoranda and all documents incorporated by reference therein
" EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973).
15 Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
19 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(8) (Supp. V, 1975) amending 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4) (1970).
" S. REP. No. 813, supra note 8, at 3. H.R. RE/'. Nu, 1497, supra note 9, at 6.
12 421 U.S. 132 (1975).
19 346 F. Supp. 751, 753, 80 L.R.R.M. 3428, 3429 (D.D.C. 1972). Section 8(b) (3)
provides that "it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer." 29 U.S.C. 158(6)(3)(1970).
20
 421 U.S. at 142-43. Specifically, Sears sought Memoranda on the subjects of
employer-union withdrawal frima multi-employer bargaining units, commencement date
of negotiations, contract successorships, and lockouts occurring in multi-employer bar-
gaining situations. Id. at 142-43 & n.9.
21 346 F. Supp. at 753, 754, 80 L.R.R.M. 3429, 3431.
22 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (5) (1970). The text of Exemption 5 is set out at note 5
supra.
23 346 F. Supp. at 752, 80 L.R.R.M. at 3429. Meanwhile the General Counsel had
announced that he would make available all Advice and Appeals Memoranda with cer-
tain deletions of names of witnesses and other "sensitive" matter when the case involved
was completed. Id. at 752-53 n. 2, 80 L.R.R.M at 3429 n. 2. See 421 U.S. at 145. How-
ever, he refused to disclose memoranda related to cases which had not been completed
("open cases"). Id. Sears moved for summary judgment to compel disclosure of
memoranda in 'open' cases atid to put an end to the practice of deleting materials from
'closed' cases. The General Coimsel also moved for summary judgment. Id.
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must be disclosed." The United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit affirmed 25 on the basis of its decision in
Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. v. Renegotiation Board." The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari to the Board." Reversing the Circuit
Court in part, the Supreme Court HELD: memoranda explaining de-
cisions of the General Counsel to file a complaint are exempt from
disclosure due to the protection afforded infra-agency memoranda
under Exemption 5. 28 Conversely, memoranda explaining decisions
24 The district court's reasoning on this point is somewhat unclear. The district
court took the correct approach in analyzing whether the documents fell within one of
the exemptions, for documents which did not fall within the exemptions would have to
be made available under the broad disclosure requirements of section 552 (a). 346 F.
Supp. at 753-54, 80 L.R.R.M. at 3430-31. The General Counsel had claimed that the
Advice and Appeals Memoranda fell within Exemption 5's protection or "inter-agency
memoranda." The district court, expressing the fear that a broad interpretation of the
exemption might engulf the rule, held that Exemption 5 did not apply to a 'final
determination of the General Counsel's staff of the disposition of a charge." Id. at 754,
80 L. R.R.M. at 3430 (emphasis supplied). The district court found that the Advice
Memoranda were final determinations since they contained instructions which were
"mandatory in substance" and which the Regional Directors routinely followed. Id. at
753, 80 L.R.R.M. at 3430. See note 3 supra.
The district court further found that the Advice Memoranda were "instructions
to staff that affect a member of the public," and thus must be disclosed under section
552 (a) (2) (C) of the FOIA. Id. See note 11 supra. However, this tatter finding was un-
necessary since, once having determined that the exemptions did not apply, the
memoranda would have to be disclosed. See notes 9-17 and accompanying text supra.
Similarly, the district court found that the Appeals Memoranda should be disclosed as
"'final opinions' within the meaning of the Act" (presumably referring to § 552(a) (2)
(A) of the FOIA), and thus, outside the protection of Exemption 5. 346 F, Supp. at
754, 80 L.R.R.M. at . Finally, the district court held that "documents incorporated by
reference" in the memoranda lost whatever exempt status they may have had previ-
ously by reason of incorporation. Id., citing American Mail Line, Ltd. v. Gulick, 411 F.
2d 696, 703 (1968)
The district court's relief was broad. It mandated; disclosure of all Advice and
Appeals Memoranda ever issued and all documents expressly incorporated by refer-
ence; production and compilation, if necessary, of indices of the memoranda; explana-
tion of vague references in the memoranda; and termination of the practice of deleting
information from the memoranda without written justification. 346 F. Supp. at 755, 80
L.R.R.M. at 3431.
26 480 F. 2d 1195, 83 L.R.R.M. 3045 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
" 482 F. 2d 710 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In Grumman, a contractor invoked the FOIA to
compel disclosure of' documents generated by the Renegotiation Board and its Regional
Boards in performing their task of deciding whether certain government contractors
must refund excessive profits from their federal contracts. Id. at 711. The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the documents explaining the decisions
of the Regional and National Board to seek or not to seek refunds must be disclosed
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552 ,(a)(2)(A) (1970) as "final opinions." Id. at 712. The Su-
preme Court ultimately reversed the Circuit Court, holding that the documents were
protected from disclosure under FOIA Exemption 5. 421 U.S. 168, 183-90 (1975).
" 417 U.S. 907 (1974).
" 421 U.S. at 159-60. The Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court with re-
spect to the disclosure of memoranda which explained the General Counsel decision
not to file a complaint, id. at 155-59, and the disclosure of documents incorporated by
reference in non-exempt memoranda. Id. at 161. However, the Supreme Court re-
versed the Circuit Court affirmance of the district court order to the Roard to produce
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not to file a complaint must be disclosed under the FOIA.
The Supreme Court grounded its holding on its view of the
proper construction and scope of Exemption 5. In light of the FOIA's
legislative history, the Court found it reasonable to conclude that Ex-
emption 5 was designed to protect only those documents normally
privileged in the civil discovery context. 29 The privileges claimed by
the government to be relevant in Sears—the government's executive
privilege30 and the work-product_ privilege available to all attorneys in
litigation 3 '—were found to be among the type of privileges normally
operative in the civil discovery context. Hence, these privileges were
found to be within the scope of Exemption 5. 32
The Court then explained the relevance of both of these
privileges within the context of Exemption 5. First, the Court noted
that the exact scope of the executive privilege in the context of the
FOIA was less than clear. 33 Citing legislative history as well as prior
case law, the Court found that the purpose of the privilege was to en-
courage "frank discussion of legal or policy matters." 34
 The Court
pointed out that the requirement of public disclosure of all communi-
cations would cause many "to temper candor with a concern for
appearances to the detriment of the decision-making process."35 How-
ever, applying a distinction drawn by the lower courts in the civil dis-
covery context," the Court found that the only situations in which the
decision-making process would be inhibited by disclosure were those
in which the communication was received by the decisionmaker prior
to the time the decision was made. 37 Thus, the Court determined that
pre-decisional communications which provide the input for a final de-
cision are protected under the government's executive privilege;
communications made after the decision and designed to explain it are
not." In other words, the Court determined that within the confines
of Exemption 5, the scope of the government's executive privilege ex-
tends only to those confidential intra-agency opinions which form the
"ingredients of the decisionmaking process."39 The disclosure of post-
or create explanatory material for certain vague references in all the memoranda. Id. at
161-62.
"Id. at 149.
" See generally EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 85-87 (1973); Kaiser Aluminum &
Chemical Corp., 157 F. Supp. 939, 946 (1958).
31 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510.14 (1947).
" 421 U.S. at 150-55. The Court relied heavily on the relevant passages in the
legislative history of the FOIA. See S. REP. No. 813, supra note 8, at 9; H.R. REP. No.
1497, supra note 9, at 10.
" 421 U.S. at 150.
34 Id. at 150, citing 5. REP. No. 813, supra note 8, at 9.
33
 421 U.S. at 150-51, citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974).
36 421 U.S. at 151-52, thing, e.g., Sterling Drug Inc. v. FTC. 450 F.2d 698 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (non-privileged post-decisional communications); Boeing Airplane Co. v.
Coggeshall, 280 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (privileged predecisional communications).
37 42I U.S. at 151.
"Id. at 151-53 (emphasis supplied).
39 /d. at 151.
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decisional information is justified, the Court explained, because, un-
like the disclosure of predecisional information, it would have no det-
rimental' impact on the quality of the decision. 4° Further, the Court
found a strong public interest in knowing the reasons for an agency
decision, since such reasons constitute the "working law" of the
agency. 4 ' Thus, the Court concluded that the correct application of
Exemption 5 in light of the government's executive privilege required
disclosure of all opinions and interpretations which embody the
agency's effective law and policy and allowed protection of all papers
"which reflect the agency's group thinking in the process of working
out its policy and determining what its law shall be." 42
The Court's discussion of attorney's work-product privilege was
somewhat limited. However, the Court did determine that, at a
minimum, the work-product rule clearly protected memoranda and
documents which set forth the agency attorney's theory of the case
and his litigation strategy. 43
Having identified the factors that were relevant to determine the
scope of Exemption 5, the Court addressed the issue of whether that
Exemption applied to the Advice and, Appeals Memoranda sought by
the respondent in Sears." With respect to this issue, the Court found
"Id. at 152.
" See id. at 152-53.
42 Id. at 153, citing Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L.
REV. 761, 797 (1967).
" 421 U.S. at 154. The Court relied on the Senate Report which explained Ex-
emption 5 as including "the working papers of the agency attorney and documents
which would come within the attorney-client privilege if applied to private parties." S.
REP. No. 813, supra note 8, at 2.
" The Supreme Court refused to rule on the General Counsel's claim that the
memoranda were protected under the FOIA's Exemption 7. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1970)
(amended 1974). At the time respondent Sears filed suit, Exemption 7 protected "inves-
tigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the extent available by
law to a party other than an agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(1970). Some time after the
General Counsel filed his brief but before the Supreme Court decided the case, Con-
gress amended Exemption 7. 5 U.S.C. § 552(h)(7) (Supp. V, 1975). The amended ver-
sion of Exemption 7 is far more limited and specific, protecting:
(iinvestigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to
the extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere with
enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or
an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of per-
sonal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source ... (E) dis-
close investigative techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or
physical safety of law enforcement personnel."
Id. However, the Genera! Counsel did not raise the Exemption 7 claim until he reached
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 421 U.S. at 163. Since
that court affirmed without an opinion, the Supreme Court was left without a lower
court determination of the legal issues and the factual question of whether the
memoranda contained "information the disclosure of which would offend the purposes
of Exemption 7." Id. at 163. Under those circumstances, the Supreme Court declined to
consider the claim and it remained for the Court of Appeals.to determine whether the
General Counsel's failure to raise the claim in the district court foreclosed further con-
sideration of the issue. See id. at 164-65 § n.30. For the same reason, the Court refused
to consider the General Counsel's claim that the memoranda were protected under Ex-
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three important differences between memoranda which concluded
that no complaint shall be issued ("closed" cases) and those which di-
rected the issuance of a complaint with the Board ("open" cases). 45
The remainder of this section will examine the Court's three distinc-
tions between "closed" and "open" cases in establishing the disclosure
requirements for Board memoranda. It will then discuss whether or
not the distinctions as developed and applied by the Supreme Court
are workable and appropriate. It will ultimately be submitted that
such distinctions create too broad a sphere of protection for Board
documents, which results in an unnecessarily restricted public access
to important agency documents.
A. Final Dispositions
The Court found that memoranda explaining the General
Counsel's decisions not to file complaints constitute "final dispositions"
within the meaning of the FOIA, since they chronologically represent
emption 2, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (1970), which exempts documents "related solely to the
internal personnel rules and practices of an agency." See 421 U.S. at 165.
Despite this "hands-off" policy, the Court in dicta made several significant obser-
vations on the purposes and scope of the amended and unamended versions of Exemp-
tion 7. The Court noted that the amended version of Exemption 7 was less favorable
than the former version for the General Counsel's claim. 421 U.S. at 165 n.30. The
Court then indicated an unfavorable disposition towards the merits of the General
Counsel's claim even under the unamended version. Id. at 163 n.28. The Court stated
that the purposes of the former version were "to prevent the premature disclosure of
the results of an investigation so that the Government can present its strongest case in
court, and to keep confidential the procedures by which the agency conducted its inves-
tigation and by which it has obtained information." Id., citing Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d
813, 817 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 409 U.S. 889 (1972). The Court then pointed out that the
purpose of allowing the Government to present its strongest case in court was "plainly
inapplicable" when the General Counsel decides not to file a charge. Secondly, the
Court indicated that the purpose of maintaining the confidentiality of agency investiga-
tive techniques is only speculatively impeded absent proof by the General Counsel that
the memoranda reveal some confidential information. 421 U.S. at 163 n.28.
The Court also stated in dicta that documents protected by Exemption 7, unlike
those protected by Exemption 5, do not lose their exempt status merely by incorpora-
tion in nonexempt memoranda. Id. at 166. The Court found that the purposes in pro-
tecting "investigatory files" under the original version and the amendments are as
equally applicable to documents incorporated in the memoranda as they are to docu-
ments which are not.
The Court's return of the Exemption 7 issues to the Circuit Court merits little
comment. The 1974 amendment to the exemption is narrowly defined. The exemption
either applies or it does not: balancing the public's interest in disclosure against the
agency's need for confidentiality is not appropriate here. See text at note 17 supra.
Further, it would seem that there is even a greater need for strict application of Ex-
emption 7 than there is for Exemption 5. Disclosure of Exemption 5 material may only
inhibit the decision-making process while disclosure of Exemption 7 information could
in the future deter witnesses from coming forward, thereby frustrating Board investiga-
tions, The Survey year saw a wealth of cases arise under Exemption 7. See note 83 infra.
45 See 421 U.S. at 153-55, 158-59 (final dispositions); id. at 151-53, 155-57 (agency
versus public interest): id. at 159-60 (work-product privilege applicability),
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the last agency action on a charge filed by the private party." By con-
trast, memoranda directing the issuance of complaints are not chrono-
logically final dispositions. In this situation, the General Counsel still
has the statutory duty to advocate the charging party's position before
the Board in the subsequent unfair labor practice proceedings..'
The characterization of closed memoranda as "final dispositions"
is important, the Court noted, in light of the language of the FOIA.
FOIA section 552(a)(2)(A) requires that "final opinions" which are
made in the "adjudication of cases" be made available to the public.'"
Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of which the FOIA is
a part, an "adjudication" is defined as an "agency process for the
formulation of an order."'" An "order" is defined as the whole or a
part of a final disposition . . . of an agency in a matter." 5 " Since the
Court determined that the General Counsel's decision not to issue a
complaint was a "final disposition" within the meaning of the APA, 51
such decisions must be disclosed pursuant to section 552(a)(2)(A). The
Court reasoned that since Advice and Appeals Memoranda explain
the reasons for the "final disposition" they qualify as "opinions" made
in the "adjudication of cases," and therefore Exemption 5 "can never
apply."52 The General Counsel's decision to issue a complaint, on the
other hand, is not a "final disposition" since the General Counsel still
must advocate the charging party's position before the Board."
Therefore, since such a decision is not a "final disposition," the
memorandum explaining the decision does not qualify as an "opin-
ion" made in the "adjudication" of a case within the statutory defini-
tion of the A PA. 54 Thus, section 552(a)(2)(A) is inapplicable and Ex-
emption 5 protects disclosure of these "open" memoranda. This
means that section 552(a)(2)(A)'s disclosure requirements will always
be limited to "closed" cases, since "open" cases will, by definition,
never be "final dispositions."
The Court did evidence some confusion in its application of a
"finality" standard to determine which Board documents must be dis-
closed as FOIA "final dispositions." In a note, the Court pointed out
that an Advice Memorandum decision stating that a complaint should
not be issued would, on rare occasion, be overturned in an Appeals
Memorandum. In this situation, the original Advice Memorandum
"id. at 158-59 n.25, 160.
47 1d. at 159-60. The Court did not explicitly set out this "finality" standard since
at times it confused its discussion of FOIA "final dispositions" with language indicating
that final dispositions could also be those decisions that do not represent the last agency
action in a matter but nonetheless have "real operative effect." Id. at 155. However, the
Court's intention can fairly be inferred. See text at notes 55-57 infra.
" 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(A) (1970) (emphasis supplied).
"	 § 551(7).
50 Id. at § 551(6) (emphasis supplied).
" 421 U.S. at 158-59.
5 ' Id. at 153-54.
" Id. at 160.
" See id. at 158.
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would lose its temporal finality because the General Counsel would
now have the duty to bring the charge before the Board. The Court
then stated that this possibility of appeal would not affect the obliga-
tion of the Board to disclose the initial Advice Memorandum: "The
decision reached in the Advice Memorandum, in the absence of an
appeal filed by the charging party, has real operative effect, as much as
does every order issued by a United States district court which might,
if appealed, be overturned by a United States Court of Appeals." 55
Thus, while an Advice Memorandum directing non-issuance of a
complaint may lose its temporal "finality" if it is overturned by an
Appeals Memorandum, it nonetheless may be a "final disposition" be-
cause it has "real operative effect."
However, it is clear that the Court did not want a "real operative
effect" standard to determine whether a Board document is a FOIA
"final disposition." For example, the Court admitted that open
memoranda have "operative effect" since they, permitted litigation be-
fore the Board." Nonetheless, this operative effect did not lead the
Court to conclude that open memoranda must be disclosed. Instead
the Court concluded that they were not disclosable "final dispositions"
since they did not constitute the chronologically "final" agency action
with respect to the unfair labor practice charge." The resolution of
this confusion may lie in viewing the "real operative effect" standard
as limited to the cases of closed Advice Memoranda which may later
be overturned by an Appeals Memorandum, and in interpreting
"finality" in a chronological sense.
B. Agency v. Public Interest
The second major distinction discerned by the Court between
the memoranda in "closed" and "open" cases was the difference in the
nature of the public interests at stakes" The Court found a greater
public interest in disclosing memoranda in "closed" cases since the de-
cisions not to file and the reasons for them have precedential impact
and, as such, constitute "agency law with which the public is vitally in-
terested and which Congress sought to prevent the agency from keep-
ing secret."59 In addition, the Court stated that disclosure of these
memoranda would not infringe upon the government's executive
privilege. Disclosure of "closed" memoranda could have no impact on
the predecisional process because by the time they are communicated
to the Regional Director the decision-making process has been
completed. 9° On the other hand, the public interest in disclosure of
memoranda in "open" cases, the Court found, was reduced by the fact
" Id. at 158-59 n.25 (emphasis supplied).
" See id. at 160.
"id.
"Id. at 151-53, 155-57.
"Id. at 155-56.
en Id. at 155.
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that the underlying "subject matter, theory, and interpretation [of the
case) will ultimately be ventilated" through the litigation process. 6 '
Further the Court found that the disclosure of "open" memoranda
would violate the government's executive privilege by revealing the
agency's "group thinking in the process of working out its policy and
determining what its law shall be."'"
The Court's concern with impeding the predecisional process
seems somewhat . misplaced. The Court did not indicate how disclo-
sure of memoranda in "open" cases could have a detrimental impact
on the decision-making process. Advice and Appeals Memoranda do
not contain dissenting views. Thus, it is difficult to see how an agency
employee would be inhibited from expressing his views and recom-
mendations since they would not only be made public if the General
Counsel chose to adopt the views as his own in the memorandum.
The Court's decision that documents incorporated by reference
in non-exempt memoranda should he disclosed indicates the inconsis-
tency in the Court's approach to protecting the Government's execu-
tive privilege. Documents incorporated by reference in non-exempt
memoranda must be disclosed despite independent Exemption 5 pro-
tection, the Court held, because such disclosure would not inhibit the
decision-making process:
If an agency chooses expressly to adopt or incorporate by
reference an intra-agency memorandum previously covered
by Exemption 5 in what would otherwise be a final opinion,
that memorandum may be withheld only on the ground
that it falls within the coverage of some exemption other
than Exemption 5. 6 '
Agency employees, the Court believed, would be "encouraged rather
than discouraged" by the public knowledge that their views were
adopted by the agency." For these same reasons, it is submitted that
the purpose of Exemption 5's executive privilege protecting the con-
fidentiality of the decision-making process is not furthered by a blan-
ket exemption in "open" cases. Rather, the inquiry should be whether
disclosure of the contested documents would be "injurious to the con-
sultative functions of government."'" The burden should be on the
" The Court quoted with approval from 2 ABA LABOR RELATIONS LAW SECTION
7 (19711),
62 421 U.S. at 151-53, citing Davis, The Information Act; A Preliminary Analysis, 34
U. Cut, L, REv. 761, 797 (1967).
e 421 U.S. at 161. However, the Court, in a very terse paragraph, reversed the
circuit court's affirmance of the district court order to the Board to produce or create
explanatory material in those instances in which a memorandum refers to the "circum-
stances of the cases." The Court indicated. that the FOIA compelled disclosure of
documents in existence but did not require agencies to write opinions where they were
not otherwise statutorily obligated to do so. Id. at 161-62.
"M. at 161.
" See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 87 (1973)
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agency to demonstrate the specific impact, 66 for surely the FOIA was
not intended to allow blanket exemptions across-the-board merely
upon an assumed impact. It is only in this manner that the least re-
strictive method of protecting confidential agency information can be
accomplished while allowing the greatest possible access to informa-
tion with which the public has a vital concern.
C. Work-Product Privilege
The third distinction noted by the Court relates to the operation
of the attorney work-product privilege in Exemption 5. 6 ' Memoranda
in "open" cases are prepared in contemplation of upcoming litigation.
As such, they will "inexorably" contain privileged material under the
work-product rule. Such material includes the General Counsel's
theory of the case, litigation strategy, and settlement advice. Since the
General Counsel must become a litigating party in the case before the
Board, the Court held that he is entitled to claim that the material in
the memoranda are a part of his work-product."
Having found the privilege applicable, the Court held that
"open" memoranda may be withheld in their entirety." This result
ignores the nature and function of the Advice and Appeals
Memoranda. These memoranda contain more than admittedly
privileged trial strategy; they also contain arguably non-privileged
summaries of the facts of the case."
In EPA v. Mink," the first Supreme Court case to construe Ex-
emption 5, the Court stated that the "public's access to internal
memoranda will be governed by the same flexible, commonsense ap-
proach that has long governed private parties' discovery of such
68 Support for this allocation of the burden of proof is found within the terms of
the FOIA itself. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(13) (1970), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (Supp.
V, 1975).
47
 421 U.S. at 159-60. The Supreme Court first recognized the work-product
privilege in the civil discovery context in the landmark case of Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495 (1947). There the Court held that documents and memoranda containing an
attorney's interviews with witnesses, correspondence, brief's and mental impressions
were privileged from discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at
508-11.
as
	 U.S. at 159-60. No claim was advanced by the Board that the work-
product rule applied to protect memoranda in "closed" cases. Presumably, there is no
need to protect an attorney's work-product for a case that will never be tried. A more
interesting question is whether the Board could claim that "closed" Memoranda are ex-
empt from disclosure under the attorney-client privilege. The Senate Report indicates
that Exemption 5 incorporates this privilege. S. REP. No. 813, supra note 8, at 2 (treating
documents of agency attorneys for purposes of the privilege the same as documents of
private attorneys). The Court's broad holding that "closed" memoranda arc "final opin-
ions" not within Exemption 5, see text at notes 46-54 supra, probably forecloses any jud-
icial resolution of this issue.
6° 421 U.S. at 160.
7° See note 3 supra,
71
 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
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documents involved in litigation with Government agencies." 72 Thus,
the Mink Court, in considering the applicability of the Government's
executive privilege in Exemption 5, stated that Exemption 5 did not
protect from disclosure "purely factual material" appearing in other-
wise privileged documents, provided the factual data could be severed
from the documents without compromising the privileged
remainder." Any other result, the Court believed, would permit the
withholding of non-privileged material simply because it was placed in
a document which contained "matters of law, policy, and opinion." 74
It is submitted that the "commonsense approach" employed in
Mink should be applied to Government claims of privilege under the
work-product rule. As the Mink Court noted, Congress intended to
"delimit" Exemption 5 "as narrowly as consistent with efficient gov-
ernment operation." 78 Consistent with this purpose, Congress pro-
vided that the district court examine in camera the contents of agency
records "to determine whether such records or any part thereof may be
withheld under any of the exemptions.""" The statutory language and
the Mink opinion suggest that, memoranda in "open" cases' need not
be withheld entirely. Those portions of the memoranda which the
agency can demonstrate to be within the work-product privilege"
should clearly be protected; the remainder should be disclosed. 78
It should further be noted that parties seeking disclosure of
NLRB memoranda are usually not doing so in the same way a private
litigant seeks to discover certain information from his opponent. The
courts should recognize that the interests in FOIA suits are different
from those in typical discovery motions. In particular, an FOIA plain-
tiff may be seeking to discern the "agency law" made by the General
Counsel's decisions to issue complaints. For example, a union or em-
ployer, in order to determine more readily the legality of a particular
course of conduct or policy which seems to fall within the so-called
"grey area" of the law, might simply wish to know the current General
Counsel's practice with respect to tiling charges based on similar con-
duct or policies. In bringing its FOIA suit, such a plaintiff also rep-
resents the interests of the public at large in seeking to gain access to
information which is useful to similarly-situated unions or employers.
Traditional rules of discovery, however, are geared more towards
balancing the interests of the immediate parties to the litigation. Thus
" Id. at 91.
73 Id.
74 Id .
" Id. at 89, citing S. REP. No. 813, supra note 8, at 9; H .R. REP. No. 1497, supra
note 9, at 10.
76 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. V, 1975) (emphasis supplied).
" The burden or proof is on the agency to demonstrate that one of the exemp-
tions applies. Id.
" The Court in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947), recognized that
"relevant, non-privileged Facts" would not be protected by the work-product or any
privilege. In Mink, the Court noted that Exemption 5 was never intended to protect
from disclosure factual material in Government files. 410 U.S. at 89-90,
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it would seem that these rules should be only guidelines for determin-
ing disclosure and not inflexible shields behind which an agency can
create secret agency "law." Courts accepting this view should well be
willing to allow disclosure of fact summaries in "open" memoranda
when such disclosure could not offend the purposes of the privileges
incorporated in Exemption 5."
The principal objection to partial disclosure of "open"
memoranda is the administrative burden of making available the
summaries from all "open" cases. These summaries would have to be
distilled from the memoranda. There would also be the added bur-
den of deleting the names and the identifying characteristics of wit-
nesses who may have made statements to Board investigators only
after promises of confidentiality. Finally, disagreements over disclo-
sure would necessitate an in camera inspection by the district court.
Since such cases have a priority on the docket," there would be a
grave potential for wasting court time with unworthy claims, thereby
setting back even further the already clogged federal docket." On the
other hand, the General Counsel could meet this problem by revamp-
ing its procedures to provide for the disclosure of the non-privileged
information in the memoranda in separate documents as a concommi-
tant element of the process of preparing the memoranda. This would
involve some duplication but would go far towards meeting the Con-
gressional goal of full agency disclosure. In addition, the disclosure of
such information would serve a useful purpose, for disclosure of
those summaries in cases where complaints have been issued informs
the public quickly of trends which the agency may be taking in its
prosecution of complaints. Management and labor are also put on
immediate notice of practices which the General Counsel believes vio-
late the federal labor laws. Nor should it be an answer that these facts
will eventually be made public in the course of the litigation. Such
litigation may not take place for months and may last for years, while
concerned labor interests may rely on the day-to-day practice of the
General Counsel in issuing complaints. A welcome by-product of the
disclosure of the summaries in "open" cases would be that the party
actually involved in the case could make a more realistic assessment of
the strength of the General Counsel's charge. This could lead to more
settlements.
'' Indeed courts might even consider whether disclosure of the legal and policy
issues contained in open memoranda, though seemingly privileged under the work-
product rule, see Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508-11 (1947), might yet be dis-
closed when the interests of the public in knowing this form of "agency law" outweigh
the General Counsel's work-product interests.
'° 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(D) (Supp. V, 1975).
"' See, e.g., Harvey's Wagon Wheel v. NLRB, 91 L.R.R.M. 2410, 2414-15 (N.D.
Cal. 1976), where the court rejected the in camera process as inadequate and a great
burden on the court's time.
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CONCLUSION
The future development of litigation under Sears standards will
probably involve definitional .problems of determining which Board
documents have the requisite finality to require disclosure. The criti-
cal line between "final opinions" and internal recommendations and
conclusions will probably be a much litigated point. As the Court itself
notes, "the line between [exempt] predecisional documents and
[disclosable] postdecisional documents" is not a "bright one."" The
Sears decision will probably lead to changes in the General Counsel's
procedures. More careful drafting of memoranda can be expected,
especially with regard to "incorporated" references in non-exempt
memoranda. Ultimately, the tug-ofwar over contested documents will
subside and hopefully the balance between the public's right to know
and the agency's right to statutorily-described confidentiality will be
achieved."
" 421 U.S. at 152 n.19.
Ka A second area of future development under Sears is in the applicability of Ex-
emption 7 to NLRB documents. See note 44 supra. The Survey year saw a significant in-
crease in the number of FO1A suits involving application of Exemption 7. In particular,
many employers who were defendants in separate unfair labor practice suits brought
actions to compel disclosure of material in the investigatory files compiled by Board
agents in their investigation of the unfair labor practice complaint. The courts split over
whether Exemption 7's protection of investigatory records applied. Those courts which
ordered disclosure based their decision mainly on the Board's failure to prove specific
harm to a specific interest protected by the exemption. See NLRB v. Hardetnan Gar-
ment Corp., 406 F. Supp. 510, 512-13, 91 L.R.R.M. 2055, 2056-57 (W.D. Tenn. 1975)
(purpose of amendment was to limit exemption to instances where government can
prove specific harm); Pass v. NLRB, 91 L.R.R.M. 2232, 2233-34 (D.D.C. 1975) (action
by union employee — Board failed to prove that disclosure of factual evidence in files
would jeopardize the confidentiality of the Board's investigative procedures); Title
Guarantee Co. v. NLRB, 407 F. Supp. 498, 503-05, 90 L.R.R.M. 2849, 2852-54 (S.D.
N,Y. 1975), rev'd, 534 F,2d 484 (2d Cir. 1976) (no specific harm demonstrated, injunc-
tion to issue if material not disclosed prior to unfair labor practice hearing). Two fed-
eral district courts applied Exemption 7 in similar FOIA actions. A federal court in
California seemingly ignoring the dicta in Sears that the 1974 amendment was intended
to limit application of the exemption, see 421 U.S. at 164-65 & n,30, held that the scope
of Exemption 7 in labor cases was not affected by the amendment. Harvey's Wagon
Wheel v. NLRB, 91 L.R,R.M. 2410, 2413-14 (N.D. Cal. 1976). The court followed the
pre-amendment rule that statements made during the course of Board investigations
would not be released prior to trial, see Wellman Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 427,
85 L.R,R.M. 2260 (4th Cir. 1974), fearing that disclosure before trial would inevitably
inhibit employees to volunteer information for fear of employer reprisal. 91 L.R.R.M.
at 2414. The federal court in Colorado, noting the danger of a deluge of FOIA cases
with precedence on the docket, found that Exemption 7(A) applied since production of
the documents would interfere with Board enforcement proceedings. Climax Molyb-
denum Co. v. NLRB, 407 F. Supp. 208, 209, 90 L.R.R.M. 3126, 3126-27 (D. Col. 1975).
However, that court seems to have erred by refusing to put the burden on the Board to
produce evidence proving such interference. Id. at 209;90 L.R.R.M. at 3127.
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VI. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION REMEDIES
A. Back Pay—Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody'
Although the availability of back pay as a remedy in Title VII
class actions is well established, 2 there has been a conflict in the cir-
cuits regarding the standards governing such awards. 3 During the
Survey year, the Supreme Court attempted to resolve this conflict by
articulating a new standard to be used in determining when an award
of back pay is appropriate.
In Albemarle Paper Cd. v. Moody,' the Court was confronted with
(
the issue of whether a lack of "b-a-d-faith" non-compliance with Title
VII constituted, grounds for refusal of a back pay award. 2
 The Court
held that "given a finding of unlawful discrimination, backpay should
I be denied only for reasons which, if applied generally, would not
I frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination
throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries suf-
fered through past discrimination." 6
In Albemarle,_ present and former employees_of_the_defendant
corporation brought_a_class_action-requesting injunctive-relief-against
alleged Title VII violations in the plant's, seniority_system_and pro-
gram_of_employment _testing,' Although the plaintiffs originally rep-
resented that they did not intend to seek back pay, they added a claim_
for class-wide back pay_five, years_after  the complaint_in_the_case_was_
filed. 6
 'The district court found that the employer's job seniority sys-
tem constituted a violation of Title VIP and ordered the implementa-
tion of a plant-wide system of seniority." However, plaintiffs' claim
for back pay was denied on two grounds. First, the district court
' 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
2 See Annual Survey of Labor Relations and Employment Discrimination Law, 16 B.C.
IND.& Com, L. REV. 965, 1086-87 (1975).
3 Compare, e.g., Kober v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,. 480 F.2d 240, 247-48, 5
FEP Cas. 1166, 1170-71 (3d Cir. 1973) (an award or denial of back pay is left to the
discretion of the district court to be exercised in light of the circumstances) with Pettway
v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 252-53, 7 FEP Cas. 1115, 1147-48 (5th
Cir. 1974) and Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870, 876, 6 FEP Cas. 813,
817 (6th Cir. 1973) (an award of back pay is mandatory unless exceptional circum-
stances are present).
4
 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
3 Id. at 413. Whereas "bad faith" non-compliance would be an intentional failure
to conform to Title VII requirements, violations may also result when an employer at-
tempts in "good faith" to conform to Title VII but does not, in fact, do so. See text at n. 28-33,
infra.
1 Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 4 FEP Cas. 561, 562 (E.D.N.C. 1971).
8 1d. at 570.
9 Id.
'° Id. at 571-72. The district court found that the personnel tests were not viola-
tive of Title VII. Id. at 570. The Supreme Court, however, agreed with the court of
appeals and ruled that the testing program also constituted a violation of Title VII. 422
U.S. at 436.
6 Id. ai 421.
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found no evidence of bad faith on the part of the defendants." Sec-
ond, the court concluded that the defendants would be substantially
prejudiced by such an award where the claim for back pay was not
filed until five years after the institution of the action."
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, ruling
that back pay should have been awarded." On appeal to the Supreme
Court, the petitioners argued that such an award is solely within the
discretion of the district court iild—th—t—ta h—e—diFfict court's denial of
back pay was not an abuse of that discretion."-The Supreme Court, 
_
agreeing witriretitiritteis—F,	 is_not an_au-
tomaiic or mandatory remedy, but one which_ courts "may" invoke,"
the_exercise of some discretion bythe district courts is permissible.T
However, the Supreme Court ruled that this_discretion must be exer-
cised consistently with the_ statutory purposes of Title VII." -In that
the primary objective of Title VII is to "achieve equality of employ-
ment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the
past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other
employees,"" the Court articulated the purposes of the back pay pro-
vision_as:...(1)..deterring_illegaLemployment practices by encouraging v
employers to police their own employment policies; and (2) making
"Id. at 570, 572. The district court reasoned that since judicial decisions had
only recently focused on the discriminatory impact of seniority systems, and since the
defendant had taken some affirmative recruitment steps on its own, there was no bad
faith non-compliance with Title V11. Id. at 570.
" Id. at 570.
"The court of appeals ruled that back pay should not be denied unless special
circumstances would render an award unjust. Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d
134, 142, 5 PEP Cas. 613, 618 (4th Cir. 1973). In fashioning this standard, the court or
appeals relied on Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968) which
had set forth guidelines governing discretionary awards of attorney's fees under Title II
of the Civil Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. 2000a-3(b) (1970). That section appears to leave
Title II fee awards to the discretion of the trial court. In Piggie Park, however, the Su-
preme Court reasoned that fees should be awarded in all but very unusual circum-
stances in order to serve the public interest in having injunctive actions brought by indi-
vidual plaintiffs. 590 U.S. at 402. Thus, in Albemarle, the Supreme Court noted that the
court of appeals' reliance on Piggie Park was misplaced. 422 U.S. at 415.
" 422 U.S. at 919.
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975) provides in pertinent part:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is in-
tentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice ... the court may
enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment prac-
tice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may
include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or
without back pay (payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor
organization, as the case may be, responsible for the unlawful employment
practice), or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
Back pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior
to the filing of a charge with the Commission (emphasis added).
" 422 U.S. at 415-16.
' 7 Id. at 417-18.
' Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 429, 429-30 (1971).
1401 c1405
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practices.' 9
The-Co—urt concluded that in light of these statutory purposes,
• the discretion granted to the district courts by Congress was intended
to facilitate affording the most complete relief possible. 2 ° Thus, the
compensatory purpose of back pay was properly met when the district
court was given authority to grant relief equal to the injury. 2 ' The de-
terrent purpose of the back pay provision was best served when the
equitable powers of the district court included the reasonably certain
\prospect of a back pay assessment as well as injunctive orders. 22Furthermore,_a_lenial of back pay would be upheld only where theif_glly_appliid,..were-found-to-be_consistentreasons for denial enera
`with 	 of-deterrence-and.compensation. 23
Examining the district court's denial of back pay in light of these
considerations,  the Supreme Court  ruled that a lack of bad faith is not
an appropriate reason fOTTefu'liTs g to award back_pay. 24 The Court
-X reasoned that if evidence_of_bad_faith.by-an_employer were a prere-quisite to an award of back . pay,_the,remedy...would_setve-primarily-to
punish :egregiousviOlkors of the Act without also_serving.to_compen-
sate those who su- ffeied from discrimination. The "make whole" pur-
 _. 
i
	,
pose of theTitleII back .pay, provision would thus be eliminated. 25T
Furthermore, since the Act is concerned with the consequences of
employment practices rather than the motivations of employers, 2 ° it
" 422 U.S. at 417-18.
45 1d. at 420-21.
"Id. at 418-19. The Court quoted from Wicker v. Hoppock, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 94
(1867):
The general rule is, that when a wrong has been done, and the law gives a
remedy, the compensation shall be equal to the injury. The latter is the
standard by which the former is to be measured. The injured party is to
be placed, as near as may be, in the situation he would have occupied if
the wrong had not been committed.
Id. at 99.
22 422 U.S. at 417-18.
"Id. at 421. In developing its guidelines to aid the district court in the exercise
of its discretion, the Supreme Court emphasized the similarities between the back pay
provisions of Title VII and those of the National Labor Relations Act. Compare 29
U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970) (If the National Labor Relations Board finds a violation, "then
the Board shall ... take ... affirmative action including reinstatement of employees
with or without back pay ....") with 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975) (If a Title
VII violation is found, "the court may ... order such affirmative action as . may be ap-
propriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of em-
ployees with or without back pay ....") The • Court reasoned that Congress, in modeling
the back pay provisions of Title VII on the NLRA, was aware that under the NLRA, the
NLRB had awarded back pay as a matter of course. 422 U.S. at 419-20. See, e.g., NLRB
v. Mastro Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d 170, 60 L.R.R.M. 2578 (2d Cir. 1965) where the
court stated, "(t)he finding of an unfair labor practice and discriminatory discharge is
presumptive proof that some back pay is owed by the employer." Id. at 178, 60
L.R.R.M. at 2583.
24 422 U.S. at 422.
"Id. at 422-23.
" Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
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would be improper to distinguish between injunctive and back pay re-
lief by conditioning only the back pay remedy upon a showing of bad
faith.27
Although the Court did not weigh the defense of a lack of bad
faith against the deterrent purpose of Title VII's back pay provision,
it is submitted that the purpose of eradicating discrimination through
employer self-evaluation would also be frustrated by requiring a show-
ing of bad faith. Employers would not be motivated to comply fully
with Title VII if back pay assessments were made only in cases of bad
faith violations of the Act. An approach closer to strict liability for vio-
lations, on the other hand, would be likely to induce full employer
self-compliance. Therefore, in addition to the problem envisioned by
the Supreme Court with respect to the subordination of the compen-
satory purpose of the Title VII back pay provision, the allowance of a
defense based on a lack of bad faith would frustrate that provision's
deterrent purpose as well.
While the Albemarle decision settles the issue of whether a show-
ing of bad faith non-compliance is necessary to hold an employer re-
sponsible for back pay, the  decision does not appear to settle the issue
of whether, and under—what-circumstances„a_showing_of a_good faith
attempt to comply with Title VII would be a permissible_factor in
considering, whether_tu elieve an_employer_of_back_payliability. The
"good faith" issue may often arise where employers are found to have
violated Title VII while attempting to comply in good faith with pre-
sumptively constitutional state statutes." If the general Albemarle test
for awarding back pay were applied in such situations, a determina-
tion would have to be made with respect to whether a good faith ex-
ception would frustrate either the deterrent purpose or the compen-
satory purpose of Title VII.
In Albemarle, Justice Blackmun,_in_a_ concurring opinion, argued
that good faith should be a - elevantsonsideration. in such cases. He
reasoned thiralouihgh an award of back pay would serve the statu-
tory ,purpose of compensating the discriminatee, it would do so by
creating a hardship on an employer who may have had no alternative
under state law and who derived no economic benefit from the ques-
tioned employment policy or practice." Chief Justice Burger, in a
separate opinion, reasoned that under the guidelines of the majority,
the statutory purpose of encouraging self-evaluation would not be
frustrated by denying back pay where a good faith attempt to con-
form to Title VII is shown, and thus good faith should be recognized
27
 422 U.S. at 423.
" Some courts, for example, have denied back pay where an employer discrimi-
nated on the basis of sex in reliance on state "female protective" statutes which limited
hours women were allowed to work. See e.g., Manning v. International Union, 466 F.2d
812, 816, 4 FEP Cas. 1282, 1286 (6th Cir. 1972); LeBlanc v. Southern Bell Tel, & Tel.
Co., 460 F.2d 1228, 1229, 4 FEP Cas. 818, 819 (5th Cir. 1972). in Albemarle, the Su-
preme Court expressed no opinion on such cases. 422 U.S. at 423 n. 18.
22 Id. at 448 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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as a defense. 3° Otherwise, for example, if employers were assessed
back pay even when•they had attempted in good faith to conform to
the law, they would have little incentive to eliminate marginal prac-
tices until required to do so by a court- 3 '
If the arguments of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun
were accepted, however, the compensatory purpose would clearly be
frustrated and would be subordinated to the deterrent purpose, since
employees would not be "made whole" when the Act had been vio-
lated. It is submitted, therefore, that an allowance of a good faith de-
fense would not be acceptable under the majority's guidelines since it
would frustrate the compensatory purpose of Title VII. Furthermore,
as the majority in Albemarle recognized, Title VII provides a narrow
good faith defense for employers who rely on EEOC opinions." Since
the legislature chose to give only a narrowly defined defense for good
faith,33
 it would appear that the courts should limit any such defense
to the statutory exemption rather than extending it to situations that
Congress did not choose to include.
The second ground on which the district court denied back pay
was that of the plaintiffs' belated and inconsistent claim for back
pay." Testing this second ground against the compensatory and de-
terrent purposes of Title VII, the Court had more difficulty. The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that "every final judgment
shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered
is entitled, even if the party has not demanded' such relief in his
pleadings." 35
 However, the Court reasoned that a party may  not be
"entitled"  to relieflif_its _procedural conduct has sttbstantially_prej-
udicedtie other party. 36 The Court stated that a denial of back pay
in a particular case for thereason that the.cIaiin wasTiTi
sirch— a manner  as to. prejudicc the other party would not necessarily
frustrate the dual purposes_ of Title VII. 37 Thus, the_issue„wasre-
tTEiled to the_district_court_for a.specific_determination_of_whether
the defendants_werein_fact_prejudiced_by_any_detrimentaLreIianceon
"Id. at 450-51 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
3 ' Id. at 451.
32 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b) (1970) provides:
In any action or proceeding based on any alleged unlawful employment
practice, no person shall be subject to any liability or punishment for or on
account of (1) the commission by such person of an unlawful employment
practice if he pleads and proves that the act or omission complained of
was in good faith, in conformity with, and in reliance on any written in-
terpretation or opinion of the Commission .... Such a defense, if estab-
lished, shall be a bar to the action of proceeding, notwithstanding that (A)
after such act or omission, such interpretation or opinion is modified or
rescinded or is determined by judicial authority to be invalid or of no legal
effect ....
" 422 U.S. at 423 n.17.
3 ' 4 FEP Cas. at 570.
33 Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c).
36
 422 U.S. at 424.
" Id. at 424-25.
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the plaintiffs' representations that they were not seeking back pay and
whether the plaintiffs' conduct was excusable." Therefore, where par-
ticular procedural matters are at issue, a comparison with the broad
aims of Title VII will require a case-by-case determination."
Applications of Albemarle
During the Survey year, Albemarle was applied in decisions in the
Fourth,4 ° Fifth,4 ' Eighth,42 and Tenth 43 Circuits. These decisions de-
veloped the Albemarle guidelines in three areas. One category of cases
involved the proper scope of a class action award where, although
promotional and transfer policies were found to be discriminatory,
some members of the employee class had not specifically requested
promotions or transfers. 44 Another area of decisions dealt with alloca-
tion of back pay awards between the employer and the union. 46 A
third category in which Albemarle was applied involved cases where
good faith efforts had been made to comply with Title VII. 46
In a Fourth Circuit case, Hairston v. McLean Trucking Co., 47 the
lower court found extensive violations of Title VII in promotional
and transfer policies but awarded back pay only to two members of
3A Id. In concurrence, Justice Marshall stated that the bar of !aches, based on any
prejudice to the defendants from the plaintiffs' late claim for back pay should be par-
ticularly difficult to establish. The doctrine of lathes, which is usually invoked on the
ground that passage of time has put necessary evidence beyond reach, should not apply
where all relevant information remains in the defendants' files. Id. at 440-41 (Marshall,
J., concurring).
39 See n. 61, infra.
"United Transp. Union Local 974 v, Norfolk & W. Ry., 11 FEP Cas. 410 (4th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1664, 12 FEP Cas. 1089, 1090 (1976); Russell v. Ameri-
can Tobacco Co., 528 F.2d 357, 11 FEP Cas. 395 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct.
1666, 1667, 12 FEY Cas. 1090 (1976); Hairston v. McLean Trucking Co., 520 F.2d 226,
11 FEP Cas. 91 (4th Cir. 1975).
" United States v. United States Steel Corp., 520 F.2d 1043, 11 FEY Cas. 553
(5th Cir. 1975).
42 Rogers v. International Paper Co., 526 F.2d 722, 11 FEE' Cas. 1000 (8th Cir.
1975) (per curiae,).
43 The Tenth Circuit, in Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 11 FEP
Cas. 211 (10th Cir. 1975) noted that Albemarle determines that back pay in class actions
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) as well as under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) must be gov-
erned by discretion that is exercised to accomplish the objectives and purposes of Title
VII, 522 F.2d at 342, 11 FEY Cas. at 218.
" United States v. United States Steel Corp., 520 F.2d 1043, I I FEP Gas. 553
(5th Cir. 1975). United Transp. Union Local 974 v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 11 FEP Cas. 410
(4th Cir. 1975), cert, denied. 96 S. Ct. 1664, 12 FEP Cas. 1089, 1090 (1976); Hairston v.
McLean Trucking Co., 520 F.2d 226, 11 FEP Cas. 91 (4th Cir. 1975).
43 United Transp. Union Local 974 v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 11 FEP Cas. 410 (4th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1664, 12 FEP Cas. 1089, 1090 (1976); Russell v, Ameri-
can Tobacco Co., 528 F.2d 347, 11 FEY Cas. 395 (4th Cir. 1975), cent, denied, 96 S. Ct.
1666,1667, 12 FEP Cas. 1090 (1976).
" Rogers v. International Paper Co., 526 F.2d 722, 11 FEY Cas. 1000 (8th Cir.
1975) (per euriam); United States v. United States Steel Corp., 520 F.2d 1043, 11 FEP
Cas. 553 (5th Cir. 1975).
" 520 F.2d 226, t I FEY Cas. 91 (4th Cir. 1975).
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the affected class." In Hairston, the two plaintiffs awarded back pay
had sought and had been illegally denied positions for which they
were qualified. However, there was no evidence that other members
of the plaintiff class had sought any change in employment." In fact,
some members of the class had rejected offers of transfer or
promotion. 50
 Thus, the court of appeals had to consider whether
under Albemarle the twin purposes of the back pay provision of Title
VII would be frustrated by a denial of back pay relief where: (1) an
employee had not requested promotions or transfers; (2) an employee
had refused a promotion or a transfer."
In examining the lack of requests for employment changes, the
court of appeals found that, in addition to a policy of hiring blacks
only as janitors and garagemen, the employer did not ordinarily post
vacancies and had a "no-transfer," "no-rehire" policy. Under that pol-
icy, plaintiffs could not in practice seek better jobs since they could
neither transfer nor resign and seek employment in better paying
departments. 52 The court reasoned that the purposes of Title VII ar-
ticulated in Albemarle would be frustrated by allowing an employer to
avoid back pay liability through this policy which made futile any at-
tempt by employees to gain better jobs."
The court next considered whether an employee's refusal of a
promotion would excuse an employer's back pay liability." If the re-
fusal had been based on an employee's reluctance to forego seniority
and to expose himself to other discriminatory employment practices
and policies, the court ruled that the refusal should not be given any
weight in back pay consideration. Likewise, an employee who refuses
a particular promotion for personal reasons should , not be denied
back pay for an employer's discriminatory policies against that em-
ployee in other promotions or transfers. 55 In another Fourth Circuit
decision, United Transportation Union Local 974 v. Norfolk & Western
Ry.," both the defendant employer and the defendant union were
found to have engaged in illegal hiring practices at two racially segre-
gated railroad yards." The district court denied back pay since (1) the
rate of pay at the two yards was the same, and (2) although fewer
promotional opportunities arose at the mainly black yard, the plain-
tiffs chose to remain there."
"Id. at 230, 11 FEP Cas. at 94.
"Id.
"Id.
" Id. at 231-32, 11 FEP Cas. at 95.
"Id. at 231, 11 FEP Cas. at 95.
"Id. at 231-32, 11 FEP Cas. at 95.
54 Id. at 232, 11 FEP Cas. at 95.
"Id.
56 I 1 FEP Cas. 410 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1664, 12 FEP Cas. 1089,
1090 (1976).
57 II FEP Cas. at 411.
"Id. at 412.
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In awarding back pay, the circuit court ruled that a general ap-
plication of any of the lower court's reasons would frustrate the pur-
poses of Title` VII as set forth in Albemarle. 59 The court first noted
that although the rates of pay in the two yards were identical, the evi-
dence tended to show that there was significantly less opportunity for
work and promotion and a greater possibility of layoff at the pre-
dominantly black yard. In that, under Title VII, compensation must be
measured by total income rather than rate of pay, and since the total
income levels of employees at the two yards would be unequal, the
court concluded that the record reflected discrimination in
compensation."
With respect to the promotional opportunities, the court of ap-
peals reasoned that the lack of requests for promotion or transfer
does not preclude an award of back pay. Under the employer's sys-
tem, an employee would have been required to forfeit seniority in
order to transfer to the mainly white yard. The court concluded that
requiring discriminatees to forfeit accrued benefits in order to remain
eligible for possible back pay awards would frustrate the purposes of
Title VII."'
Albemarle was also applied by the Fifth Circuit in United States v.
United States Steel Corp." where some members of the employee class
had not requested transfers or promotions. Although violations of
Title VII had been found, the district court had denied back pay to
members of the plaintiff class, giving a variety of reasons." 3 On re-
view, the court of appeals first ruled that neither the lack of bad faith
non-compliance with Title VII, absence of unjust enrichment by
the employer, grant of broad injunctive relief, nor the difficulty of as-
certaining the amount of employee economic injury were adequate
reasons for denying back pay. 64 Furthermore, although the defendant
corporation had offered evidence that some members of the employee
class had refused to request advancement to higher paying positions,
such an advancement often entailed loss of seniority. The court ruled
that such refusals might have some bearing on individual back pay
"Id.
"Id.
Id. The plaintiffs in United Transportation Union had also claimed that certain
minimum wage guarantees made to some employees should be extended to them. Id.
Since the wage adjustment claim had not been raised until final argument on remand
from a first appeal of the case, the district court had declined to consider any wage ad-
justment on the ground that the claim was untimely. Rock v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 11 FEP
Cas. 407 (F.D. Va. 1974). Citing Albemarle's ruling that the purposes of Title VII would
not necessarily be frustrated by denial of back pay relief where a particular cause has
been prosecuted in a manner substantially prejudicial to the other party, the court of
appeals remanded this issue to the lower court to consider whether the defendants would in
fact be prejudiced. I I FEP Cas. at 417. See text at n. 37 supra.
62 520 F.2d 1093, 11 FEP Cas. 553 (5th Cir. 1975).
63 United States v. United States Steel Corp., 371 F. Supp. 1095, 1062-63, 7 FEP
Cas. 322, 334-35 (N.D. Ala. 1973),
a' 520 F.2d at 1052-53, II FEP Cas. at 560.
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claims. However, a blanket denial to the class for that reason was not
appropriate. 65
The results reached in Hairston, United Transportation Union, and
United States Steel Corp. seem appropriate in light of Albemarle's
mandate, If the court were to preclude an award of back pay because
the employee had failed to use the employer's discriminatory promo-
tional or transfer system, that employee would be denied his compen-
satory award not because he or she was not disadvantaged by dis-
crimination, but because of a peculiar method by which the discrimi-
nation was implemented. Thus, it is submitted that the purpose of
Title VII would be frustrated by conditioning an award of back pay
on an employee's actual attempts at promotion or transfer.
A second area where Albemarle guidelines were found applicable
involved the allocation of back pay awards between employees and un-
ions. Although the back pay issue in Albemarle involved the liability of
employers, Title VII additionally provides that back pay must be as-
sessed against a labor organization that has engaged in unlawful
discrimination."
In United Transportation Union, the court of appeals was con-
fronted with the possible allocation of a back pay award between the
union and the railroad." The court reasoned that it would not be in-
consistent with Albemarle to consider good faith efforts in resolving the
question of whether the employer or the union should bear a particu-
lar share of a back pay assessment." The court stated that to maintain
consistency with the purposes of Title VII, however, any judgment
should be against the employer and the union jointly and severally, or
the employer solely with a partial indemnity right from the union, so
as to insure both the incentive voluntarily to eliminate discrimination
and the compensation of employees by both the employer and the
union."
Another case involving the allocation of back pay awards be-
tween the employer and the union was Russell v. American Tobacco
Co.," where the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed a
district court decision which awarded back pay against both the em-
ployer and the union. The union had argued that the employer alone
should be liable for the back pay since it could better afford it." The
court reasoned that this argument ignored the fact that back pay
awards are not only compensatory but are designed to induce full
compliance with Title VII. In affirming the lower court, the court of
appeals reasoned that under Albemarle, the reasonably certain prospect
65 Id. at 1057.58, 11 FEP Cas. at 564-65.
66 See note 15 supra.
67 11 FEP Cas. at 419.
°"Id.
" Id.
" 528 F.2d 397, 11 FEP Cas. 395 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1666,
1667, 12 FEP Cas. 1090 (1976).
" Id. at 366, 11 FEP Cab. at 402.
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of a back pay award was designed to induce unions as well as em-
ployers to voluntarily eliminate discriminatory policies and practices."
The third area where Albemarle guidelines were applied involved
cases where a defense of good faith , non-compliance with Title VII
was raised. In United States Steel Corp. the defendant union argued that
it should be relieved from back pay liability because it had made good
faith efforts to comply with its interpretation of the law regarding
seniority systems in the steel industry, even though that interpretation
proved to be erroneous. 73 The court's rejection of the union's argu-
ment appears consistent with the Albemarle guidelines since allowance
of a defense based on good faith compliance with an erroneous in-
terpretation of the law would frustrate the purposes of Title VII.
Similarly, in Rogers v. International Paper Co.," the district court
for the eastern district of Arkansas kad denied back pay because the
employer had demonstrated good faith efforts at compliance" and
because a previous Eighth Circuit decision stated that the law regard-
ing back pay had been too uncertain to provide employers with ade-
quate notice of possible back pay liability." This ruling was appealed,
and the Eighth Circuit upheld the denial of back pay." The em-
ployees then appealed to the Supreme Court which remanded to the
court of appeals for further consideration in light of Albemarle."' Thus,
the appeals court in Rogers, following the mandate of the Supreme
Court, ordered the district court to reconsider its prior denial of back
pay in light of the Albemarle guidelines." It would appear that the
reason set forth by the district court, would not withstand the test of
Albeinarle, since, as in United States Steel Corp., reliance on good faith
compliance with an erroneous interpretation of the law should not be
a defense to back pay liability.
Based on these decisions from the circuit courts, it seems that in
attempting to follow Albemarle's test of measuring an award of back
pay against the broad objectives of Title VII, the courts will probably
find that few defenses exist to an assessment of back pay which would
not frustrate the dual statutory purposes of deterrence and compensa-
tion. Thus, with very few exceptions, 80 back pay should henceforth be
the rule.
72 Id.
" 520 F.2d at 1058-59, 11 FEP Cas. at 565-66.
" 526 F.2d 722, 11 FEP Cas. 1000 (8th Cir. 1975) (per curiam)
"Rogers v. International Paper Co., 10 'FEP Cas. 388, 401 (E.D. Ark. 1973).
"Id. at 402, relying on United States v. N.L. Indusirie, Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 380,
5 FEP Cas. 823, 843.44 (8th Cir. 1973),
" Rogers v. International Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340, 1357, 10 FEP Cas. 404, 418
(8th Cir. 1975).
7' Rogers v. International Paper Co., 423 U.S. 809 (1975).
" 526 F.2d at 723, 11 FEP Cas. at 1001.
'° As set forth in Albemarle, exceptions may be given where a particular case has
been prosecuted with procedural irregularities that may have substantially prejudiced
the other party. See text at note 37 supra,
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B. Seniority Relief: Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.
With the emergence of organized labor, seniority systems estab-
'lished through collective bargaining have become increasingly impor-(
tant as a means of allocating employment benefits.' Typically, senior-
ity systems are based upon the length of time an employee has
worked in a company ("plant seniority") or in a specific department
within a company ("departmental seniority"). Since  these systems are
usually governed by the objective criterion of length of service, most
seniority systems --d6----_not overtly aiscriminate against minority
w—afk-ers. 2-However, if a company in
ov tly_
 hassd—enied employment
or promotions because of discrimination, a facially' _ —neultil_seniority
sy—ts em may in fact perpetuate or exacerbate_these_prior_discrimina-
-tory practices. For example, a company may initially discriminate in its
/ IiiringTbrit—rater reform its employment policies and hire minority
/ workers. Despite the later good intentions of the employer, an
economic downturn followed by layoffs on a last hired-first fired basis
could have a disproportionate adverse effect upon the newly hired
minority workers.' Another problem that may be perpetrated by a fa-
cially neutral seniority system arises when a minority employee has
been forced to remain in a low-paying department within a company
because of discrimination in promotional policies. If the company
does change its practices and permit advancement, the minority
• worker's seniority in the new department will not be an accurate re-
flection of his or her proper status. 4
While Congress -in_ enacting. Title _VII_recognized that seniorityV
systems may thus perpetuate discriminatory practices,_the_question..of
Tvhat-seniority-relief-should - be ided_for_aggrieved_minority work-
ers_has posed several significant problems. Thesourts_have generally
been willing to grant seniority relief to_minority_employees who, once
Iiired,:h—a-Ve_._beenTdiscriminatorily-denied-promotion_to_better paying
' See Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General
Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1601-1607
(1969).
The exception would be a seniority system which specifically enumerates senior-
ity benefits as to black and white workers such as a collective bargaining agreement
which explicitly stated that black workers should be laid off prior to white workers. See
110 CONG. REC. 7207 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Clark).
See Comment, Last Hired, First Fired Seniority, Layoffs, and Title VII: Questions of
Liability and Remedy, II COLUM. J. LAW & SOC. PROB. 343, 343-45 (1975). The problems
inherent in a last hired-first fired seniority system must also be considered in the con-
text of how such systems have perpetuated this country's historic discrimination against
minority workers in terms of denial of employment and confinement to low paying
jobs. See Edwards & Zaretsky, Preferential Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 74
MICH. L. REV. 1, 1-9 (1975).
If the employer in this hypothetical situation had not established discriminatory
transfer policies, a minority worker would have been able to transfer to the better de-
partment at an earlier date than under the discriminatory system. This would have al-
lowed the employee to accumulate a greater degree of departmental seniority.
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or more prestigious departments.° In these "departmental seniority': , ,
cases,th-E - EruFts have ordered that minority workers be permitted to
use their "plant seniority" instead of "departMental seniority" in bidding'
for new positions.° In contrast, the courts have been reluctant to grant
seniority relief to individuals who were initially denied any employ-
ment by a company and who were later hired by the same employer.'
These  employees are harmed by the initial hiring policies, not by the
transfer policies which affect . employeeiTay -iffeT th-eY are hired. In a
"plant seniority" situation, the minority worker seeks "fictional" or re-
troactive seniority from the date of his initial job application, on the
theory that he would have earned the seniority but for the dis-
criminatory acts of the employer in originally denying him employ-
ment. The analytical basis employed by several courts to justify their
refusal to grant fictional seniority is illustrated by the Fifth Circuit's,
statement in Local 189, Papermakers and Paperworkers v. United States: 6
It is one thing for legislation to require the creation of
fictional seniority for newly hired Negroes, and quite
another thing for it to require that time actually worked in
Negro jobs be given equal status with time worked in white
jobs. To begin with, requiring employers to correct their
pre-Act discrimination by creating fictional seniority for
See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 495 F.2d 398, 414-17, 8 FEP
Cas. 66, 77-79 (5th Cir. 1974), rt;zt'd in part, 424 U.S. 747 (1976); United States  v.
Bethelehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 660.61, 3 FEP Cas. 589, 594-95 (2d Cir. 1971);
Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 519-21, I FEP Cas. 260, 271-74 (E.D.
Va. 1968).
'See, e.g., Franks, 495 F.2d 398, 415-17, 8 FEP Cas. 66, 78.79 (5th Cir. 1974).
The basis for this remedy originated in a student note wherein the author outlined
three interpretations of the degree to which relief should be provided under Title VII;
(1) under the "status quo" doctrine, an employer would be required to refrain from
further discrimination and the seniority of white and minority workers would remain
unaffected, (2) under the "rightful place" approach, a minority worker would be per-
mitted to use plant seniority in bidding for positions within a department which were
normally subject to departmental seniority bidding, and (3) under the "freedom now"
interpretation, a minority worker would be permitted to displace a white worker if the
minority worker would have qualified for the position "but for" the prior discrimina-
tion. Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination, and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1260, 1268-69 (1967). The "rightful place" doctrine was adopted by the Fifth Circuit in
Local 189, United Papermakers and Paperworkers v. United ,States, 416 F.2d 980, 988,
1 FEP Cas. 875, 881 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970). The court re-
jected both the "status quo" approach, since it did not provide a remedy for past dis-
crimination, and the "freedom now" approach since it would result in the displacement
or "bumping" of white workers. Under the "rightful place" doctrine, a minority worker
receives the seniority that would have been rightfully due "but for" prior discrimina-
tion. This beneficial result is accomplished without the adverse effect of automatically
displacing other employees.
? See, e.g., Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309, 13 i9-20, 8 FEP Cas.
577, 585 (7th Cir. 1974); Local 189, United Papermakers and Paperworkers v. United
States, 416 F.2d 980, 994-95, 1 FEP Cas. 875, 886.87 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 919 (1970). Contra, Acha v. Beame, 531 F.2d 648, 651-55, 12 FEP Cas. 257, 259-62
(2d Cir. 1976).
A 416 F.2d 980, 1 FEP Cas. 875 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, '397 U.S. 919 (1970).
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new Negro employees would not necessarily aid the actual
victims of the previous discrimination. There would be no
guarantee that the new employees had actually suffered ex-
clusion at the hands of the employer in the past, or, if they
had, there would be no way of knowing whether, after
being hired, they would have continued to work for the
same employer. In other words, creating fictional employ-
ment time for newly-hired Negroes would comprise prefer-
ential rather than remedial treatment. 9
The result of such a rationale, which places emphasis on a demonstra-
tion by the Title VII plaintiff that he suffered a clear and continuing
harm, has resulted in a narrow construction of the remedial purposes
of Title VII to exclude fictional seniority relief."
In addition to the problem of demonstrating a continuing harm,
another major-hurdle_in_granting-fictional-seniority_is-created-by-the'
language of section 703(h) ofTitle_VIIII-whichprovides-in..part:,
flit shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to apply different standards of compensation, or
different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system ... pro-
vided that such differences are not the result of an inten-
tion to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin ... . 12
The legislative history of this section is "singularly uninstructive on
seniority rights," 13 since the subject was not treated in a committee
report prior to the addition of the section to the Senate's version of
Title VII." Furthermore, the statute fails to define adequately the
scope of the term "bona fide seniority system." As a result, several
courts have had to grapple with the question of whether the seniority
system at issue in a particular case meets the criteria of section
703(h)."
2 Id. at 995, I FEP Cas. at 886. Under § 703(j) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(j) (1970), an employer cannot be required to grant preferential treatment to a
minority worker.
1 ° See, e,g., Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309, 1318-19, 8 FEP Cas.
577, 584-85 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2214 (1976); Quarles v. Philip Morris,
Inc. 279 F. Supp. 505, 519, 1 FEP Cas. 260, 272 (E.D. Va. 1968).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
' 2 Id.
13 Papermakers, 416 F.2d 980, 987, 1 FEP Cas. 875. 880 (5th Cir. 1969).
"See Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. & Com, L. REv. 431, 443-57
(1966).
' 2 See, e.g., Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. 1.B.E.W., 508 F.2d 687, 705-710,
9 FEP Cas. 117, 128-132 (3c1 Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, sub nom., EEOC v. Jersey
Central Power & Light Co., 96 S. Ct. 2196 (1976); Watkins v. Steelworkers. 516 F.2d
41, 46-52, 10 FEP Cas. 1297, 1301-1307 (5th Cir. 1975); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel
Works, 502 F.2d 1309, 1317-1320, 8 FEP Cas. 577, 583.585 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
96 S. Ct. 2214 (1976); Papermakers, 416 F.2d 980, 986-997, 1 FEP Cas. 875, 879.887
1142
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
Ihis„S.urvfy year the Supreme Court.„,in_Eranks_.v.. Bowman...Trans-
portation Co.'" considered for the first time the appropriateness_of
laiority relief under Title VII. The Court held that the use of fic-
tional seniority is an appropriate remedy and within_ the scope of a
cot—irt s power to grant equitablliefunder section 706(g) of Title y
VII."-In sanctioning the use of fictional seniority to make whole a
minority worker who had faced job discrimination in hiring, the
Court also concluded that the seniority provisions of section 703(h) of
Title VII do not "modify or restrict relief otherwise appropriate once
an illegal discriminatory practice occurring after the effective date of
the Act is proved ... ." 1 " The result of this holding,is,.that..,a, job..ap-
plicant who has been denied employment, because of discrimination T.44
may now sue for injunctive, hack pay, and seniority relief." There-
rae, the ` position taken by the Court in Franks with respect to fictional
seniority relief expands the remedies available to aggrieved employees
under Title V11. 2 °
Franks arose out of a claim of racial discrimination in various hir- t rcici
ing and promotional practices of the Bowman Transportation Co."
Petitioner Lee intervened on behalf of himself and other black indi-
viduals who had applied for positions as over-the-road (OTR) drivers,
asserting that they were denied employment because of discriminatory
hiring practices. 22 The district court found that Bowman had discour-
aged or prohibited its black workers from transferring to OTR posi-
tions. Further, the court found that black applicants from outside the
company who were interested in OTR positions were denied any seri-
ous consideration. 23 The court separated the class represented by Lee
into two distinct subdivisions: all black Bowman employees who had
applied to transfer to an OTR position; and all non-employee black
applicants who applied for positions as OTR drivers. 24 Even though
(5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F.
Supp. 505, 516.18. I FEP Cas. 260, 269.71 (ED. Va. 1968).
'" 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
" Id. at 762-80. Section 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. 111, 1973), is
quoted in the text at note 61 infra.
"424 U.S. at 761-62.
" Injunctive and back pay relief are specifically provided for in § 706(g) of Title
VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. III, 1973).
2° In the subsequent case of United States v. Elevator Constructors, 13 FEP Cas.
81, 87-88 (3d Cir. 1976), the Third Circuit interpreted Franks as justifying the use of
preferential remedies under Title VII.
21 Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 5 FEP Cas. 421, 422.23 (N.D. Ga.
1972).
22 Bowman maintained several departments within the company. The OTR driv-
ers department, which was almost exclusively white, received higher wages than the
other departments. On the whole the black workers were frozen into the lower paying
departments. Id. at 423-25.
Lee also claimed that Bowman's refusal to permit him to transfer to an OTR po-
sition and his subsequent discharge from the company were based on discriminatory
practices. Id. at 423.
" Id. at 424-25.
" Id. at 430.
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the district court found a pattern of racial discrimination, it denied
any backpay or retroactive seniority relief to the two subclasses,
reasoning that it could not give backpay or seniority relief to an entire
class, when the class could not demonstrate "a vacancy, qualification,
and performance by every member." 25 On appea1,26 the Fifth Circuit
reversed the district court's holding as to the denial of back pay to the
two subclasses and remanded the judgment for the district court to
determine the appropriate back pay relief for each class member."
Relying on the departmental seniority cases," the circuit court also
ordered retroactive seniority relief for the black employees who had
attempted to transfer to OTR positions." However, the appeals court,
in relying on its prior reasoning in Papermakers, 3° refused to grant fic-
tional or retroactive seniority to the black applicants who had not ac-
tually worked for Bowman during the time for which seniority relief
was claimed." This refusal to grant seniority relief to the non-
employee black applicants was reversed on appeal, when the Supreme
Court found fictional seniority to be an appropriate form of relief
under Title VII. 32
This note will first analyze the divergence between the Fifth Cir-
cuit and the Supreme Court in their interpretation of section 703(h).
While the Court's holding that the provision does not preclude senior-
ity relief is correct, it will be submitted that the Supreme Court failed
to resolve whether section 703(h) is directly applicable to situations
where the operation of a seniority system and not a company's hiring
policies is at issue. This note will then discuss the Court's holding that
seniority relief is an appropriate form of relief under section 706(g)
of Title VII. It will be concluded that despite the fact that retroactive
seniority as a remedy may deprive individual nonminority workers of
their employment expectations, such a result may be necessary in
order to provide adequate relief for minority workers who have been
denied employment because of discrimination.
1. Bona Fide Seniority Systems—Section 703(h).
The analysis used by the Fifth Circuit in Franks serves as an ex-
ample of the approach utilized by several federal courts in confront-
ing the issues of seniority relief and the significance of section 703(h)
25 Id. at 426. The court did find, however, that members of the two classes
should receive priority in consideration for any future positions as OTR drivers. Id. at
425.
" 495 F.2d 398, 8 FEP Cas. 66 (5th Cir. 1974).
27 Id. at 421.22, 8 FEP Cas. at 83.84.
"See note 5 supra.
" 495 F.2d at 414-17, 8 FEP Cas. at 77-79.
" 416 F.2d at 995, 1 FEP Cas. at 886. Papermakfrs is quoted in the text at note 9
supra.
" 495 F.2d at 417-18, 8 FEP Cas. at 79-80.
32 424 U.S. 747, 779 (1976).
1144
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
of Title VII. 33 The Fifth Circuit first distinguished between the class
of minority workers who as Bowman employees were denied transfers
to OTR positions and the class of job applicants who were initially de-
nied any employment with Bowman." The court found that the de-
partmental seniority system perpetuated the effects of prior discrimi-
nation by forcing minority employees of Bowman to remain in in-
ferior departments. 35 To prevent the minority employee from being
"locked in" to the inferior departments, the court permitted the
minority workers to use their plant seniority when transferring to new
positions, reasoning that the employer's departmental seniority system
perpetuated the effects of past discrimination and was, therefore, an
unlawful employment practice proscribed by and remediable under
Title VII. 35
. The Fifth Circuit applied a different approach to the minority
job applicants who sought fictional seniority relief. As to the job ap-
plicants, the court utilized a two pronged test. It found first that the
minority applicants had suffered a wrong in being denied employ-
ment because of race. 37 The court then turned to the question of
whether Title VII permits the use of fictional seniority as relief under
these circumstances. To resolve this question the court focused on sec-
tion 703(h),35 which pertains to the use of different standards in the
distribution of employment benefits under bona fide seniority sys-
tems. The Fifth Circuit found that section 703(h) implicitly prevents
the use of fictional seniority, stating that "[Ole discrimination which
has taken place in a refusal to hire does not affect the bona fides of
the seniority system. Thus, the differences in the benefits and condi-
tions of employment which a seniority system accords to older and
newer employees is protected as 'not an unlawful employment
33 See cases cited at note 15 supra.
34 495 F.2d at 417-18, 8 FEP Cas. at 79-80.
35 1d. at 414-15, 8 FEP Cas. at 77-78. By discouraging transfers to other better
paying departments, Bowman had prevented the minority workers from being able to
accumulate any departmental seniority in the more desirable departmental positions.
This means that once the discriminatory transfer policy is abolished, the minority em-
ployee is faced with a difficult decision. If he does transfer to a better department, he
will be unable to transfer his seniority from his old department. This will place him at
the bottom of the ladder when competing for assignments in the new department.
Conversely, if the minority worker remains in his old department, he may receive lower
pay, but he will still maintain his departmental seniority and be able to compete on a
better level within that department. This conflict effectively "locks" an employee into
the lower paying department.
35 /d. at 414, 8 FEP Cas. at 77.
37 1d at 417, 8 FEP Cas. at 80.
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970). Section 703(h) is quoted in the text at note 12
supra. It should be noted that the court did not refer to § 703(h) in concluding that the
black Bowman employees were entitled to seniority relief. It would appear, however,
that the Court assumed that the departmental seniority system, coupled with the dis-
criminatory transfer policy, created a seniority system which was not bona fide. 495
F.2d at 414-15, 8 FEP Cas. at 77-78.
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practice'."39
 Therefore, while the court found that the applicants were
the subject of wrongful discrimination, section 703(h) prevented the
use of fictional seniority as a remedy, since the discrimination had not
affected the bona fide nature of the seniority system.
The Supreme Court dismissed this analysis as "clearly
erroneous."'" The Court initially adopted the view of the lower court
that the wrong affecting the job applicants in Franks was not the oper-
ation of the seniority system but the discriminatory hiring practices of
the company. However, the majority went on to point out that the
plaintiffs did not seek to modify the seniority system directly, but in-
stead, sought an award of rightful seniority status." Hence, according
to the Court, the appellants were not using section 703(h) as a method
of establishing a violation of Title VII or as a means of modifying the
seniority system. 42
The decision that section 703(h) did not form the statutory basis
for the cause of action in Franks raises the question of what, if any,
relevance section 703(h) had to the questions presented in the case. If
the appellants did not need to utilize the section as a means of estab-
lishing a violation or remedy under Title VII, then section 703(h) had
no bearing on the appellants' claim. To resolve this issue, the Court
turned to the legislative history of that section in order to clarify its
meaning and effect.
While conceding that the history of the provision does not pro-
vide a clear definition, the Court did find that "Where is no indication
in the legislative materials that §703(h) was intended to modify or re-
strict relief otherwise appropriate once an illegal discriminatory prac-
tice occurring after the effective date of the Act is proved—as in the
instant case, a discriminatory refusal to hire."'" Based on this reading
of the legislative history, the Court found that section 703(h) was in-
tended by Congress to define those situations where the operation of
a seniority system constitutes an illegal discriminatory practice. There-
fore, if some illegal practice, such as discriminatory hiring,44 is appar-
ent, there is no need to base the cause of action upon section 703(h)
which only applies where discriminatory seniority systems are in issue.
The Court's interpretation of section 703(h) would appear to be
sound. The language of the provision is clearly intended to provide a
" 495 F.2d at 417, 8 FEP Cas. at 80. See Stacy, Title VII Seniority Remedies in a
Time of Economic Downturn, 28 VANn. L. RP:V. 487, 506 (1975).
4° 424 U.S. at 757.
" Id. at 757-58.
4°
 The Court stated:
Petitioners do not ask modification or elimination of the existing seniority
system, but only an award of the seniority status they would have indi-
vidually enjoyed under the present system but for the illegal discrimina-
tory refusal to hire. It is this context that must shape our determination as
to the meaning and effect of 703(h).
Id. at 758.
43 Id. at 761-62.
"See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970).
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definition of an "unlawful employment practice" in a seniority
system. 45 This language should be confined to defining an illegal act
under Title VII, since there is no expression of an intent to extend
the section to a definition of appropriate remedies. However, the
Court's opinion in Franks falls far short of providing guidance for fu-
ture cases where a plaintiff claims that the seniority system, and not a
firm's hiring practices, is violative of section 703(h). In that the Franks
Court found that a cause of action day in the company's hiring prac-
tices governed by section 703(a) 46 and not in the discriminatory opera-
tion of the seniority system prohibited by section 703(h), the Court
did not specifically deal with the question of what constitutes a section
703(h) violation. In presenting its analysis of this section, the Court
also failed to mention the extensive treatment given the provision by
several lower courts. 47 In so doing, the Court thereby avoided any
discussion of the problem faced by lower courts in distinguishing be-
tween departmental and plant seniority cases. As a result, the scope of
the Court's interpretation is not immediately clear. 48
4 ' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970). Section 703(h) is quoted in the text at note 12
supra.
-1 ° 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) (1970).
47 See note 15 supra.
" Further, it is unclear whether, in analyzing § 703(h), the Court meant to deal
with the question of the extent to which pre-Title Vii discriminatory employment prac-
tices can invalidate the post-Act operation of a facially neutral seniority system. This
issue occupied much of the Senate's debate on Title VII in terms of whether. IT*le
Vfl would undermine vested rights of seniority" that were established prior to the ef-
fective date of the Act. 110 Com:. Re c. 7207 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Clark). The floor
leaders responded to this concern by stating that Title VII would have a proposective
effect and would leave vested rights unchanged. See id. at 7213 (Memorandum of
Senators Clark and Case); id at 7207-7217 (remarks of Sen. Clark). Thus, section 703(h)
was inserted into Title VII. See, id. at 12, 723 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
After reviewing this legislative history, the Supreme Court in Franke stated:
Accordingly, whatever the exact meaning and scope of section 703(h) in
light of its unusual legislative history and the absence of the usual legisla-
tive materials ... , it is apparent that the thrust of the section is directed
toward defining what is and what is not an illegal discriminatory practice
in instances in which the post-Act operation of a seniority system is chal-
lenged as perpetuating ,the effects of discrimination occurring prior to the
effective date of the Act.
424 U.S. at 761. In stating that the section is directed "toward defining what is and what
is not an illegal discriminatory practice" in terms of pre-Act polities, the Court appears
to imply that there may be instances in which pre-Act discriminatory acts may invalidate
present seniority systems. Such an interpretation is in direct conflict with the remarks of
Senator Clark that Title VII would not affect a seniority system "even in the case where
owing to discrimination prior to the effective date of the title, white workers had more
seniority than Negroes." 110 Colic. Rec. 7207 (1964). See Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and
Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and
Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1613 (1969). However, it is most likely that the Court
did not intend to permit pre-Act discriminatory practices to invalidate present seniority
systems, despite the Court's rather puzzling wording. For example, Justice Powell inter-
preted the majority's opinion as holding "the 'thrust' of § 703(h) of Title VII to be the
insulation of an otherwise Fiona lick seniority system from a challenge that it amounts
to a discriminatory practice because it perpetuates the effect of pre-Act discrimination."
424 U.S. at 781 (Powell J., dissenting).
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The failure of the Court to define the scope of section 703(h)
adequately is demonstrated by the subsequent case of EEOC v. Jersey
Central Power & Light Co." in which the Supreme Court vacated and
remanded a circuit court decision which had sustained a seniority sys-
tem even though it perpetuated past discriminatory practices. 5 ° Jersey
Central arose out of a request for a declaratory judgment in which the
employer power company attempted to resolve an apparent conflict
between a conciliation agreement with the EEOC and a collective bar-
gaining agreement." Under the conciliation agreement, the employer
agreed to take affirmative action to increase the percentage of minor-
ity and female workers in the company. By contrast, the collective
bargaining agreement called for lay-offs on a last hired-first fired
basis regardless of minority status. The Third Circuit first held that
the agreements were not in conflict since the conciliation agreement
applied to hiring policies, while the labor contract governed layoffs. 52
In terms of whether the collective bargaining seniority system violated
Title VII, the Third Circuit stated that "a facially neutral company-
wide seniority system, without more, is a bona fide seniority system and
will be sustained even though it may operate to the disadvantage of
females or minority groups as a result of past employment
practices."53
 The Supreme Court in a three line opinion vacated and
remanded the case "for further consideration in light of Franks v.
Bowman Transportation Co. . . . "5 4
It would appear that the Supreme Court's action was based on
the lower court's reasoning that past employment practices cannot
serve to invalidate the present operation of a seniority system. If a vio-
lation can be found in the employment practices of a company, Franks
would appear to permit a remedy despite the validity of the seniority
system. This initially would appear to be the correct result, since as
the Court pointed out,55 the use of seniority relief to restore an em-
ployee to his rightful place would not be restricted by the presence of
a facially neutral seniority system. However, Franks and Jersey Central
are distinguishable in one important respect—the type of relief
sought. Franks concerned the use of fictional seniority to make whole
those job applicants who were denied employment because of
discriminatory hiring practices. In Jersey Central, the power company
sought a declaratory judgment as to the validity of - the conciliation
agreement and the collective bargaining contract. On remand, the
question in Jersey Central will not be whether the employees should re-
ceive seniority relief, but whether the collective bargaining seniority
system is a violation of section 703(h). Unlike Franks, where the ques-
" 96 S. Ct. 2196 (1976).
5° 508 F.2d 687, 710, 9 FEP Cas. 117, 132 (3d Cir. 1975).
"Id. at 691-93, 9 FEP Cas. at 118-19.
52 Id. at 701-04, 9 FEP Cas. at 125-27,
53 1d. at 710, 9 FEP Cas. at 132.
54 96 S. Ct. at 2196 (1976).
55
 See text at notes 41-42 supra.
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don of a violation of section 703(h) did not arise, the Third Circuit in
Jersey Central will have to consider whether the seniority system is
bona fide. Despite the holding of the Court, Franks does not provide any
direct guidance on the issue. However, Franks does establish by implica-
tion a general method of interpretation.
Where the seniority system on its face specifically singles out
minority workers for discriminatory treatment, there is little doubt
that the system is not bona fide and, hence, is an illegal employment
practice under Title VII. 56 The same result would also be achieved if
it were found that the seniority system was the direct result of an in-
tention to discriminate." The harder question is the one presented by
Jersey Central, which concerns a facially neutral seniority system which
perpetuates past discriminatory practices. Franks could be interpreted
as holding that for a seniority system to be invalid under section
703(h) the illegality must flow from the seniority system itself and not
any other employment practice. For example, if a facially neutral
seniority system perpetuates the effects "of past hiring practices," the
violation is not in the seniority system, but in the hiring policies which
are specifically covered in section 703(a). 58 Hence, it is arguable that
the Jersey Central seniority system is valid under section 703(h) and
should not be modified as a result of the declaratory judgment." An
alternative interpretation of Jersey Central would be that the Franks
Court implied that a seniority system should be invalidated if it per-
petuates past discriminatory practices. However, Franks dealt with a
situation where the plaintiffs did not seek to modify the seniority sys-
tem. As a result Franks does not hold that discriminatory hiring prac-
tices may act as a basis for invalidating a seniority system.
2. Fictional Seniority as Appropriate Equitable Relief—Section 706(g).
-)Having determined that section 703(h) does not restrict the
granting of fictional seniority, 6° the Court next turned to the question
of whether seniority relief is an appropriate remedy under Title VII.
Section 706(g) provides in part that:
If the court finds that the respondent has intention-
ally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful
employment practice ... , the court may enjoin the respon-
dent ... , and order such affirmative action as may be ap-
propriate, which may include, but is not limited to, rein-
statement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay
59 See note 2 supra.
" Section 703(h) provides that an employer may apply different standards under
a bona fide seniority system "provided that such differences are not the result of an in-
tention to discriminate ...." 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(h) (1970).
S " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1970).
" Relief from the discriminatory hiring practices would still be available in a sub-
sequent suit brought by aggrieved employees.
°° See text at notes 43-44 supra.
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, or any other equitable relief as the court deems
appropriate."
The central issue presented by section 706(g) is whether fictional
seniority relief is within the scope of the section's provision for the
granting of such "equitable relief as the court deems appropriate."
In another Survey year decision, Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 62
the Supreme Court emphasized that "the purpose of Title VII is to
make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful em-
ployment discrimination." 6" Although the issue in Albemarle was the
appropriateness of an award of back pay, the Court in Franks again
stressed the principle of compensating persons injured by past dis-
crimination. The thrust of the Court's reasoning in Franks was that
seniority benefits are of such importance that a minority worker "will
never obtain his rightful place in the hierarchy of seniority" unless fic-
tional seniority is utilized as a remedy." Therefore, the Court found
that fictional seniority is an appropriate remedy under section 706(g),
since the relief is an effective means of making whole the minority
worker. 65
Justice Powell, dissenting in Franks," noted that the Court in Al-
bemarle had stressed not only the principle of making employees
whole but also the need "to achieve equality of employment oppor-
tunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor
an identifiable group of white employees over other employees."67
Justice Powell argued that the granting of fictional seniority did little
to meet the objective of eradicating discrimination. The employer who
is responsible for the discriminatory employment practices would not
be penalized by such relief since there is "only a rearrangement of
employees along the seniority ladder without any resulting increase in
cost."" The Justice noted that relief such as back pay is far more ef-
fective, since the employer would be directly affected by such a rem-
edy. The majority argued against Powell's interpretation stressing that
the removal of discriminatory barriers as well as making employees
whole could be accomplished by the granting of fictional seniority. 6°
The use of back pay was viewed by the Court as a limited form of re-
lief which only compensated the employee for past wrongs. Con-
versely, the use of fictional seniority gives the minority worker a
greater degree of power in competing for future work assignments in
the company. While an employer may not be directly "punished" by
6 ' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp, III, 1973).
62 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
6 ' 422 U.S. at 418.
61 424 U.S. at 768-69.
" Id. at 767.
"Id. at 782-85 (Powell, J., dissenting).
67 422 U.S. at 417, quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30
(1971).
66 424 U,S. at 787 (Powellj., dissenting).
"Id. at 768 n.28.
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an award of fictional seniority, the Court correctly noted that fictional
seniority does further the goal of eradicating employment discrimina-
tion by giving the aggrieved employee a potent means of advancing
toward his or her employment objectives.
The other consideration relevant to a determination of the ap-
propriateness of fictional seniority relief under section 706(g) is
whether the granting of such relief would be equitable if one conse-
quence would be to take away the employment expectations of white
workers whose seniority is based solely on actual length of service.
Justice Powell argued that the effects of fictional seniority might be to
penalize employees who were not responsible for the initial dis-
criminatory refusal to hire." White workers who expected to use their
seniority to avoid plant layoffs, might find themselves unemployed
because of a court's award of fictional seniority to minority workers.
Because of this "penalty," Justice Powell submitted that the use of fic-
tional seniority to compete for employment benefits was not an "ap-
propriate" affirmative action under section 706(g).
The majority recognized that the use of fictional seniority would
affect both discriminates and nondiscriminatee employees." However,
the Court also noted that notwithstanding the use of fictional senior-
ity, minority employees may still not be able to obtain complete relief.
Due to the employer's initial refusal to hire minority workers, it is
possible that several white workers were given jobs they might not
have received but for the discrimination. After an award of fictional
seniority these white workers would not lose the seniority that was ac-
cumulated because of discriminatory practices. This means that the
minority worker, even with his fictional seniority, will still find himself
competing on the basis of a seniority list that reflects the prior dis-
crimination. As a result, a minority employee may never receive
"complete relief" from past wrongs, while at the same time a nondis-
criminatee employee may have to delay some of his or her employ-
ment expectations because of the sudden shift in the seniority system.
The Court concluded that:
We are of the view, however, that the result which we reach
today—which, standing alone, establishes that a sharing of
the burden of the past discrimination is presumptively
necessary—is entirely consistent with any fair characteriza-
tion of equity jurisdiction, particularly when considered in
light of our traditional view that laittainment of a great na-
tional policy ... must not be confined within narrow canons
for equitable relief deemed suitable by chancellors in ordi-
nary private controversies.'"
7° Id, at 788-89 (Powell, J., dissenting).
T' /d. at 777.
"Id. at 777-78, quoting Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB,, 313 U.S. 177, 188 (1941).
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The argument with respect to fashioning appropriate equitable
relief formed the central area of disagreement between the majority
and dissent in Franks. In terms of the individual employees involved,
it is questionable whether either the majority or the dissent provided a
truly equitable solution for the problem of remedying discriminatory
hiring practices. Ultimately, it was the Court's decision to favor the
national policy of eradicating employment discrimination that tipped
the balance in favor of granting fictional seniority relief. If the result
of this policy is to deny the employment expectations of nondis-
criminatees, it is a loss that must be accepted in order to resolve a
greater national dilemma.
VII. PROCEDURE
A. Tolling of the Statute of Limitations in a Section 1981 Action — The
Inter-Relationship Between Title VII and Section 1981: Johnson
In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,' the Supreme Court
this Survey year, held that the timely filing of a charge of employment
discrimination under Title VII does not toll the statute of limitations
for a cause of action based on the same facts under 42 U.S.C. section
1981. 2 The petitioner in Johnson had filed an action with the EEOC in
1967 claiming that Railway Express Agency, Inc. (REA) discriminated
against all of its Black employees with respect to seniority rules and
job assignments and that the two unions involved with REA main-
tained racially segregated memberships. 3 Three weeks after the
petitioner filed the complaint, the company terminated his
employment.' Thereafter, Johnson amended his complaint to include
the allegation that REA had discharged him because of his race. Ap-
proximately four years later, the EEOC issued a right to sue letter to
1 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
2 1d. at 462-66. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) provides in part:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue,
be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens ....
The Court had granted certiorari to resolve "an apparent conflict" among the circuits
as to whether a § 1981 statute of limitations was tolled during the pendency of Title
VII administrative proceedings. 421 U.S. at 457. See Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, 489 F.2d 525, 529.30, 6 FEP Cas. 1163, 1166 (6th Cir. 1973), rehearing denied,
489 F.2d 530, 530-31, 7 FEP Cas. 486, 487 (6th Cir. 1974), ofd, 421 U.S. 454 (1975)
(statute is not tolled). Contra, Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, 478 F.2d 979, 994-95
n.30, 5 FEP Cas. 994, 1005-06 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge
Marine Contracting Co., 437 F.2d 1011, 1017 n.16, 3 FEP Cas. 99, 103 n.16 (5th Cir.
1971).
3 421 U.S. at 455.
4 1d.
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Johnson, 5 who then brought an action against the employer and the
two unions under both Title VII and section 1981.° Both the district'
and circuit" courts dismissed Johnson's Title VII complaint on pro-
cedural grounds."
As to the petitioner's section 1981 claim, the lower courts found
that the claim was governed by the applicable state statute of
limitations" which required that civil actions "for injuries to person
[and] civil actions for compensatory or punitive , damages, or both,
brought under the federal civil rights statutes .. shall be commenced
within one ... year after cause of action accrued."" The district and
circuit courts rejected Johnson's argument that this statute of limita-
tions was tolled during the period when his charges were being pro-
cessed by the EEOC." The Supreme Court affirmed."
The Supreme Court approached the statute of limitation issue
by first analyzing the interrelationship between Title VII and section
1981. The Johnson Court noted that in enacting Title VII, Congress
had stressed the importance of encouraging the business community
to comply voluntarily with the goal of eliminating employment
discrimination." As a part of this policy, the EEOC was given the
power to conciliate employment discrimination disputes in order to
avoid litigation and forced compliance." The Court pointed out how-
Id. at 455-56. A right to sue letter informing an individual who has brought
charges under Title VII that he or she may bring an action in federal court is issued if
(1) the Commission dismisses the individual's complaint, (2) the EEOC or Attorney
General have not filed a civil action based upon the charges within a prescribed period,
or (3) the individual has refused to join in a conciliation agreement. Once the right to
sue letter is given, the aggrieved employee has 90 days in which to bring a civil action.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Stipp. III, 1973). See
6 421 U.S. at 456.
7 6 FEP Cas. 1160 (W.D. Tenn. 1973). See din 6 FEP Cas. 1159 (W.D. Tenn.
1971); sub nein. Thornton v. Railway Express Agency, 6 FEP Cas. 1158 (W.D. Tenn.
1971).
489 F.2d 525, 6 FEP Cas. 1163 (6th Cir. 1973), rehearing denied, 489 F.2d 530, 7
FEP Cas. 486 (6th Cir. 1974).
6 The progress of Johnson's complaint from his initial filing of charges with the
EEOC to the final adjudication by the Supreme Court presents a disturbing commen-
tary on the ability of indigent minority employees to seek speedy and fair resolutions of
employment disputes. Johnson's Title VII complaint against REA was dismissed by the
district court, because the plaintiff failed to refile his complaint within the 30 day filing
period. 6 FEP Cas. at 1161-62. The reason for Johnson's failure to properly file was an
inability to locate an attorney who would handle his case after the withdrawal of
Johnson's original counsel. Id. at 1161. The EEOC was also "partially at fault" because
of the four year delay between the submission of the complaint to the Commission and
the issuance of the right to sue letter. Id. at 1163. It should also be noted that the case
was not resolved until eight years after the initial complaint was filed in 1967.
" 6 FEP Cas. at 1162; 489 F.2d at 529, 6 FEP Cas. 1166.
" TENS. CODE ANN. § 28-304 (Supp. 1975). See note 44 infra.
" 6 FEP Cas, at 1162; 489 F.2d at 529-30, 6 FEP Cas. at 1166.
" 421 U.S. at 467.
" 421 U.S. at 459. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974).
15 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1970), amended by, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. III,
1973).
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ever, that it was not the intent of Congress in enacting Title VII to
preclude other avenues of relief, including in particular, relief under
section 1981. The Court also noted that while both Title VII and sec-
tion 1981 provide remedies for discriminatory employment
practices,' 6 the relief available under the two provisions varies in sev-
eral respects such as back pay relief and attorney's fees." The Court
ultimately concluded that "the remedies available under Title VII and
under § 1981, although related, and although directed to most of the
same ends, are separate, distinct, and independent." 6 Within this
framework, the Court turned to the specific question of whether to
toll the statute of limitations.
Since section 1981 does not contain its own statute of limitations,
the Court in Johnson first looked to state law to determine the appro-
priate limitations period."' It found that the one-year state limitation
for tort and civil rights actions was the most appropriate. 20 The Court
further held that the state statute of limitations was not suspended by
any of the applicable state tolling statutes." Having settled the ques-
tion of whiCh state statute of limitations applied, 22 the Court ad-
'° The Court stated that "(although this Court has not specifically so held, it is
well settled among the Federal Courts of Appeals—and we now join them—that § 1981
affords a federal remedy against discrimination in private employment on the basis of
race." 421 U.S. at 460.
IT A backpay award under Title VII is restricted to the two year period prior to
the filing of charges, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. III, 1973), while backpay under §
1981 is restricted by the applicable state statute of limitations. •See note 19, infra. A
party may recover attorney's fees under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (Supp. III,
1973), but such a recovery is unavailable under § 1981. Alaska Pipeline Co. v. Wilder-
ness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 270-71 (1975). The Johnson Court also noted that § 1981
provides compensatory and punitive damages implying that such damages are not
available under Title VII. 421 U.S. at 460. SinceJohnson Congress has enacted legislation
permitting attorney's fees under § 1981, Pub. 1.. No. 94.559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976).
" 421 U.S. at 461.
19 1d. at 462. See O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 322-23 (1914). The Court also
noted that under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970) Congress provided that state law could be
applied in fashioning relief under § 1981. Section 1988 provides in part:
[fin all cases where [the federal civil rights laws) are not adapted to the ob-
ject [of vindicating a person's civil rights], or are deficient in the provisions
necessary to furnish suitable remedies ... the common law, as modified
and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the
court having jurisdiction of such civil cause is held, so far as the same
is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States,
shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition
of the cause ....
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970).
2 ° 421 U.S. at 463.
21 id.
" Id. at 465. Johnson indirectly raises several questions as to the inter-relationship
between state and federal law. In his argument the petitioner relied on American Pipe
& Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), and Burnett v. New York Central
Railroad Co., 380 U.S. 424 (1965), in which the Court had tolled federal limitation stat-
utes because of a potential conflict with federal policy. The petitioner contended that
the state statute of limitations should be tolled on similar grounds, since "a failure to
toll the limitation period [would] conflict seriously with the broad remedial and humane
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dressed the remaining issue whether the state law should be set aside
as inconsistent with the federal policies underlying the Civil Rights
Acts. 23
The petitioner argued that a "failure to toll the limitation period
in this case [would] conflict seriously with the broad remedial and
humane purposes of Title VII." 24 While the underlying policy of the
Act is to encourage the voluntary eradication of empliiyment dis-
crimination, a decision by the Court not to toll the statute would force
an aggrieved employee to enter into litigation during the pendancy of
conciliation efforts by the EEOC., The Court agreed with the
petitioner that the effect of forcing a minority worker into litigation
would be to "deter efforts at conciliation," 25 since the threat of court
action would severely reduce an employer's willingness to enter freely
into a settlement. The Court suggested, however, that a possible solu-
tion could be found where the plaintiff filing a claim under section
1981 requested a stay of the 1981 action until the Title VII adminis-
trative proceedings were completed. 26 While recognizing that this
suggestion was not a "highly satisfactory solution," 27 the Court
reasoned that the importance of maintaining section 1981 as a sepa-
rate remedy in discrimination cases outweighs the problems encoun-
tered in Title VII conciliation:
[T]he fundamental answer to petitioner's argument lies in
the fact—presumably a happy one for the civil rights
claimant—that Congress clearly has retained § 1981 as a
remedy against private employment discrimination separate
from and independent of the, more elaborate and time-
consuming procedures of Title VII."
Underlying this conclusion was the basic presumption that if section
1981 is to be accorded separate treatment, then the provision's statute
of limitations should run independently from the course of adminis-
trative proceedings. In effect, then, the petitioner, in relying exclu-
sively on the administrative remedies available under Title VII, had
purposes of Title VII." 421 U.S. at 465. The Court found that contrary to the
petitioner's reasoning a failure to toll would not conflict with federal policy. Id. at 965,
467 n. 13. This avoided any consideration of whether the Court, if it had found a con-
flict, could still have tolled the state limitation statute. If the statute were tolled, the
Court would have, in effect, created a new federal common law which would supersede
state law. While a full discussion of the Court's power to create such a new federal law
is beyond the scope of this Survey, the lack of any discussion by the majority or, in par-
ticular, the dissent on this question is puzzling,
" 421 U.S. at 465.
27 Id.
25 Id. at 461.
25 1d. at 465.
27 Id.
"Id. at 465-66.
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"slept on his § 1981 rights"29 by not filing within the time allotted by
applicable statute of limitations.
Although the cornerstone of the Court's opinion is the premise
that Title VII and section 1981 must be treated as independent grants
of rights and remedies to civil rights plaintiffs, it is questionable
whether the tolling of the statute of limitations would seriously affect
the independent nature of these two statutes. If the limitation statute
were tolled during the pendancy of an administrative process, an
individual's rights under Title VII and section 1981 would be unaf-
fected, since the same procedures and remedies would still be
availabIe. 30
 The only change would be to permit a claimant more flex-
ibility in bringing a civil action for employment discrimination. In-
stead, the Court has chosen to favor form over substance by maintain-
ing a strict separation between section 1981 and Title VII.
It is also arguable that the Court's holding in Johnson may ulti-
mately restrict the effectiveness of Title VII and section 1981 by im-
peding the conciliation process and complicating the procedures
necessary to bring a civil action for employment discrimination. After
Johnson, an aggrieved employee would be well advised to institute
simultaneous actions under Title VII, under section 1981, and under
23 Id. at 466. The Court's use of these words is apparently taken from language
in Burnett v. New York Central Railroad Co., 380 U.S. 424, 429 (1965). In Burnett the
plaintiff had first filed an action under the Federal Employee's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.
§ 51 el seq. (1970), in a state court. After the action was dismissed for improper venue,
the plaintiff brought a similar action in federal court. The federal court dismissed rul-
ing that the federal statute of limitations had run. In reversing, the Court found that
the plaintiff had not slept on his rights under the FELA, since his initial cause of action
was the same as his subsequent claim in the federal courts. 380 U.S. at 429. This dem-
onstrates the importance of the Court's interpretation in Johnson that Title VII and sec-
tion 1981 are separate remedies. If the two provisions were treated as one and the
same, Burnett would apply and the statute of limitations for § 1981 would be tolled.
However, as they are separate remedies, the institution of a claim under Title VII has
no effect on one's § 1981 rights.
3°
 In his dissent in Johnson, Justice Marshall reasoned that adopting a stand in
favor of tolling would not affect the basic principles and interests protected by the stat-
ute of limitations. 421 U.S. at 473 (Marshall, J., dissenting). As the Court stated in
American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974), the purpose of a
statute of limitations is:
to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims
that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories
have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. The theory is that even if one
has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend
within the period of limitation and that the -right to be free of stale claims
in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.
Since a claim under Title VII and § 1981 would be based on the same set of facts, an
employer would be put on notice of the § 1981 claims with the filing of charges with
the EEOC. 421 U.S. at 473 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Hence, there would be little
chance of unfair surprise or a stale claim when the § 1981 claim is brought. If for some
reason the aggrieved employee does raise a new claim under § 1981 which is unrelated
to the Title VII charges, the statute of limitations should not be tolled as to the new
claim. As suggested by Justice Marshall this would prevent an unfair surprise, while still
allowing the party to utilize § 1981 for the original charges.
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any available collective bargaining grievance procedure. 3 ' Due to the
immense variation among the state statutes of limitations which apply
to section 1981 32 and due to Johnson's anti-tolling policy, little if any
reliance can be placed on the approach of instituting an action only
after the previous remedy has failed. Therefore, an employer may
suddenly find himself overwhelmed by an aggrieved employee who is
demanding simultaneously the right to arbitration, administrative con-
ciliation, and court action. The employer might reason that there is
little to be gained in compromise, fof, if the employee fails at one
remedy, he will only go on to the next. Alternatively, the deluge of
potential remedies may force some employers into a premature set-
tlement in order to avoid the drain on time and resources that would
be necessary to avoid liability. As the Supreme Court suggested, a par-
tial solution to this problem may be to request a stay of proceedings in
the section 1981 action.33 However, such a stay would do little to less-
en the impact on the employer of being divided three ways between
the union, the EEOC, and the courts.
It is questionable whether Congress meant to encourage concilia-
tion and settlement by overwhelming employers with the remedies
available to an aggrieved employee. It is equally questionable whether
Congress, in maintaining separate remedies of arbitration, concilia-
tion, and judicial relief, desired to impose complicated and exacting
procedures on aggrieved employees. As Justice Marshall stated in his
dissent:
[Legislative pains to avoid unnecessary and costly litigation
by making the informal, investigatory and conciliatory of-
fices of the EEOC readily available to victims of unlawful
discrimination cannot be squared with the formal mechanis-
tic requirement of early filing for the technical purpose of
tolling a limitation statute. 34
Therefore, it is submitted that by forcing an aggrieved employee to
institute a legal action during the pendency of Title VII administra-
tive proceedings, the Court in Johnion has unnecessarily complicated
the process of voluntary conciliation and has significantly impaired
the effectiveness of Title V1I's general policy of encouraging volun-
tary settlement.
The Court in Johnson was careful to note at several points in the
opinion that its decision was limited to the tolling issue. 35
 As a result
3 ' See text at notes 51-66, infra, If the pursuance of collective bargaining griev-
ance procedures does not toll the limitation statutes for Title VII or § 1981, then an
aggrieved employee should bring alt three actions simultaneously.
32 See text at notes 39-42, infra.
33
 421 U.S. at 465.
34 421 U.S. at 473 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
35 421 U.S. at 455, 456-57 n.3, 462 n.7. The Court stated that it would not rule
on the issue of "whether a § 1981 claim of employment discrimination is ever subject to
a requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted." Id, at 456-57 n.3. This issue
1157
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
several issues remain unresolved as to the choice of an appropriate
statute of limitations and the scope of Johnson's application. As men-
tioned previously," section 1981 does not contain a specific statute of
limitations and, as a result, a court must refer to state law to deter-
mine whether an action is barred." In looking to the applicable state
statutes, the federal courts have not yet reached a consensus as to
which type of state statute of limitation should apply. 38 For example,
courts have held that section 1981 is governed by limitation statutes
that related to torts," contracts," liabilities created by statute,'" and
back wages."
Although the holding in Johnson requires a resolution of this
issue, the Johnson Court offered no guidelines in this area. In Johnson,
the Supreme Court was faced with three different statutes of limita-
tions that could have applied to the section 1981 claim: 43 (1) a one
year limitation on tort and civil rights action," (2) a six year limitation
on contract actions," and (3) a ten year limitation for actions not ex-
had arisen in the district court where the court dismissed Johnson's case partly because
he had failed to exhaust his remedies under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 151 et
seq. (1970). 6 FEP Cas. 1160, 1162 (W.D. Tenn. 1973). It is submitted that despite the
statement of the Court that it would not decide the exhaustion issue on appeal, the
Johnson Court inadvertently submitted a strong argument against the requirement of
exhaustion. In response to the petitioner's argument that a refusal to toll the statute of
limitations would be contrary to the policies of Title VII, the Court suggested that a fu-
ture complainant under § 1981 request a stay of proceedings until the EEOC adminis-
trative process was complete. 421 U.S. at 465. However, the Court failed to note that
the claimant in order to submit the request for a stay of proceedings would have had to
first surmount the exhaustion issue, since the administrative proceedings would still be
in progress. In addition, it is an unavoidable conclusion of Johnson that if the statute of
limitations for § 1981 is not tolled during the pendency of administrative proceedings, a
§ 1981 claimant should not be held to the duty of first exhausting his administrative
remedies. This would be especially true in a situation such as in Johnson where the
Court enforced a one year statute of limitations, but the EEOC took four years to com-
plete its administrative procedures. See note 9, supra.
"See text at notes 19-22, supra.
37
 421 U.S. at 462.
" See generally Warren v. Norman Realty Co., 513 F.2d 730, 733.34 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 855 (1975); Note, A Limitation on Actions for Deprivation of Federal
Rights, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 763 (1969).
"Davis v. U.S. Steel Supply., 12 FEP Cas. 1, 1-2 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Smith v. Olin-
kraft, Inc., 404 F. Supp. 861, 863, 11 FEP Cas. 1188, 1189-90 (W.D. La. 1975).
4° Pittmen v. Anaconda Wire & Cable Co.. 408 F. Supp. 286, 293, 11 FEP Cas. 9,
14 (E.D.N.C. 1974).
" Mason v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 517 F.2d 520, 522, 11 FEP Cas. 443, 445 (6th
Cir. 1975); Ross v. General Motors Corp., 391 F. Supp. 550, 553, 10 FEP Cas. 306, 309
(N.D. Ga. 1973).
" Williams v. Sheraton Corp. of America, 11 FEP Cas. 897, 898 (E.D. La. 1975).
" 421 U.S. at 462.
" TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-304 (Supp. 1975). Section 28-304 imposes a statute of
limitations on actions "brought under the federal civil rights statutes ...." Id. In its de-
cision in Johnson the Court refrained from considering whether such a limitation "is an
impermissible discrimination against the federal cause of action ...." 421 U.S. at 462
n.7. See Bulls v. Holmes, 11 FEP Cas. 1063, 1065 (E.D. Va. 1975).
45 TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-309 (1955).
1)58
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
pressly covered by other statutes." While accepting the one year limi-
tation for tort and civil rights actions as applicable, the Court specifi-
cally stated that, due to the limited nature of the question under con-
sideration, it was not considering whether another statute might be
better suited to the section 1981 action. 47
It is difficult to isolate the area of the law to which section 1981
is related for the purposes of applying the appropriate statute of limi-
tations. At least three alternatives are possible. First, viewing an action
under section 1981 as a claim of "tortious interference with a basic
statutory right,' the statute of limitations for actions in tort could
apply. Second, in that the relationship between the employer and em-
ployee is based on a contract, and that, arguably, an implied condition
of any employment contract is that the employer will refrain from il-
legal discrimination, the statute of limitations applied in actions for
breach of contract may be appropriate. 49 A third alternative is to first
isolate the various remedies claimed by the plaintiff under section
1981 and then apply the relevant specific statutes of limitations to
each remedy. 5 ° For example, that part of a claim which sought injunc-
tive or punitive damages would be governed by the statute of limita-
tions that pertains to torts, and a claim for back wages would be gov-
erned by the applicable contract limitation statute.
Because of the lack of any generally accepted interpretation of
which statute of limitations should apply to a section 1981 claim, the
practitioner will have to refer to the case law of the individual juris-
diction involved. If such case law does not exist, it will be necessary to
make an educated guess as to which statute should apply. It is submit-
ted that the proper solution to this conflict is congressional action in
the form of a federal statute of limitations for an action under section
1981. This would result in a more consistent treatment of each ag-
grieved employee's claim and prevent reliance on limitation statutes
which later prove to be inapplicable.
Aside from the question of which statute of limitations should
apply in a section 1981 action, the Court also left unresolved the
problem of whether the Court's anti-tolling stance should be applied
to situations where the interaction between Title VII and section 1981
is not at issue. This relates particularly to the case where an aggrieved
employee first pursues a remedy through a collective bargaining
grievance procedure and then files a charge with the EEOC. Should
46 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-310 (1955).
47 421 U.S. at 462 n. 7.
" Wilson v. Sharon Steel Corp., 399 F. Supp. 403, 408, 11 FEP Cas. 145, 148
(W.D. Pa. 1975).
" In this respect it should be noted that § 1981 specifically protects the right to
"make and enforce contracts:" 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). See Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge
Marine Contracting Co., 437 F.2d 1011, 1017 n.16, 3 EEP Cas. 99, 103 n.16 (5th Cir.
1971).
" See Smith v. Olinkraft, Inc., 404 F. Supp. 861, 863, 11 FEP Cas. 1188, 1190-91
(W.D. La. 1975).
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the statute of limitations for filing a charge of employment discrimi-
nation under Title VII be tolled during the grievance procedure? In
addressing this issue it should be noted that Johnson was decided on
the basis of the interrelationship between Title VII and section 1981.
No mention was made by the Court as to whether the principles
enunciated in Johnson should be extended to the area of grievance
procedures. Despite this possible limitation on Johnson, two Survey year
cases have applied Johnson to the question of whether the statute of
limitations for Title VII should be tolled during a grievance
proceeding. 31
In Guy v. Robbins & Meyers, Inc.," the plaintiff was discharged
from work on October 25, 1971. 33 Two days later a grievance was
filed under a collective bargaining agreement." This grievance was
rejected by the company and, instead of going to arbitration, the
plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC. The charge was filed 108 days
after the discharge-18 days beyond the Title VII statute of limita-
tions in effect at the time of the action." The Sixth Circuit in Guy
held that the statute of limitations was not tolled during the grievance .
proceedings and that the Title VII action was barred." In reaching
this result, the court relied primarily on Johnson and Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co." In Gardner-Denver, the Supreme Court consid-
ered whether an aggrieved individual was entitled to a trial de .novo
under Title VII after the completion of final arbitration under a col-
lective bargaining agreement." In granting a trial de novo, the
Gardner-Denver Court construed Title VII as a separate remedy which
supplemented the grievance procedure." While the Court in
Gardner-Denver did not consider the tolling issue, its holding repre-
sents the same basic policy of "separate" remedies that the Court later
followed in Johnson." The Sixth Circuit in Guy interpreted
Gardner-Denver and Johnson as support for the reasoning that the Title
VII statute of limitations was not tolled during the grievance proceed-
" Guy v. Robbins & Meyers, Inc., 525 F.2d 124, II FEP Cas. 641 (6th Cir. 1975),
cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3608 (April 27, 1976); Bush v. Wood Bros. Transfer, Inc.,
398 F. Supp. 1030, II FEP Cas. 113 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
52
 525 F.2d 124, 11 FEP Cas. 641 (6th Cir. 1975), cert, granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3608
(April 27, 1976). See also Roberts v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 11 FEP Cas. 1440 (C.D.
Cal. 1975), vacated, 12 FEP Cas. 526 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
53
 525 F.2d at 126, 11 FEP Cas. at 641.
54 Id. at 126, 11 FEP Cas. at 642.
55 Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1970). The filing period was extended under
the 1972 amendments From 90 to 180 days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. III, 1973).
36 525 F.2d at 128, 11 FEP Cas. at 643-44.
37 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
5 " Id. at 38.
"Id. at 47-49.
See text at note 28, supra. In both Gardner-Denver and Johnson the Court placed
great reliance on the principle that "the legislative history of Title VII manifests a con-
gressional intent to allow an individual to pursue independently his rights under both
Title VII and other applicable state and federal statutes." 421 U.S. at 459, quoting
Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 48.
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ings, since Title VII and the grievance proceedings are regarded as
separate remedies."
Contrary to the Sixth Circuit's decision in Guy, the district court
for the Southern District of Texas held in Bush v. Wood Bros. Motor
Transfer, Inc. 62 that the 90 day statute of limitations for Title VII did
toll during the grievance procedure. 63 The court narrowly applied
Johnson by restricting its scope only to those cases in which the rela-
tionship between section 1981 and Title VII was in issue." Although
its reasoning is unclear, the Bush court, unlike the court in Guy, inter-
preted Gardner-Denver to support its holding that the statute was
tolled."5
The opinion in Bush leads to an incongruous result when com-
pared with the opinions in Johnson and Gardner-Denver. Read together,
the Court's analysis in the two cases stands for the principle that the
remedies provided by Title VII, section 1981, and collective bargain-
ing grievance procedures are separate and supplemental. If, under
this approach, the statute of limitations for a section 1981 action
should not be tolled during a Title VII administrative proceeding, as
the Court ruled in Johnson, the same should apply for Title VII's stat-
ute of limitations during a grievance proceeding. In addition, as the
Court stated in Guy, the statute of limitations for Title VII is "a clear
pronouncement" of a "jurisdictional prerequisite."66 To add a tolling
exception such as the one established in Bush might greatly expand a
plaintiff's time limitations far beyond the relatively short limitations
imposed by Title VII.
An additional conflict arose during the Survey year among the
district courts in relation to the scope of Johnson's applicability. In con-
cluding that the statute of limitations for section 1981 is not tolled
during an administrative proceeding, the Supreme Court in Johnson
gave no indication as to whether its holding should be applied ret-
roactively. This has led to a conflict among the district courts as to
whether Johnson should be applied retroactively to deny a section 1981
claim due to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations.
In Bush v. Wood Bros. Transfer, Inc.," the plaintiff was discharged
from his job in 1970. After pursuing his remedies through collective
bargaining grievance procedures and Title VII administrative pro-
ceedings, the plaintiff brought an action under Title VII and section
1981."" Unless tolled by the Title VII action, the applicable state two
year statute of limitations for a section 1981 claim would have barred
81 525 F.2d at 128, 11 FEP Cas. at 643.
" 398 F. Supp. 1030, I I FE? Cas. 113 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
83 Id. at 1033-34, 11 HP Cas. at 116.
8  Id. at 1033, 11 FEP Cas. at 116.
65 Id. at 1034, 11 FE? Cas. at 116.
" 525 F.2d 127, 11 FE? Cas. at 642.
" 398 F. Supp. 1030, 11 FEP Cas. 113 (S.D. Tex. 1975). See also Roberts v. Lock-
heed Aircraft Corp., 12 FEP Cas. 526 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Hambrick v. Royal Sonesta
Hotel, 11 FEP Cas. 863 (E.D. La. 1975).
88 398 F. Supp. at 1031, 11 FEP Cas. at 114.
1161
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
the action. The Supreme Court's decision in Johnson was handed
down subsequent to the institution of the action in Bush, but prior to
the lower court's ruling.
In relying on the criteria enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 69 the district court in Bush held that Johnson
is not retroactive," because (1) the plaintiff in delaying his action
under section 1981 relied on past precedent," (2) a retrospective ap-
plication of the anti-tolling rule would frustrate the "policy of en-
couraging the plaintiff to use every avenue of relief prior to institut-
ing a civil suit," 72 and (3) it would be inequitable to deny relief to the
plaintiff." Without specifically so holding, the court noted that the
non-retroactivity of Johnson should apply to a plaintiff who has insti-
tuted a Title VII administrative proceeding, but who has notyet
brought a claim under section 1981." However, the court qualified
this specific result with the condition that the statute of limitations be
tolled during the pendancy of the EEOC proceedings only if the delay
was due to the failure of the EEOC to process the claim rapidly."
The court also implied that the statute of limitations should not be
tolled, if the plaintiff, at the time Bush was handed down, could still
file a section 1981 action before the statute of limitations expired.
It should be noted that contrary to Bush, several courts during
the Survey year applied Johnson retroactively and have found that the
statute of limitations was not tolled during the pendency of the EEOC
administrative proceedings." In these cases the question of retroacti-
vity was not specifically discussed by the courts. It is submitted that
Johnson should not be applied retroactively, since, as the court stated
in Bush, there are "numerous litigants who relied on the rule [that the
statute of limitations was tolled] and refrained from instituting
theoretically premature § 1981 actions prior to the conclusion of an
EEOC proceeding." 77
B. Consent Decrees—Back Pay Settlements—Intervention:
Allegheny-Ludlum
As part of Congress' intention to encourage cooperation and
voluntary compliance in eliminating employment discrimination under
Title VII, the EEOC is authorized to use "informal methods of con-
ference, conciliation, and persuasion" in resolving employment
13 ° 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971).
" 398 F. Supp. at 1033, 11 FEP Cas. at 116.
"Id. at 1032, 11 FEP Cas. at 115.
72 1d. at 1032-33, 11 FEP Cas. at 115.
"Id. at 1033, 11 FEP Cas. at 115-16.
"Id. at 1033, 11 FEP Cas. at 116.
as Id.
" Wilson v. Sharon Steel Corp., 399 F. Supp. 403, 408, 11 FEP Cas. 145, 148
(W.D. Pa. 1975); Heath v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 11 FEP Cas. 1152, 1153 (N.D. Ala.
1975); Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 11 FEP Cas. 748 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
22 398 F. Supp. at 1032, 11 FEP Cas. at 115.
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disputes.' In United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, Inc.,' the Fifth
Circuit this Survey year considered several arguments challenging the
right of the EEOC to negotiate industry-wide conciliation agreements
and the right of third parties to intervene in opposition to such
agreements . 3
The United States, on behalf of the EEOC and the Secretary of
Labor, initially brought an action under section 707 of Title VII 4 and
Executive Order 11246 5 against nine major steel companies and the
United Steelworkers of America.' The suit covered a substantial part
of the steel industry, as it involved 240-250 plants and 300,000
employees.' The United States charged that "the companies had vio-
lated Title VII and Executive Order 11246 by hiring and assigning
employees on impermissible grounds, and by restricting ethnic
minorities and females to low-paying and undesirable jobs with scant
opportunities for advancement."' The charges were ultimately re-
solved out of court in two consent decrees which provided broad
forms of relief throughout the steel industry.' In the agreements, the
parties consented to a permanent injunction on discriminatory em-
ployment practices; major revisions of the industry's seniority system;
affirmative action programs to correct past hiring practices; a review
committee to insure observance of the agreement; and a back pay
fund of $30,940,000 to compensate those employees injured by past
discrimination.'"
I 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. 111, 1973). See also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974). If the Commission is unable to reach a settlement, the
EEOC may bring a civil action against the employer. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f) (1) (Supp.
III, 1973).
2
 517 F.2d 826, 11 FEP Cas. 167 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, sub nom., N.O.W. v.
United States and Harris v. Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, Inc., 44 U.S.L.W. 3593
(April 20, 1976).
3
 The Fifth Circuit stated that the central issue presented by the case was:
whether the responsible government agencies may lawfully conciliate and
settle by consent decree charges of discrimination cutting across an entire
industry in a manner which assures cooperative defendants that they will
not face future government lawsuits on those claims, and which accords
the defendants the opportunity to offer final satisfication to aggrieved in-
dividuals who are willing to accept tenders of back pay and execute re-
leases.
517 F.2d at 850-51, 11 FEP Cas. at 185,
42 U.S.C. 2000e-6(e) (Supp. III, 1973).
5 3 C.F.R. 169 (1974).
° 517 F.2d at 834, I l FEP Cas. at 171-72.
7 Id. at 834 & n.l, II FEP Cas. at 171.72 & n.l. The appellee steel companies es-
timated that the "complaint reached seventy-three percent of the country's basic steel
industry." Id. at 834 n.1, 11 FEP Cas. at 171-72 n.1.
" Id. at 834, 11 FEP Cas. at 172.
9 Under §§ 706(b) and 707(e) of Title VII the EEOC is empowered "to eliminate
any ... alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, con-
ciliation, and persuasion." 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(h), 2000e-6(e) (Supp. 111, 1973). Under
this power the EEOC along with the Justice and Labor Departments entered into the
consent decrees with nine major steel companies. The two consent decrees are re-
printed in BNA, LAti. REL. REP.. FEP Man. 431:125-152.
'° 517 F.2d at 834-35, II FEP Cas. at 172-73.
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Id.
After the entry of the consent decrees in the district court, sev-
eral parties, including the National Organization of Women [NOW),
sought to intervene and to either stay or vacate the agreements." The
claimants principally attacked two provisions of the consent decrees:
(1) Paragraph 18(g), which provided that a back pay settlement would
be tendered to each affected employee upon the execution of a re-
lease, relieving the steel industry of any further liability for dis-
criminatory acts occurring on or before the entry of the decrees;"
and (2) Paragraph C, in which the government agreed to be bound by
the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel with respect to all
issues within the scope of the decrees.' 3
 The claimants argued first
that the government, by agreeing to these two paragraphs and others
within the consent decrees," exceeded the powers and responsibilities
granted to the EEOC, and second, that the agreements infringed
upon the right of the individual employee to seek recovery through a
civil action.' 5 The district court in Allegheny-Ludlum overruled these
arguments and sustained the consent decrees." The Fifth Circuit
a ffi rmed ."
Prior to addressing the case on its merits, the Fifth Circuit first
established the scope of its review. The court concluded that "the
scope of our review is narrow and we should interfere with the im-
plementation of the consent decrees only upon a clear showing that
the district judge abused his discretion by approving the settlement.""
In reaching this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit noted that Title VII and
" 63 F.R.D. 1, 4-5, 8 FEP Cas. 198, 199.200 (N.D. Ala. 1974).
12 BNA, LAB. REL REP,. FEP Man. 431:144-45. Paragraph 18(g) is quoted in the
text at note 24 infra.
13 BNA, LAB. REL. REP., FEP Man. 431:126. Paragraph C provides in part:
This Decree resolves all issues between plaintiffs and defendants re-
lating to acts and practices of discrimination by the defendants to which
this Decree is directed, as well as any future effects of such acts and prac-
tices and, with respect to such matters, compliance with this Decree shall
be deemed to be compliance with Title VII and Executive Order 11246, as
amended, and shall be deemed to satisfy any requirement for affirmative
action by defendants or any of them. The doctrines of res judicata and col-
lateral estoppel shall apply to all plaintiffs with respect to all issues of law
and fact and matters of relief within the scope of the complaint or this De-
cree. If a private individual seeks, in a separate action or proceeding, relief
other than back pay which would add to or be inconsistent with the sys-
tematic relief incorporated in this Decree, the plaintiffs will undertake to
advise the Court or other forum in which such private action or proceed-
ing is brought that such relief in that action or proceeding is unwarranted.
14
 The claimants also attacked paragraphs 15, 16, and 19 of the Consent Decree
I. 517 F.2d at 869-75, 11 FE? Cas. at 201-06. See BNA, LAB. REL REP., FEP Man.
431:142-43 & 145-46.
's 63 F.R.D. at 5, 8 FEP Cas. at 200.
" Id. at 6-7, 8 FEP Cas. at 201. The district court sustained the decrees essen-
tially on the same basis as did the subsequent circuit court opinion.
" 517 F.2d at 834, 11 FE? Cas. at 171.
" Id. at 850. 11 FEY Cas. at 185.
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the accompanying case law exhibit a preference for voluntary com-
pliance over litigation in the federal courts." As a result, the court
was reluctant to hold consent decrees to the standard of providing the
same degree of relief that would be achieved if each individual em-
ployee were able to litigate his or her claim fully. The court recog-
nized that the adoption of such a standard would discourage vol-
untary compliance, since the standards for judicial approval of the
consent decree—relief similar to that achievable through
litigation—would be difficult to establish. In rejecting this exacting
standard, the court adopted a balancing approach between "the af-
firmative action objectives of Title VII [and] the generally strong con-
gressional policy favoring voluntary compliance."20 While the consent
decrees might not provide complete relief for each aggrieved em-
ployee under Title VII, the court found that the decrees did result in
voluntary compliance and that this factor served to counteract any
weakness in the effectiveness of the agreements."
It appears, however, that despite the court's attempt to adopt a
balancing approach, little actual "balancing" occurred. It is submitted
that the immense coverage of the consent decrees in providing relief
for a substantial number of employees in a major industry was a factor
which predisposed the court towards sustaining the decrees even be-
fore the merits of the case were considered. For example, at several
points in the decision, the court was careful to compare the broad
scope of the decrees' coverage and the enormity of the governmental
resources involved with the limited interests of the claimants. 22 Thus,
while expressing the scope of its review in terms of subscribing to a
balancing policy, it seems more likely that the court's approach was
the result of the peculiar facts of the case,23 resulting in a situation
where the court's view of the merits significantly influenced its per-
ception of the appropriate scope of review. As a result of this reliance
on the particular facts in the case, Allegheny-Ludlum may not be gener-
ally applicable, especially in disputes limited to a company which in it-
self does not have a significant national impact. Whereas in
is
	
at 848-49, 11 FEP Cas. at 182-84.
30 Id. at 850, 11 FEP Cas. 185. The court also limited its scope of review in stat-
ing that it would not interfere with the consent decrees unless there was a clear showing
that "the district court failed to satisfy itself of the settlement's overall fairness to ben-
eficiaries and consistency with the public interest." Id.
21 1d. at 850.51, 11 FEY Cas. at 185-86.
12 The court reasoned that:
Against the overwhelming speculative advantage that might accrue to a
small number of aggrieved persons if the decrees were vacated must be
weighed the certain loss to all of the immediate injunctive benefits and the
unimpeded opportunity to receive some back pay today—instead of after
months of years of litigation.
Id. at 851, 11 FEP Cas. at 186. See also, id. at 862, 11 FEP Cas. at 195.
" The only other consent decree of similar magnitude was signed with American
Telephone & Telegraph Co. and provided for broad reforms throughout the industry
along with a back pay fund of approximately $15 million. 8NA. LAB. REL REP., FEP
Man. 431:75-124k.
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Allegheny-Ludlum the facts mitigated in favor of sustaining the decrees,
a subsequent case may involve a consent decree which covers only a
few workers and which is achieved without a significant use of gov-
ernment resources. In such a situation, the complaints of individual
workers should be given greater weight than that given the claimants
in Allegheny-Ludlum, since an order vacating the decrees would not
have national impact. As a result, the scope of the court's review in
Allegheny-Ludlum should be given a limited application in situations
where a consent decree is confined to only a few aggrieved em-
ployees.
In discussing the merits of the case, the court initially centered
its attention on arguments challenging the settlement of back pay
claims. Paragraph 18(g) of Consent Decree I provides that in order
for an employee to receive a back pay award:
[E]ach affected employee shall be required to execute a re-
lease ... of any claims against or liability of the [steel
industry] resulting from any alleged violations based on
race, color, sex ... , or national origin, occurring on or be-
fore the date of entry of this Decree, of any equal employ-
ment opportunity laws, ordinances, regulations, or orders,
including but not limited to Title VII , 42 U.S.C. § 1981
, Executive Order 11246 ... , and any other applicable
federal, state, or local constitutional or statutory provisions,
orders, or regulations. Such release will also bar recovery of
any damages suffered at any time after the date of entry of
this Decree by reason of continued effects of any such dis-
criminatory acts which occurred on or before the date of
entry of this Decree. 24
The appellants argued that by precluding the employee from utilizing
other forms of relief such as Title VII and section 1981, 25
 the release
violated the federal policy of providing independent avenues of relief
for employment discrimination. 26
 They argued, therefore, that the
waiver of damages was contrary to the strong Congressional policy of
eradicating employment discrimination."
22
 Id. at 431:144-45. The claimants argued that this release was an illegal pro-
spective waiver of an employee's rights under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
517 F.2d at 853, 11 FEP Cas. at 187. In dismissing these arguments, the Fifth Circuit
noted that a release executed under Paragraph 18(g) would not completely deprive an
employee of the right to further relief, since the worker could still institute an action
for any new discriminatory acts. Id. at 853, II FEP Cas. at 187-88.
25
 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
25
 517 F.2d at 856-57, 11 FEP Cas. at 190. See Johnson Y. Railway Express
Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-61 (1975). The claimants argued that the release only barred
the employee from suing the same defendants in a pattern and practice suit based upon
the same cause of action, As the court noted, the chances of this occurring were re-
mote. 517 F.2d at 857, I I FEP Cas. at 190.
"See Newman v. Figgie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
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In dismissing this argument, the Fifth Circuit relied primarily on
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.," where the Supreme Court held that
an individual's submission of an employment discrimination claim to a
collective bargaining grievance proceeding does not constitute a
waiver of the right to bring a subsequent civil action under Title
V11. 2" Gardner-Denver rested on the principle that "Title VII was de-
signed to supplement, rather than supplant, existing laws and institu-
tions relating to employment discrimination." 3 " The claimants in
Allegheny-Ludlum, also relying on Gardner-Denver, maintained that the
principle set forth in that case allowed an employee to bring charges
under a conciliation agreement and a subsequent Title VII civil action
regardless of a waiver of Title VII rights in the initial settlement.
However, the Fifth Circuit correctly Pointed out that Gardner-Denver
referred to the waiver of collective rights based on an arbitration
agreement and not to a waiver of personal rights under Title V11. 3 ' In
the Gardner-Denver situation, an employee pursuing a complaint
through a grievance proceeding exercises a right achieved through
collective bargaining. If a final decision is reached in arbitration, the
only rights affected are those under the employment contract created
by the collective bargaining process. By contrast, Title VII rights are
derived from an act of Congress and are not dependent on the collec-
tive bargaining process for their existence. In addition, an employee's
rights under Title VII are personal and vest in the individual em-
ployee. Therefore, an employee may waive his personal Title VII
rights as part of an arbitration settlement. As the Supreme Court
stated in Gardner-Denver "an employee may waive his cause of action
under Title VII as a part of a voluntary settlement, [but] mere resort
to the arbitral forum to enforce contractual rights constitutes no such
waiver."32 Hence, it is clear from Gardner-Denver that an employee
may waive his or her personal Title VII rights as part of a back pay
settlement of the type offered in Allegheny-Ludlum. 33
22 415 U.S. 36 (1974). See Annual Survey of Labor Law, 15 B.C. INU, & Cost. L.
RYA'. 1105, 1187 -98 (1974).
22 415 U.S. at 59-60.
3° Id. at 48-49.
3 ' 517 F.2d at 857, 11 FE? Cas. at 191.
32
 415 U.S. at 52.
'3 In a related Survey year case the Fourth Circuit held in Williams v. Norfolk
and Western Railway Co., 530 F.2d 539, 11 FEY Gas. 836 (4th Cir. 1975), vacating and
remanding 11 FEP Cas. 403 (E.D. Va. 1974), that a release "in full satisfaction of all
claims and demands,' 11 FEP Cas, at 404, did not waive rights under Title V11 or 42
U.S.C. § 1981. 530 F.2d at 543, 11 FEP Cas. at 840. The case arose out of the merger
of the Norfolk and Western Railroad with the Virginian Railroad in 1959. Each rail-
road had maintained two separate railyards—one for white and another for black
workers. Upon merger, the seniority rosters for the white railyards were dovetailed so
that a white worker on the Virginian line was able to transfer seniority over to the Nor-
folk and Western. However, the black railyards, through their unions, were unable to
agree on any dovetailing. To resolve the issue, the black workers were offered a settle-
ment in lieu of continued employment on the Norfolk and Western. Id. at 541, 11 FEY
Cas. at 838. All of the black workers except the two plaintiff's in Williams accepted the
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Besides attacking the impropriety of the release, the claimants
also took issue with the adequacy of the back pay fund that would be
disbursed once the waiver was signed. Under paragraph 18(a) of the
consent decree in Allegheny-Ludlum, the steel industry had agreed to
pay up to $30,940,000 to compensate affected employees for back
pay." Based on a potential affected class of 60,000 employees," the
average recovery, if the entire fund were utilized, would be approxi-
mately $500 for each of the affected workers. 3° The claimants argued
that this recovery was inadequate when compared with the recoveries
received by employees at U.S. Steel's Fairfield Works in United States v.
United States Steel Corp. [hereinafter Fairfield]. 37
The Fabfield decision was rendered prior to the entry of the
steel industry consent decrees, but was based on similar claims of em-
ployment discrimination. In Fairfield, the court awarded an average
back pay recovery of $3,350 to each plaintiff who ultimately
prevailed." The claimants in Allegheny-Ludlum maintained that this re-
compensation. The Norfolk and Western, after negotiating with the plaintiffs' union,
offered to employ the plaintiffs at a guaranteed annual wage for five years along with a
lump sum payment of three months pay. In return the plaintiffs agreed that their
seniority would not be transferred to the new railroad and signed a release stating that
the contract was accepted "in full satisfaction of all claims and demands ...." 11 FEP
Cas. at 404. The plaintiffs later brought an action under Tide VII and * 1981 claiming
that the railroad, in refusing to allow them to transfer their accumulated seniority, es-
tablished a discriminatory seniority system. However, the railroad argued that the re-
lease was a waiver and full settlement of the plaintiffs' claims. The Fifth Circuit held
that the release did not act as a waiver of rights under Tide VII or 42 U.S.C. 1981,
since the settlement was not based on the discriminatory acts of the railroad, but upon
the merger itself which was not racially motivated. 530 F.2d at 542-43, 11 FEP Cas. at
840. The court reasoned that the "agreement and the compensation paid to Williams
and Russell dealt only with their [black railyard) seniority, not their relations to white
[employees), which is the subject of their present claim." Id. at 543, 11 FEP Cas. at 840.
It should be noted, however, that the plaintiffs' release did not differentiate between
the subject areas of the rights which were waived. The waiver applied to "all claims and
demands" against the employer. Thus, contrary to the court's holding, the agreement
should have constituted a sufficient waiver of antecedent rights under Title VII and
should have barred the action.
To further support its conclusion, the court quoted from Robinson v. Lorillard,
444 F.2d 791, 799, 3 FEP Cas. 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1971), in which the Fourth Circuit
had reasoned that "[Ole rights assured by Title VII are not rights which can be bar-
gained away—either by a union, by an employer, or by both acting in concert." How-
ever, the court's reasoning in Williams is unclear on this point, since Robinson refers to
the question of a union's pressure on an employer to adopt discriminatory practices and
not to the question of waiver of rights by an employee.
34 BNA, LAB. REL. REP., FEP Man. 431:143.
as It is not clear how the court arrived at the 60,000 affected employees figure.
The court does state that one fifth of the 300,000 persons presently employed by the
steel companies are part of the affected class. 517 F.2d at 834, 11 FEP Cas. at 172.
However, the consent decree in paragraph 18(c) does not relate solely to present em-
ployees.
3" 517 F.2d at 862, 11 FE? Cas. at 195.
37
 371 F. Supp. 1045, 7 FEP Cas. 322 (N.D. Ala. 1973), dismissed in part, vacated,
and remanded, 520 F.2d 1043, 11 FEP Cas. 553 (5th Cir. 1975), rehearing denied, 525 F.2d
1214 (5th Cir. 1976).
" 517 F.2d at 863, 11 FEP Cas. at 196.
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covery demonstrated that the back pay fund in the consent decrees
was inadequate. The Fifth Circuit disputed these figures and con-
cluded that the actual recovery in Fairfield, taking into account those
plaintiffs who were denied any recovery, would be only $60. 39 Thus,
according to the court, the back pay fund provided by the steel indus-
try in Allegheny-Ludlum was adequate.
The claimants also argued that the parties to the contract had
failed to demonstrate that a recovery under the consent decree would
be equal to a recovery through successful litigation." In dismissing
this argument, the court noted that the burden was on the claimants
to prove that the amount of the back pay fund was inadequate.
Moreover, the court again relied upon Fairfield to demonstrate that
not every affected employee who could recover under the consent de-
crees might also be successful through litigation."
The court's reliance on Fairfield is problematic because in dismiss-
ing claimant's arguments in Allegheny-Ludlum, the court based its deci-
sion upon figures provided by the lower court in Fairfield. Subsequent
to Allegheny-Ludlum, the Fairfield decision was appealed to the Fifth
Circuit, which vacated and remanded the case to the district court for
reconsideration of the back pay award." It is, therefore, questionable
whether the Fifth Circuit should have relied upon the district court's
original decision in Fairfield as an accurate determination of the aver-
age back pay recovery in a steel industry discrimination claim. How-
ever, the Fifth Circuit in Allegheny-Ludlum did not rely exclusively on
Fairfield to justify its reasoning. The court recognized that while it
could not accurately predict the back pay recovery of each individual,
any inaccuracy had to be weighed against the consequences of disal-
lowing the settlement." While individual litigation might yield a more
accurate result in terms of back pay, it would come at the expense of
an enormous effort by the government in obtaining the agreement
and would nullify the broad based relief that the consent decrees
would make available to the steel industry. In addition, the court
found that the consent decrees would apply to a potential class of
60,000 individuals," while the principle claimants in Allegheny-Ludlum
consisted of only 36 individuals." As the court stated, "we are con-
cerned ... with a scale of probabilities: the probable outcome of con-
tested litigation, balanced against its probable costs in time, money,
and public resources."" In essence, the consent decrees demonstrated
a relative degree of efficiency and fairness in resolving industry-wide
discrimination, while the alternative of vacating the settlement prom-
39 Id.
"Id.
4 ' Id.
42 520 F.2d 1043, 1060, 11 FEP Cas, 553, 567 (5th Cir. 1975).
43 517 F.2d at 862, 11 FEP Cas. at 195.
"Id. at 864, 11 FEP Cas. at 197.
93 Id. at 839, 11 FEP Cas. at 176.
"Id. at 862, 11 FEP Cas. at 195.
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ised further delays and a potential recovery for only a limited number
of individuals. 47 The court's argument as to the "scale of probabilities"
is far more persuasive than its reliance on the recovery achieved in
Fairfield. The Fifth Circuit's subsequent action of vacating and re-
manding Fairfield demonstrates that any comparison between possible
recoveries through litigation and those obtained through settlement
can be misleading. The far sounder course is to consider the effi-
ciency of the consent decrees in providing relief as compared to the
problems created by litigation of individual claims.
The claimants also contended that the consent decrees infringed
upon an aggrieved employee's right to representation by the EEOC.
In Paragraph C of Consent Decree I, the government, and the steel
industry agreed that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estop-
pel would apply between the parties with respect to the terms of the
settlement." As part of this agreement the parties stipulated that:
If a private individual seeks, in a separate action or pro-
ceeding, relief other than back pay which would add to or
be inconsistent with the systemic relief incorporated in this
Decree, the plaintiffs will undertake to advise the Court or
other forum in which such private action or proceeding is
brought that such relief in that action or proceeding is
unwarranted."
The claimants argued that Paragraph C denied an employee the right
to representation by the EEOC, since the Commission had agreed that
the doctrine of res judicata applied to all of the issues within the
scope of the agreement. 5° However, the Fifth Circuit maintained that
Title VII does not vest a right to such representation. There is no
specific wording in Title VII obligating the EEOC to institute legal ac-
tions or to represent individual employees. Upon the filing of a
charge with the EEOC, the Commission is required to serve notice on
the employer, to make an investigation, and where "reasonable cause"
is found, attempt to conciliate the dispute. 51 However, under section
706(f)(1) of Title VII the government "may bring a civil action ...." 52
This permits the Commission discretion in deciding whether or not to
represent an aggrieved employee. Accordingly, the EEOC is under no
17 See id. at 851 n.28, 11 FEP Cas. at 186 n.28.
" BNA, LAB, REt., REP., FEP Man. 431:126. See note 13 supra.
BNA. LAB. REI.. REP.. FEP Man. 431:126. The parties in Allegheny-Ludlum also
agreed to petition those courts with jurisdiction over pending steel industry discrimina-
don cases to have the relief granted in those cases modified to conform with the con-
sent decrees. Id. at 431:130 (Consent Decree I, Paragraph 3(c)(2)). See, United States v.
United States Steel, 520 F.2d 1043, 1056-57, 11 FEP Cas. 553. 564 (5th Cir. 1975).
5° 517 F.2d at 867, 11 FEP Cas. at 199.
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(h) (Supp. III, 1973). In the Survey year case Patterson v.
American Tobacco Co., 12 FEP Cas. 314, 325 (4th Cir. 1976), the court held that the
EEOC may not bring an action in court under § 706 unless it has first attempted to
conciliate the issue.
u 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. III, 1973) (emphasis added).
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obligation to give an individual representation in a Title VII action. 53
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit's holding that the EEOC is not required
to represent all aggrieved employees under Title VII should be fol-
lowed. 54
Aside from the claimants' challenge to the validity of the consent
decrees, a major question arose as to the right of the National Or-
ganization of Women (NOW) to intervene in the case. After the entry
of the steel industry consent decrees in Allegheny-Ludlum, several indi-
53 Under § 706(b) the EEOC "shall endeavor to eliminate any ... alleged unlaw-
ful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persua-
sion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. III, 1973). However, under paragraph 19(a) of
Consent Decree I of the Commission agreed not to conciliate individual claims within
the scope of the decrees. BNA, LAB. REL. REP.. FEP Man. 431:145. The claimants con-
tended that paragraph 19(a) was an illegal abdication of the EEOC's duty to conciliate.
517 F.2d at 868-69, 11 FEP Cas. at 200. The Fifth Circuit in rejecting this argument
noted that in negotiating the consent decrees, the Commission had fulfilled its duty to
conciliate. The court reasoned that the EEOC's failure to negotiate each individual
claim, was not illegal, since the Commission is not in a position of lawyer-client in pro-
tecting each individual employee. Id. at 870, 11 FEP Cas, at 202. In addition, paragraph
19(b) provides that the Commission will still'conciliate those claims not wholly within
the scope of the Decrees. BNA, LAB. REL. REP., FEP Man. 431:145.
54 In the Survey year case of EEOC v. McLean Trucking Co., 525 F.2d 1007, 11
FEE' Cas. 833 (6th Cir. 1975), the Sixth Circuit considered the related question of
whether the EEOC is bound by res judicata when the Commission brings an action based
upon an employee's charge, if the employee has settled his claim prior to the conclusion
of the EEOC's action. In McLean Brown, a black male, filed a complaint with the EEOC
in 1970 claiming that the trucking company had discriminated against him and other
black drivers. Id. at 1008, 11 FEP Cas. at 833. In 1972 the EEOC brought an action
based on Brown's charges against McLean Trucking Co., claiming discriminatior
against its employees on the basis of race. Brown also filed a separate action against the
trucking company which was ultimately settled out of court. The district court dismissed
the EEOC action concluding that, since Brown was barred by his settlement from any
further action, the Commission was precluded from bringing any claim based on
Brown's charges. 64 F.R.D. 643, 645, 7 FEP Cas. 299, 301 (W.D. Tenn. 1974). The
Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. 525 F.2d at 1012, 11 FEP Cas. at 836.
The EEOC argued that it had not consented to the settlement between Brown
and McLean Trucking Co. and, therefore, it should not be barred from instituting a
separate action. Id. at 1010, 11 FEP Cas. at 834. The Commission also considered its ac-
tion to be separate, since it was brought in the public interest and not for the sole
benefit of Brown. In accepting these arguments the Sixth Circuit relied primarily on its
earlier decision in EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 10 FEP Cas. 38 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 994 (1975). In that case, the court stated that the "EEOC
sues to vindicate the public interest, which is broader than the interests of the charging
parties ... land] the EEOC is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata from basing its
complaint on charges of' discrimination which it never agreed to settle." Id. at 1361, 10
FEP Cas. at 46.
In permitting the EEOC's action to continue, the Sixth Circuit in McLean was
faced with the additional problem of deciding what relief Brown could receive if the
trucking company were found liable. The court found that since Brown had agreed to
a settlement, he was not entitled to any further "'private benefit', such as back pay, not
granted to him under the compromise settlement of his separate action 525 F.2d
at 1011, 11 FEP Cas. at 835-36, See also, Fairfield, 520 F.2d 1043, 1056-57, 11 FEP Cas.
553, 564 (5th Cir. 1975). However, the Sixth Circuit held that Brown could share in the
general benefits that might flow from the EEOC's action, such as improvements in
working conditions. 525 F.2d at 1011, II FEP Cas. at 835-36.
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viduals and groups sought to intervene to stay or vacate the
settlement." The district court permitted several of the individual
petitioners to intervene, but denied intervention to three organiza-
tions including NOW." On appeal, the Fifth Circuit dismissed NOW's
request to intervene and held that intervention is not conferred as a
statutory right under section 707 of Title VII. 67
Under Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party
may intervene as a matter of right or by permission of the court." A
claimant may intervene as a matter of right if the action is based on a
federal statute which "confers an unconditional right to intervene""
or if the action "may as a practical matter impair or impede" the
claimant's ability to protect his or her interest in the property or
transaction which is the subject of the civil action."
The Fifth Circuit found that NOW did have an interest in the
subject matter of the case, but that since the organization was not a
party to the consent decrees, it would not be bound by res judicata or
collateral estoppel if the decreases were sustained. Hence, the court
reasoned that NOW should not be permitted to intervene, since the
consent decrees would not impair its rights.'"
As to a statutory right of intervention under Rule 24(a)(1), NOW
argued that section 706(0(1) of Title VI1 62
 constituted an uncondi-
tional statutory right to intervene." Section 706(0(1) does provide
that an aggrieved individual may intervene as a matter of right."
However, the Fifth Circuit noted that the government's claim was
35 517 F.2d at 839, 11 FEP Cas. at 176.
" 63 F.R.D. at 4, 8 FEP Cas. at 199-200. NOW was permitted to name three in-
dividual women to intervene on behalf of former, present, and future female em-
ployees of the defendant steel companies. These women were represented by NOW's
counsel throughout the proceedings. In addition, NOW was permitted to submit briefs
to the district court judge concerning the effects that the consent decrees might have on
female employees. Id. at 4 n.1, 8 FEP Cas. at 199 n.1; 517 F.2d at 839 n.11, I1 FEP
Cas. at 176 n. 11.
" 517 F.2d at 842-46, 11 FEP Cas. at 178-82. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (Supp. III,
1973), amending in part 42 U.S.C. 2000e-6 (1970).
U Rule 24(a) states in part:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be
permitted to intervene in an action: (I) when a statute of the United States
confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant
claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the sub-
ject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action
may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that in-
terest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing
parties. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 24(a).
" Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 24(a)(1).
6° Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 24(a)(2).
61 517 F.2d at 845-46, II FEP Cas. at 181-82.
62 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(f)(1) (Supp. III, 1973).
U 517 F.2d at 841-42, 11 FEP Cas. at 178.
64 Section 706(()(1) provides in part that "ItJhe person or persons aggrieved shall
have the right to intervene in a civil action brought by the Commission ...." 42 U.S.C.
2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. III, 1973).
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based upon a pattern and practice suit under section 707. 65 Unlike
section 706, section 707 contains no specific language referring to a
right of intervention. Section 707(e) does state that all actions under
section 707 "shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures set
forth in [section 706]." 66 On its face this statement would imply that
the right to intervene in section 706(f) is incorporated into section
707. However, the Fifth Circuit, after examining the relevant legisla-
tive history,'" concluded that section 707(e) referred only to adminis-
trative procedures of the EEOC and not the right to intervene." As a
result, the Fifth Circuit held that there is no statutory right to inter-
vention in section 707. 66
It is submitted that the court's holding on the statutory right of
intervention is sound, since the Fifth Circuit's analysis is supported
not only by legislative history, but also by the general policy behind
section 707. As the court stated, the purpose of the section is to "pro-
vide the government with a swift and effective weapon to vindicate
the broad public interest in eliminating unlawful practices ...."" In
contrast to the procedure under section 706(b), in section 707(a) the
government may bring charges without first receiving a claim from an
individual employee." The government may also request under sec-
tion 707(h) that the proceedings be expedited." A denial of the right
to intervene is consistent with this purpose, since it relieves the court
from the burden of hearing one or more individual complaints that
may not be relevant to a broad pattern and practice charge.
Allegheny-Ludlum presented the Fifth Circuit with several novel
challenges to the right of the EEOC to enter into industry-wide con-
sent decrees. While the court's scope of review may have been greatly
affected by the peculiar facts of the case, the Fifth Circuit did reach
the correct result in sustaining the decrees. In providing relief for a
vast number of aggrieved employees, the consent decrees demon-
strated a far greater ability to remedy industry-wide discrimination
problems than would the potential of recovery through individual
litigation. In addition, Allegheny-Ludlum strengthened the power of the
EEOC to conciliate those employment disputes which may have a na-
tional impact.
C. Scope of Private Actions Under Title VII: Sanchez—Gamble--Jenkins
Before an individual can file a civil action alleging violations of
Title VII, the procedures set forth in section 706 of that Title must be
" 517 F.2d at 843, 11 FEP Cas. at 179.
66 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(e) (Supp. III, 1973).
" See 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 2137, at 2164.
68
 517 F.2d at 844, I 1 FEP Cas. at 180.
66 Id. at 842-43, 11 FEP Cas. at 178-79. See also EEOC v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 515 F.2d 946, 949, 10 FEP Cas. 909, 910-11 (7th Cir, 1975).
7
 517 F.2d at 843, 11 FEP Cas. at 179.
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1970); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. III,
1973), amending 42 U.S.C. 11 2000c-5(a) (1970).
72 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(b) (1970).
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completed. The employee must first file a charge of unlawful em-
ployment discrimination with the EEOC.' Within ten days, the Com-
mission must notify the employer of the complaint. 3 The EEOC must
then investigate the charge. 3 If, after such investigation, the EEOC
does not find reasonable cause to support the allegations, it must dis-
miss the charge and notify the employee.' However, if the EEOC does
determine that there is reasonable cause to believe the allegations, the
Commission must attempt to eliminate the unlawful employment
practices through informal conciliation' If the EEOC either dismisses
the charge or fails to file a civil action within 180 days after the filing
of the initial charge, the aggrieved employee may then bring a civil
action against the employer.°
In light of this procedural framework, courts have been required
to determine the proper relationship between an initial charge filed
with the EEOC and a subsequent complaint filed in a civil action
under section 706. 7 In 1970, the Fifth Circuit in Sanchez v. Standard
Brands, Inc. 8 had set forth a standard to be used in determining the
permissible scope of a civil complaint. In Sanchez, an employee filed a
charge of sex discrimination with the EEOC.° In its investigation the
Commission concluded that reasonable cause did not exist to support
a charge of sex discrimination, but reasonable cause did exist to sup-
port a charge of discrimination based on national origin.'° After
EEOC conciliation attempts failed, the employee filed a complaint in
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V 1975). "Charges shall be in writing under oath
or affirmation and shall contain such information and be in such Form as the Commis-
sion requires." Id. The Commission requirements are set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 1601.6 - §
1601.8, § 1601.11 (1975).
a 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V 1975). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13 (1975). If
the alleged discriminatory act occurred in a state which prohibits such an act and pro-
vides for relief, the EEOC must also notify that state authority, which may then proceed
under state law. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(c) to (d) (Supp. V 1975). See also 29 C.F.R.
1601,12 (1975).
' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V 1975).
' Id.
Id.
a 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V 1975) provides in pertinent part:
If a charge filed with the Commission ... is dismissed by the Commission,
or if within one hundred and eighty days from the filing of such charge or
the expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c) or (d) of
this section, whichever is later, the Commission has not filed a civil action
under this section ... or the Commission has not entered into a concilia-
tion agreement to which the person aggrieved is a party, the Commission
shall so notify the person aggrieved and within ninety days after the
giving of such notice a civil action may be brought against the respondent
named in the charge ... by the person claiming to be aggrieved ....
Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 522 F.2d 1235, 11 FEP Cas. 707
(7th Cir. 1975) relict, 538 F.2d 164, 13 FEP Cas. 52 (1976); Gamble v. Birmingham S.
R.R. Co., 514 F.2d 678, 10 FEP Cas. 1148 (5th Cir. 1975).
a 431 F.2d 455, 2 FEP Cas. 789 (5th Cir. 1970).
9 Id. at 458, 2 FE? Cas. at 790.
la id. at 459, 2 FEP Cas. at 790.
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district court alleging discrimination because of national origin." In
allowing the complaint, the court reasoned that allegations in a judi-
cial complaint filed pursuant to Title VII may include any kind of
discrimination "like or related to" allegations contained in the EEOC
charge and growing out of those allegations during the Commission's
investigation.' 2 Thus, the allowable scope of an individual action is not
defined by the allegations in the EEOC charge, but rather by "the
scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to
grow out of the charge of discrimination."" Under this test, an em-
ployee may seek redress both for grievances described in the EEOC
charge and for grievances which are reasonably the subject of the
EEOC's relatively broad investigatory and remedial powers with re-
spect to the particular complaint."
During the Survey year, two circuit courts were required to de-
termine the proper scope of an individual action in a situation some-
what different from the one in Sanchez. In a Fifth Circuit case, Gamble
v. Birmingham Southern Railroad Co., 15 Black railroad switchmen filed a
charge with the EEOC claiming they were not considered for promo-
tions to conductor because of their race.'° In its investigation, the
EEOC found reasonable cause to support the employees' allegations."
However, the EEOC apparently did not investigate discrimination in
supervisor promotions and thus did not attempt any conciliation on
that issue." The employees subsequently filed a civil complaint in dis-
trict court. The court limited the scope of the trial to discrimination in
promotions to conductor and refused to consider discrimination in
promotions to supervisor." Although the employees urged that the
scope properly included all promotional opportunities, the district
court reasoned that the EEOC charge, investigation, and conciliation
attempts had contemplated only promotional opportunities to
conductor.2 °
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court and ruled that the
issue of supervisory promotions should have been considered by the
trial court. 2 ' The court of appeals noted that the Sanchez decision did
not entirely resolve the problem of the permissible scope of a private
action in situations such as the one in Gamble. 22 In Sanchez, both the
EEOC investigation and subsequent complaint were claimed to exceed
" Id. at 459, 2 FEP Cas. at 791.
"Id. at 466, 2 FEP Cas. at 796.
"Id.
' 4 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9 (1970); 29 C.F.R. II 1601.14-1601.18 (1975).
" 514 F.2d 678, 10 FEP Cas. 1148 (5th Cir. 1975).
'fi Id. at 687, 10 FEP Cas. at 1155.
" Id.
"Id. at 688, 10 FEP Cas. at 1156.
" Consideration for promotion to supervisor required a prior promotion to con-
ductor. Id. at 687, 10 FEP Cas. at 1155.
2 ° Id. at 687-88, 10 FEP Cas. at 1155-56.
21 Id. at 689, 10 FEP Cas. at 1157.
"Id. at 688, 10 FEP Cas. at 1156.
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the original charge to the EEOC, whereas in Gamble, the complaint
was said to exceed both the charge to the EEOC and the EEOC's
investigation." Thus, instead of automatically applying the Sanchez
standard, the court of appeals evaluated several policy considerations.
First, the court reasoned that charges filed with the EEOC
should be liberally construed in order to effectuate the remedial
policies of Title VII." Otherwise, unsophisticated employees who are
unable to describe thoroughly the discriminatory practices to which
they have been subjected would be deprived of a remedy." Further-
more, the court noted that although the Commission's role in obtain-
ing voluntary compliance with Title VII is important to the statutory
scheme, conciliation efforts are not a jurisdictional prerequisite to an
individual suit under section 706, 26 particularly where attempts to ef-
fect compliance on a similar issue have failed. 27 In addition, judicial
economy would be poorly served by requiring the employees to file a
new EEOC charge regarding the supervisor claim where the question
was so closely aligned with the conductor claim. 26
These policies seemed well served by an application of the same
standard used in Sanchez. Therefore, the court ruled that the issue of
supervisory promotions was properly raised since it was "'like or re-
lated to' the conductor complaint and an investigation of the super-
visor situation could reasonably be expected to grow from the original
complaint."28
In other cases during the Survey year, district courts applied the
Sanchez-Gamble standard which permits the scope of an individual ac-
tion to include activities which are like or related to the allegations
contained in the EEOC charge and which can reasonably be expected
to grow out of an investigation of that charge. In Black News Employees
v. Evening News Association, 3° an employee filed charges with the
"Id.
"See, e.g., Tipler v. duPont deNemours and Co., 443 F.2d 125, 131, 3 FEP Cas.
540, 544 (6th Cir. 1971). A liberal construction of a charge that there was no opportu-
nity for promotion to conductor would include the charge that there was no opportu-
nity for promotion to supervisor, since supervisors are chosen from the conductors'
ranks. 514 F.2d at 688, 10 FEP Cas. at 1156.
25 The court noted that if a charge filed with the EEOC were required to articu-
late specifically the "full panoply" of discrimination which had been suffered, the very
persons Title VII was designed to protect might lose that protection because they were
unable to describe the discriminatory practices thoroughly. Id. at 689, 10 FEP Cas. at
1156-67. See Danner v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 447 F.2d 159, 162, 3 FEP Cas. 858, 860
(5th Cir. 1971).
" 514 F.2d at 688, 10 FEP Cas. at 1156. See also Danner v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 447 F.2d 159, 161, 3 FEP Cas. 858, 860 (5th Cir. 1971).
" The defendant railroad had argued that it had a right to attempt conciliation
on the supervisor issue. In Danner.v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 447 F.2d 159, 3 FEP Cas.
858 (5th Cir. 1971), however, the court noted that "IiJt is now too well settled to discuss
that no EEOC effort to conciliate is required before a federal court may entertain a
Title VII action." Id. at 161, 3 FEP Cas. at 860.
" 514 F.2d at 688, 10 FEP Cas. at 1157.
"Id. at 688, 10 FEP Cas. at 1156.
" 11 FEP Cas. 912 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
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EEOC claiming he was subjected to "unbearable working conditions"
on account of his race. 3 t In a subsequent civil action, the employee al-
leged discrimination with respect to terms and conditions of his em-
ployment as well as hiring, promotion, transfer, and discharge
policies. 32 In applying the test from Sanchez, 33 the court reasoned that
even though no EEOC investigation had been conducted, such an in-
vestigation would reasonably have extended to all the areas alleged in
the complaint. 34
In another district court decision, Reese v. Alpha Portland Cement
Co.," a charge claiming discharge because of race was filed with the
EEOC. Although the ensuing•EEOC investigation and conciliation ef-
forts concerned only the discharge issue, the employee's complaint in
the subsequent civil action also included the issues of hiring, job as-
signments, and job classification." The Reese court, citing Sanchez and
Gamble, stated that a civil action may encompass both the original
EEOC allegations and "issues which are like or related to the issues
before the EEOC and which could reasonably be expected to grow
out of the EEOC investigation of the charge." 37 In applying this stan-
dard, the court found that the allegations regarding hiring, job as-
signments, and job classifications were not "like or related to" the
issue raised by the EEOC charge, and therefore, could not reasonably
be expected to grow out of the EEOC investigation, although the issue
of discharge generally could be included. 38
A standard , similar to the Sanchez-Gamble rule was adopted by the
Seventh Circuit in another Survey year decision. in Jenkins v. Blue Cross
Mutual Hospital Insurance, Inc.," the court of appeals had to determine
the permissible scope of an individual action which deviates from the
original charge to the EEOC. The plaintiff, a Black woman employee,
filed an EEOC charge alleging racial discrimination in that she was
denied a promotion for wearing an Afro hairstyle.4° After receiving
EEOC notice of her right to sue, the employee filed a class action suit
alleging a broad pattern and practice of both race and sex discrimina-
tion in hiring, assignment, and pay, as well as promotion. 4 '
In comparing the original EEOC charge with the allegations in
the complaint, the court of appeals ruled that "the complaint in the
civil action ... may properly encompass any ... discrimination like or
31 Id. at 914.
31 1d. at 914-15.
33 The Sanchez standard had been adopted by the Sixth Circuit in Tipler v. du-
Pont deNernours and Co., 443 F.2d 125, 131, 3 FEP Cas. 541, 544 (6th Cir. 1971).
35 11 FEP Cas. at 916.
35 11 FEP Cas. 338 (N.D. Ala. 1975).
" Id. at 339.
37 1d.
"Id. at 340.
3a 522 F.2d 1235, 11 FEP Cas. 707 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 538 F.2d 164, 13 FEP
Cas. 52 (1976),
'° 522 F.2d at 1240, 11 FEP Cas. at 711.
' Id.
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reasonably related to the allegations of the charge and growing out of
such allegations."'" This standard does not explicitly include, as the
Sanchez-Gamble standard does, provisions for matters developed in a
reasonable investigation, by the EEOC.
In applying its standard, the Jenkins court reasoned that the
EEOC charge did not form a proper basis for alleging a broad pattern
and practice of race and sex discrimination and upheld the district
court determination that the permissible scope of the employee's ac-
tion was limited to the specific issue of denial of a promotion for
wearing an Afro hairstyle. 43 On rehearing, the entire court agreed
that the enunciated standard was correct." However, the majority of
the court reasoned that under this standard, the issues of race and sex
discrimination could be litigated." Relying strongly on the policy that
courts should'be solicitous of the Title VII plaintiff," the court ruled
that the statements made by the plaintiff in her EEOC complaint were
sufficient to support her subsequent judicial action for both race° .
and sex discrimination."
Although the Jenkins rule does not specifically provide that mat-
ters developed in the EEOC investigation can be included in a subse-
quent judicial complaint, there may be no difference between the
Jenkins rule and the Sanchez-Gamble rule if the Jenkins rule is applied
so that discrimination uncovered in the course of the EEOC investiga-
tion can be included under Jenkins as discrimination "growing out of
such allegations."" On the other hand, if the Jenkins rule results in a
narrower scope than Sanchez-Gamble and different results occur in ap-
plication of the standards, then it is submitted that the broader scope
of Sanchez-Gamble is preferable. Several reasons support this view. For
example, under Jenkins, a strict interpretation of "like or reasonably
related to" and "growing out of such allegations" might allow little
more than the original specific allegation to be included in a subse-
42 Id. at 1241, 11 FEP Cat. at 712. See Danner v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 447 F.2d
159, 162, 3 FEP Cas. 858, 860 (5th Cir. 1971) (adopting a similar standard).
43 522 F.2d at 1241, 11 FEP Cas. at 712.
" 538 F.2d at 167, 13 FEP Cas. at 55.
" Id. at 169, 13 FEP Cas. at 56.
" Id. at 168, 13 FEP Cas. at 55. See Gamble, 514 F.2d at 687-89, 10 FEP Cas.
1156-57; Danner v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 447 F.2d 159, 161-2, 3 FEP Cas. 858, 860
(5th Cir. 1971); Sanchez, 431 F.2d at 463, 2 FEP Cas. at 793-94.
" The court noted that a charge alleging discrimination stemming from groom-
ing requirements which applied particularly to Blacks constituted a sufficient charge of
racial discrimination, particularly when accompanied by other general allegations. 538
F.2d at 168, 13 FEP Cas. at 56.
43 Although the plaintiff had not checked off the sex discrimination box on the
EEOC complaint form, her charge that her superior accused her of being "a leader of
the girls on the floor" was sufficient to support her allegations of sex discrimination.
538 F.2d at 168-69, 13 FEP Cas. at 56.
" Prior to the rehearing of Jenkins, one district court had queried whether the
Jenkins standard is in fact different from the Sanchez -Gamble standard. Ortega v. Con-
struction and General Laborers' Union No. 390, 396 F. Supp. 976, 980, 11 FEP Cas.
1176, 1179 (D. Conn. 1975).
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quent civil action. 5° In contrast, the application of the Sanchez-Gamble
standard, which specifically includes issues which could reasonably be
expected to grow out of the EEOC investigation of the charge, should
provide greater flexibility in the scope of a subsequent civil action
which deviates from the original EEOC charge. 5 ' The allowance of a
broad range of issues in a civil action appears to be an appropriate
method to serve the Title VII policy of being solicitous of Title VII
plaintiffs" as well as insuring that attempts at conciliation will not be
hampered." A broader scope in a judicial action reinforces the liberal
construction which must be accorded to EEOC charges in recognition
of the fact that these charges are often filed by lay complainants with-
out assistance of counsel. Furthermore, conciliation would be frus-
trated where an employer knew a particular issue not specifically
mentioned in an EEOC charge could not be pursued in a subsequent
civil action. Finally, judicial economy is well-served by including all is-
sues which could reasonably grow out of an EEOC investigation
rather than requiring the filing of new specific charges with respect to
similar issues. Therefore, a standard which permits a broad scope in a
subsequent civil action seems appropriate for serving the policy con-
siderations accompanying Title VII.
VIII. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION—THE REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION RULE
Under Title Virs prohibition of discrimination because of
religion,' a recurring question has been whether it is discriminatory to
discharge or refuse to hire an individual who regularly observes
Saturday as the Sabbath, and as a consequence is unavailable for work
on that day when such work is required by an employer. During the
an
	e.g., Jenkins, 538 F.2d at 169, 13 FEP Cas. at 56-57 (Tone, J., dissenting)
where three of the seven justices would limit the action under the articulated standard
to racial discrimination due to wearing an Afro hair style.
51 See, e.g., Black News Employees, 11 FEP Cas. at 916.
53 See Danner v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 447 17 .2d 159, 161-62, 3 FEP Cas. 858,
860 (5th Cir. 1971); 'I'ipler v. duPont deNemours and Co., 443 F.2d 125, 131, 3 FEP
Cas. 540, 544 (6th Cir. 1971).
53
 Although attempted conciliation is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing
an action in district court, see note 25, supra, the resolving of disagreement through
conciliation remains an important aspect of the Title VII framework. See, e.g., Reese, 11
FEP Cas. at 339.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970) provides in part:
It shall he an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with . respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . religion .. .
or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any indi-
vidual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual's ... religion ....
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Survey year, the Sixth, 2 Eighth, 3 and Tenth 4 Circuits reported deci-
sions involving such situations. The current statutory and regulatory
framework will undoubtedly be the subject of an increasing amount of
litigation in the future.
When Congress enacted the equal employment opportunity pro-
visions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 5 it did not define the term "re-
ligion" or indicate which acts would constitute religious discrimination
in employment. In 1966, however, the EEOC issued guidelines pro-
viding that "the duty not to discriminate on religious grounds includes
an obligation on the part of the employer to accommodate to the
reasonable religious needs of employees, and in some cases, prospec-
tive employees where such accommodation can be made without seri-
ous inconvenience to the conduct of the business." 5 The 1966
guidelines did allow an employer "to establish a normal workweek ...
generally applicable to all employees, notwithstanding that this
schedule may not operate with uniformity in its effect upon the re-
ligious observances of his employees."' As an example, the regulations
noted that an employer who closes for business on Sunday does not
discriminate by requiring employees to be available for work on
Saturday. "
In the following year, the regulations were modified to their
present form.° The section providing that an employer may establish
a normal work week was deleted entirely. The new regulation pro-
vided that the duty not to discriminate because of an individual's re-
ligion "includes an obligation on the part of the employer to make
reasonable accommodations to the religious needs of employees and
prospective employees where such accommodations can be made without
undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." 10 The
regulations noted that undue hardship can occur, for example,
"where the employee's needed work cannot be performed by another
employee of substantially similar qualifications during the period of
absence of the Sabbath observer."" The EEOC regulations further
provided that due to the sensitive nature of individual beliefs, "the
2 Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 11 FEP Cas. 1106
(6th Cir. 1975); Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 521 F.2d 512, 11 FEP Cas. 129 (6th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3361 (Nov. 16, 1976); Cummins v. Parker Seal Co.,
516 F.2d 544, 10 FEP Cas. 974 (6th Cir. 1975), afj'd by an equally divided court, 45
U.S.L.W. 4009 (Nov. 2, 1976).
3 Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527 F.2d 33, 11 FEP Cas. 1121 (8th
Cir. 1975), cm. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3359 (Nov. 16, 1976).
4 Williams v. Southern Union Gas. Co., 529 F.2d 483, 12 FEP Cas. 5 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3361 (Nov. 16, 1976).
5
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970) (amended 1972).
° 31 Fed, Reg. 8370 (1966).
7 Id.
Id.
° 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1975).
" 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b) (1975) (emphasis added).
" Id.
1180
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
employer has the burden of proving that an undue hardship renders
the required accommodations to the religious needs of the employee
unreasonable."' 2
In its 1972 amendments to Title VII, Congress incorporated the
substance of the 1967 regulations into Title VII by defining religion
as follows:
The term "religion" includes all aspects of religious obser-
vance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer
demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate
to an employee's or prospective employee's religious obser-
vance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct
of the employer's business."
Under the EEOC regulation and subsequent statutory incorporation
of the reasonable accommodation rule, two major issues have arisen:"
" 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(c) (1975). The regulation notes that each case will be re-
viewed on an "individual basis in an effort to seek an equitable application of these
guidelines to the variety of situations which arise due to the varied religious practices of
the American people." 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(d) (1975).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp.V 1975).
" For those parties whose rights accrued prior to the 1972 amendment, an addi-
tional question wises as to whether the 1967 "reasonable accommodation" rule is consis-
tent with the original statutory framework. The effect of holding the rule inconsistent
with the statute prior to amendment is to allow only those parties who allege religious
discrimination after 1972 to he governed by a reasonable accommodation requirement.
The Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have all accepted the regulation as valid and con-
sistent with the original legislation. See Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113, 1116, 4
FE? Cas. 951, 952.53 (5th Cir. 1972); Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527 F.2d
33, 38 & n.5, Il FE? Cas. 1121, 1124 & n.5 (8th Cir. 1975); Williams v. Southern
Union Gas Co., 529 F.2d 483, 488, 12 FE? Cas. 5, 8 (10th Cir. 1976).
The Sixth Circuit has reported conflicting decisions regarding the consistency of
the regulation and the statute. In Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 10 FEP
Cas. 974 (6th Cir. 1975), a three-judge panel concluded that the regulation was consis-
tent with Title VII. It found that the 1972 amendment provided evidence that the reg-
ulation expressed the prior intent of Congress. Id. at 547, 10 FE? Cas. at 976-77. Rely-
ing on Cummins, a separate panel in Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527
F.2d 515, 11 FEP Cas. 1106 (6th Cir. 1975), also upheld the consistency of the regula-
tion and the statute. Id. at 517 n,1 & n.2, II FEP Cas. at 1107 n.I & n.2. In Reid v.
Memphis Publishing Co., 521 F.2d 512, 11 FE? Cas. 129 (6th Cir. 1975), however,
another panel held to the contrary. The majority in Reid reasoned that the guidelines
added for the first time an additional obligation that the employer accommodate reli-
gious practices and beliefs. As such, the guidelines were found to proscribe something
more than discrimination. Id. at 519.20, II FE? Cas. at 134-35.
It should he noted that this was the second appeal of Reid. See Reid v. Memphis
Publishing Co., 468 F.2d 346, 5 FEP Cas. 69 (6th Cir. 1972). The majority of the panel
on the second appeal consisted of Judges Weick and Celebretze, both of whom have
expressed doubts regarding the constitutionality ,of the reasonable accommodation rule.
See Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 334, 2 FEP Cas. 869, 870 (6th Cir.
1970) (Weick, J.) (denial of rehearing), affd by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689
(1971); Cummins, 516 F.2d 544, 554, 10 FEP Cas. 974, 983 (6th Cir. 1975) (Celebrene,
J., dissenting).
It is suggested that the rejection of the 1967 EEOC guidelines in Reid is incor-
rect. Although the subsequent adoption of the rule by Congress does not necessarily re-
flect an earlier intent, the EEOC was given power to promulgate regulations to carry
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(1) what constitutes reasonable accommodation without undue
hardship," and (2) whether the reasonable accommodation duty vio-
lates the establishment clause of the First Amendment.' 6
A. Application of the Reasonable Accommodation Rule
The Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth" Circuits attempted during the
Survey year to define what steps will constitute a reasonable accommo-
dation of an employee's religious practices without undue hardship to
the employer's business, when those practices include abstention from
work on Saturday. The various factors examined by the courts in de-
termining whether efforts have been made to accommodate religious
beliefs and practices reasonably, without undue hardship to an
employer's business include: (1) the nature of the job," (2) the
number of qualified employees capable of performing the duties of
the Sabbath observer," (3).the size of the employer's establishment, 20
(4) the effects of transferring the employee to a different job," and
out the provisions of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1970), and those regulations are
entitled to great deference. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433 (1971). Fur-
thermore, the "reasonable accommodation" rule does not appear inconsistent with the
original enactment of Title VII and does promote the overall purpose of Title VII to
relieve the effects of employment discrimination. Therefore, the statutory and regula-
tory framework since 1967 could properly be interpreted as requiring employers to at-
tempt a reasonable accommodation of employees' or prospective employees' religious
needs unless an undue hardship to the employer would result.
' 2
 Williams v. Southern Union Gas Co., 529 F.2d 483, 488, 12 FEP Cas. 5, 8
(10th Cir. 1976); Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 517, 11
FEP Cas. 1106, 1107 (6th Cir. 1975); Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527 F.2d
33, 37, 11 FEP Cas. 1121, 1123 (8th Cir. 1975); Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 521
F.2d 512, 513, 11 FEP Cas. 129, 130 (6th Cir. 1975); Cummins v. Parker Seal Co„ 516
F.2d 544, 546, 10 FEP Cas. 974, 976 (6th Cir. 1975).
16 Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527 F.2d 33, 37, 11 FEP Cas. 1121,
1123 (8th Cir. 1975); Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 546, 10 FEP Cas. 974,
976 (6th Cir. 1975).
" See notes 2-4, supra.
'" Williams v. Southern Union Gas Co., 529 F.2d 483, 488, 12 FEP Cas. 5, 9
(10th Cir. 1976); Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 521, I 1
FEP Cas. 1106, 1110 (fith Cir. 1975); Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527 F.2d
33, 39-40, II FEP Cas. 1121, 1125 (8th Cir. 1975); Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co.,
521 F.2d 512, 515-16, II FEP Cas. 129, 131-32 (6th Cir. 1975).
'° Williams v. Southern Union Gas Co., 529 F.2d 483, 488, 12 FEP Cas. 5, 9
(10th Cir. 1976); Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 521, 11
FEP Gas. 1106, 1109 (6th Cir. 1975); Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527 F.2d
33, 39, 11 FEP Cas. 1121, 1125 (8th Cir. 1975); Reid v, Memphis Publishing Co., 521
F.2d 512, 516, 11 FEP Cas. 129, 132 (6th Cir. 1975); Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516
F.2d 544, 550, 10 FEP Cas. 974, 980 (6th Cir. 1975).
2° Hardison v, Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527 F.2d 33, 39, 11 FEP Cas. 1121,
1125 (8th Cir. 1975); Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 521 F.2d 512, 515, 11 FEP Cas.
129, 131 (6th Cir. 1975).
2 ' Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 519-20, 11 FEP
Cas. 1106, 1109 (6th Cir. 1975); Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527 F.2d 33,
40, 11 FEP Cat, 1121, 1125 (8th Cir. 1975).
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(5) the effects of accommodation upon the morale of other
employees. 22
In two of the three cases decided by the Sixth Circuit during the
Survey year, employers failed to show that an undue hardship would
result from accommodation of employees' religious practice of observ-
ing Saturday as the Sabbath. In Cummins v. Parker Seal Co.," the em-
ployee was discharged following complaints from fellow employees
who were required to substitute for him on Saturdays. The court of
appeals reversed as "clearly erroneous"" the lower court's finding
that the employer could make no further accommodation without
creating an undue hardship on his 'business." The court of appeals
stated that the system whereby other employees had substituted for
the employee for more than .a year, in return for which the employee
was available to substitute for them, was not creating an undue
hardship." The court reasoned that ,the employer could have pursued
a more active course of accommodation by scheduling longer hours
for the employee on weekdays or Sundays, reducing the employee's
salary commensurate with his shorter work week, or taking pains to
ensure that the employee substituted for his colleagues on an equita-
ble basis rather than leaving substitutions to individual initiative."
The court also reasoned that "Cuindue hardship is something
greater than hardship,"28 and stressed the fact that the employer had
lived with the situation for more than a year. The court further noted
that objections and complaints of fellow employees do not constitute
undue hardship." The concession was made, however, that employee
morale problems could in some cases constitute an undue hardship
where, for example, "chaotic personnel problems" arose." It appears,
therefore, that in Cummins, a reasonable accommodation could have
been made since the nature of the employee's job was such that a suf-
. ficient number of other employees were qualified to perform the
duties. Furthermore, a certain amount of discontent by fellow em-
ployees arising from such an accommodation was not considered an
undue hardship to the employer's business.
22 Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 520-21, 11 FEP
Cas, 1106, 1110 (6th Cir. 197.5); Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 521 F.2d 512, 516-17,
11 FE? Cas. 129, 132 (6th Cir. 1975); Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544,
550-51, 10 FEP Cas. 974, 979-80 (6th Cir. 1975).
22 516 F.2d 544, 10 FEP Cas. 974 (6th. Cir, 1975), affd by an equally divided court,
45 U.S.L.W. 4009 (Nov. 2, 1976).
"M. at 551, 10 FEP Cas. at 980. See FED. R. C1V. P. 52(a).
25 516 F.2d at 546, 10 FEP Cas. at 976, quoting District Court Memorandum
Opinion, No. 2432 (E.D. Ky. March 20, 1974).
26 516 F.2d at 550, 10 FEP Cas. 979.
27 Id. at 550, 10 FEP Cas. at 980.
28 1d. at 551, 10 FFP Cas. at 980.
"Id. at 550, 10 FEP Cas. at 979.
3° Id., 10 FEP Cas. at 979-80. See, e.g., EEOC Decision No. 72-0606, Dec. 22,
1971, 4 FEP Cas. 311, 312; EEOC Decision No. 71-463, Nov. 13, 1970, 3 FEP Cas. 385,
386.
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In Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co.," the most recent of
the three Sixth Circuit decisions, the lower court's finding that the
employer could not further accommodate the employee without
undue hardship to its business was again found to be "clearly
erroneous."32 The employee in Draper was requested to work on
Saturdays in violation of his religious beliefs. In attempting an ac-
commodation, the employer offered to aid the employee's transfer to
a production job where he would be less likely to be required to work
on Saturday." With such a transfer, however, the employee would re-
ceive a lower wage and would be unable to use his skill and experi-
ence as an electrician. Furthermore, such a transfer was not certain to
eliminate conflicts with his religious practices." The court ruled that
when an employee is thus adversely affected to a substantial degree by
a transfer, the employer must first attempt to accommodate the em-
ployee within his current job classification."
The court examined alternative accommodations such as ex-
perimentation with shift exchanges and scheduling arrangements such
as excused absences combined with overtime during the week, and
concluded that a reasonable accommodation of the employee's reli-
gious practices was possible." Since a reasonable accommodation was
found to be feasible, the court considered whether such an accommo-
dation would have imposed an undue hardship on the employer.
Citing Cummins, the Draper court noted that an employer's bur-
den of proof would not be met by showing administrative difficulties
or operating routine disruptions." The court also stated that
"hypothetical hardships" would not suffice. An employer would be
"on stronger ground when he has attempted various methods of ac-
commodation and can point to hardships that actually resulted."33
3 ' 527 F.2d 515, 11 FEP Cas. 1106 (6th Cir. 1975).
32 /d. at 519, 11 FEP Cas. at 1108. In dissent, Judge Engel argued that the dis-
trict court findings were not clearly erroneous. He noted that in Cummins, the error had
been made by not specifying what particular undue hardship would exist. In Draper,
however, the district court had evidence that each of the suggested accommodations
was not feasible. Thus, he argued that particularly where the lower court's record
showed no suggestion of religious bias or prejudice, the findings should not be over-
turned. Id. at 524, 11 FEP Cas. at 1112-13 (Engel, J., dissenting). It is well settled, how-
ever, that intent to discriminate is not a prerequisite to a finding of Title VII violation.
"Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices,
not simply the motivation." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (em-
phasis in original).
33 527 F.2d at 518, 11 FEP Cas. at 1108.
34 The court noted that the employer could not assure the plaintiff that Saturday
work would not be required. Id. at 519, 11 FEP Cas. at 1109.
35 Id.
3" The company personnel manager testified that a shift adjustment might not
necessarily increase labor costs. Furthermore, under the collective bargaining agree-
ment, the company had the right to make shift assignments. Id. at 520, 11 FEP Cas. at
1109.
" The court quoted from Cummins that "{u]ndue hardship is something greater
than hardship." Id., quoting 516 F.2d at 551, 10 FEP Cas. at 980.
3" 527 F.2d at 520, 11 FEP Cas. at 1109.
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The court conceded, however, that an employer could prove undue
hardship without actually having undertaken any of the possible
accommodations." Again relying on Cummins, the court agreed that
employee "grumbling" was not sufficient and that something akin to
"chaotic personnel problems" should be shown before employee dis-
content would be considered an undue hardship." The court noted
that in determining whether a proposed accommodation would pro-
duce an undue hardship, safety considerations would be highly rele-
vant. In the present case, however, the employer had not shown that
the proposed accommodations would jeopardize the safety of the
employer's plant. 4 '
The Sixth Circuit was again confronted with the issue of what
constitutes a reasonable accommodation of employees who observe
Saturday as the Sabbath in Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co. 42 The dis-
trict court had found that the employer violated Title VII's prohibi-
tion of religious discrimination." The court of appeals ruled that the
employer's accommodation of the prospective employee's religious
practices would have imposed an undue hardship and thus reversed
the lower court's finding as clearly erroneous." The plaintiff in Reid,
an applicant for a copyreader position on the defendant's newspaper,
disclosed at his final interview that he would not be available to work
on Saturdays as required. The district court found that although the
job was specialized, other employees of similar qualifications were
available to perform the work on Saturdays and that the employer made
no attempt to accommodate the religious needs of the plaintiff.° Re-
viewing the evidence, the court of appeals ruled that an undue hard-
ship would result by accommodating the plaintiff since requiring
senior copyreaders to substitute for him would incur overtime ex-
penses or employment of an additional copyreader, and serious
morale problems among the other copyreaders would arise. 4 °
50 Contra, Calybaugh v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., '355 F. Supp. 1, 6, 5 FEP
Cas. 719, 723 (D. Ore. 1973); Shaflield v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Serv., Inc., 379
F. Supp. 937, 941-42, 7 FEP Gas. 465, 468 (M.D. Ala. 1974) where the courts ruled that
the employer's burden of showing undue hardship cannot be sustained without actually
having made an attempted accommodation.
4° 527 F.2d at 520-21, 11 FEP Cas. at 1110.
Al Under the proposed accommodations, some workers might be required to
work longer than 8-hour shifts. Although testimony showed that 16-hour shifts might
create safety problems, such shifts were not a necessary result of accommodation. The
court also noted that the collective bargaining agreement permitted shifts up to 121/2
hours per day. Id. at 521, 11 FEP Gas. at 1110.
" 521 F.2d 512, 11. FEP Gas. 129 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3361
(Nov. 16, 1976). Reid was decided after Cummins and before Draper.
13 369 F. Supp. 684, 690, 7 FEP Gas, 13, 18 (W.D. Tenn. 1973).
" 521 F.2d at 517, 11 al' Cas. at 133.
" 369 F. Supp. at 689, 7 FEP Cas. at 17.
46 521 F.2d at 517, 11 FEP Gas. at 133. In dissent, judge Edwards argued that the
district court's findings were not clearly erroneous because the majority was in essence
shifting the burden of proof from the employer to the employee. Id. at 523-24, 11 FEP Gas.
at 138 (Edwards, j., dissenting).
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It is difficult to reconcile Reid with Cummins and Draper.
Although Cummins and Draper seem to be consistent in requiring
specific proof of attempts at reasonable accommodation along with
evidence of specific hardship that would result, Reid allows hypotheti-
cal hardships to suffice. The Reid court may have been less exacting
with the employer because the plaintiff was a prospective employee,
whereas in Cummins and Draper, the plaintiffs were already employed
at the time the alleged discriminatory acts occurred. However, the
statute makes no distinction between employees and prospective
employees.'" Therefore, it is suggested that the reasoning of Cummins
and Draper is preferable to that of Reid.
The reasoning employed by the Eighth Circuit appears to align
with the reasoning of Cummins and Draper rather than with Reid in re-
quiring specific showing of how accommodation would cause an
undue hardship. In Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.," the em-
ployer was found to have violated Title VII's prohibition against reli-
gious discrimination. The court of appeals ruled that the lower court's
finding that the employer had fulfilled its duty to attempt a reason-
able accommodation short of undue hardship was clearly erroneous."
The company argued that the employee's transfer from one position
to another was evidence of lack of cooperation on his part since he
would have retained sufficient seniority in his original position to pro-
tect himself against Sabbath day assignments. 5 ° The court ruled, how-
ever, that although an employee must be responsive to reasonable ac-
commodation, limiting transfer rights as a condition of accommoda-
tion was not appropriate. 5 '
The court of appeals also found that more than 200 employees
were capable of performing the employee's work. Furthermore, under
the collective bargaining agreement, the employer could have permit-
ted the employee to work a four-day week, filled the employee's
Saturday shift with other available personnel, or made a swap between
the employee and other personnel for certain shifts. 52 Thus, the
" See text at notes 10 and 13, supra.
" 527 F.2d 33, 11 FEP Cas. 1121 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3359
(Nov. 16, 1976).
45
 Id. at 39, li FEP Cas. at 1125.
5 " Id.
5a Id .
"Id. at 39.41, II FEP Cas. at 1125-26. The court also explored the relationship
between a bona fide seniority system and the requirement of reasonable accommoda-
tion. Although the court was not required to decide the issue of whether employee
seniority rights must be modified when no other accommodation can be accomplished
since TWA had not even attempted such accommodation, the court did note that, "It
would seem that a collective bargaining agreement, the seniority provisions of which
preclude any reasonable accommodation for religious observances by employees, is
prima facie evidence of union and employer culpability under the Act." Id. at 41, 11
FEP Cas. at 1127. The court further noted that:
If Saturday work inevitably falls to the employees with lowest seniority,
one may well ask whether such seniority provisions would not effectively
preclude [an employer] from ever hiring those [persons] whose religious
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Hardison court examined the size of the employer's business, the
number of employees available to perform the employee's work, the
effects of transfer, and the nature of the job.
The employer contended that such possible accommodations
would create an undue hardship to its business by causing administra-
tive problems in finding substitutes, leaving one shift short-handed, or
requiring payment of overtime compensation." In rejecting the
employer's contentions, the court stressed that the burden of proving
undue hardship is on the employer, and that some degree of incon-
venience or cost to an employer is not precluded by the statutory and
regulatory framework. The court also agreed with Cummins and
Draper that employee irritation did not constitute an undue hardship
on the employer's business."
The Tenth Circuit in Williams v. Southern Union Gas Co., 55 af-
firmed the lower court's findings that the employer had not violated
the reasonable accommodation rule. In Williams, the employee had in-
formed his supervisor that he would be unable to work on Saturdays
due to his religious beliefs." Initially, no problems arose, since Sun-
day through Thursday was the employee's regular work week. How-
ever, when plaintiff was assigned to work on a pipeline system in an
isolated area, he was asked to work one Saturday in order to complete
the project on schedule. When the plaintiff did not do so, his super-
visor had to delay a long-planned vacation and do the work himself.
Plaintiff was subsequently discharged. 57
Although the court considered the factors of whether other em-
ployees were available to perform the plaintiff's work and the nature
of the job, the court characterized the issue as a determination of
whether the employer had acted reasonably under all the
circumstances." Stressing that the trial court's findings must not be
disturbed unless clearly erroneous, the court noted that reasonable
minds might differ and affirmed the judgment of the lower court that
Title VII had not been violated." The court of appeals seemed to
rely on the fact that prior to the particular Saturday in question, the
employer had reasonably accommodated plaintiff's religious practices
by not compelling him to do Saturday work as part of his normal
work week.
convictions preclude work ... on Saturday. It is no answer to such a per-
son, or to the statute itself, that if' he compromises his religious beliefs For
a time he may develop enough seniority to practice them again.
Id, at 41-42 n.12, 11 FEP Cas. at 1127 n.12.
53 /d. at 40-41, 11 FEP Cas. at 1126-27.
"Id. at 40-42, I I FEE' Cas. at 1126-27.
"529 17 .2d 483, 12 FEE' Cas. 5 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3361 (Nov.
16, 1976).
" Apparently, it was not contrary to the employee's beliefs to work on Saturdays
if he believed a true emergency existed. Id. at 485, 12 FEP Gas. at 6.
" Id, at 486, 12 FEP Cas. at 7.
5 ' Id. at 489, 12 HP Cas. at 9.
5 ' id. at 488-89, 12 FEP Cas. at 9.
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It is suggested that under Cummins, Draper, and Hardison, the
situation in Williams would not have been found to create an undue
hardship to the employer's business. Although the court may balance
the varying factors," it would appear that requiring an employee to
delay a vacation in order to perform the work of a Sabbath observer
does not constitute the type of hardship contemplated by the statute
as interpreted in Cummins, Draper, and Hardison.
In the sensitive area of religious accommodation, a case by case
determination is necessary." However, certain guidelines can be set
forth as relevant considerations. In light of the Survey year decisions,
it appears that in examining the nature of the job, an employer may
discharge62 or refuse to hire" an individual whose religious practices
conflict with specialized or unique needs of the employer. This factor
is closely aligned with the concept of whether other employees can
perform the work. If an employer has a large staff, it may be neces-
sary for him to show why shifts or substitutions are not feasible. 64
Furthermore, the employer should be prepared to show what effect a
transfer of an employee may have as a means of accommodation."
If any such accommodation can be made, the employer must
then show specific undue hardship which has resulted or will result.
Although an undue hardship will not result from employee grum-
bling, it may result from "chaotic" personnel morale problems. 66
Minor economic burdens" or scheduling inconvenience" do not ap-
pear sufficient to establish undue hardship.
B. Establishment Clause Challenge to the Reasonable
Accommodation Rule
The reasonable accommodation rule has been a subject of dis-
pute not only in terms of its application, but also in terms of its rela-
tionship to the First Amendment. The Sixth Circuit was the first court
of appeals to voice concern regarding the constitutionality of an im-
position on employers of a duty to accommodate religious beliefs and
practices of employees. In Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.," the court
"See Hardison, 527 F.2d at 40, 11 FEP Cas. at 1125.
61 See note 12, supra.
62 See Williams, 529 F.2d at 489, 12 FEP Cas. at 9.
" See Reid, 521 F.2d at 521, 11 FEP Cas. at 136.
" Williams, 529 F.2d at 488, 12 FEP Cas. at 9; Draper, 527 F.2d at 521, 11 FEP
Cas. at 1109; Hardison, 527 F.2d at 39, 11 FEP Cas. at 1125; Reid, 521 F.2d at 516, 11
FEP Cas. at 132; Cummins, 516 F.2d at 550, 10 FEP Cas. at 980.
" Draper, 527 F.2d at 519-20, 11 FEP Cas. at 1109; Hardison, 527 F.2d at 40, 11
FEP Cas. at 1125.
"Draper, 527 F.2d at 520-21, 11 FEP Cas. at 1110; Reid, 521 F.2d at 516-17, I I
FEP Cas. at 132; Cummins, 516 F.2d at 550-51, 10 FEP Cas. at 979-80.
" See Hardison, 527 F.2d at 40-41, 11 FEP Cas. at 1126-27.
" See Draper, 527 F.2d at 520, 11 FE? Cas. at 1109; Hardison, 527 F.2d at 40-41,
11 FEP Cas. at 1126-27.
" 429 F.2d 324, 2 FE? Cas. 869 (6th Cir. 1970) (denial of rehearing).
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warned that "[do construe the Act as authorizing the adoption of
Regulations which would coerce or compel an employer to accede to
or accommodate the religious beliefs of all of his employees would
raise grave constitutional questions of violation of the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment."'"
When confronted with an establishment clause challenge in
Cummins, the majority of the court rejected the argument that the
reasonable accommodation rule was a law "respecting an establishment
of religion" 71 and therefore invalid under the First Amendment." In
Cummins, the employer argued that the reasonable accommodation
rule constituted a governmentally mandated preference for religion
that is impermissible under the First Amendment." The employer
contended that the rule fostered religion by requiring private em-
ployers to defer to employee's religious practices. In determining
whether the reasonable accommodation requirement could survive
this establishment clause challenge, the court applied the three-
pronged test outlined by the Supreme Court. 74 To be constitutional, a
law must (1) "reflect a clearly secular legislative purpose," (2) "have a
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion," and (3)
"avoid excessive government entanglement with religion." 75
In determining whether the reasonable accommodation rule had
an adequate secular purpose, the court found that the rule was in-
tended to bolster the prevention of employment discrimination." The
court reasoned that the rule reflected a legislative judgment to refrain
from penalizing those who, as a practical matter, will not compromise
their religious beliefs. 77 The majority, therefore, ruled that the
reasonable accommodation rule did meet the requirement of reflect-
ing a secular legislative purpose."
Applying the second part of the Supreme Court's test, the court
found that the primary effect of the rule neither advanced nor inhib-
ited religion, but instead guaranteed job security to employees." The
court reasoned that the reasonable accommodation rule restrained
employers from enforcing uniform rules that have a discriminatory
"Id. at 334, 2 FEP Cas. at 870.
71 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ...." U.S.
CONST. amend, I.
" 516 F.2d at 554, 10 FEP Cas. at 983.
" The employer argued that under the reasonable accommodation rule, "an em-
ployer may be required to excuse an employee from Saturday work to attend church,
but an atheistic employee who wishes to go fishing on Saturdays enjoys no similar right
. ." Id. at 551, 10 FEP Cas. at 980.
74 Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973).
TB
 Id. at 773.
" 516 F.2d at 552, 10 FEP Gas. at 981.
"hi. at 552-53, 10 FEP Cas. at 981. The court drew support froM Gillette v.
United States, 401 U.S. 437, 453 (1971), where the Supreme Court ruled a congres-
sional desire to respect conscientious action to be a valid secular purpose.
" 516 F.2d at 552, 10 FEP Cas. at 981.
"Id. at 553, 10 FEP Cas. at 981-82.
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impact on certain employees. The court also focused on the fact that
no direct or indirect financial support for any religion flows from the
rule. 8 ° Conceding that, for example, churches holding Saturday ser-
vices may have greater attendance and correspondingly greater in-
come, the court characterized this as an incidental benefit." Although
some incidental benefits may thus result from the rule, such benefits
do not render the law unconstitutional. 82 Since the primary effect was
to inhibit discrimination, the court thus found that the second prong
of the Supreme Court's test was met. 83
Thirdly, the court found that the reasonable accommodation
rule did not create any excessive government entanglement with
religion." The court relied on the fact that the rule requires little or
no contact between governmental agencies and religious institutions.
The court rejected the employer's argument that excessive entangle-
ment would result where the EEOC was required to evaluate the
tenets of many religions to ascertain whether employee practices were
genuinely religious." Reasoning that this issue would probably not be
frequently disputed, the court noted that similar involvement has
been upheld by the Supreme Court."
The Cummins court drew additional support from Supreme
Court cases upholding state Sunday closing laws." Since such laws
have the effect of forcing employers to close on Sundays, thereby ac-
commodating the religious practices of the dominant Christian popu-
lation, the court reasoned that the reasonable accommodation rule
was a lesser interference with religion by the government. 88
In dissent in Cummins, Judge Celebrezze argued that the reason-
able accommodation rule grants preference to employees on account
of their religion in a manner inconsistent with the First
Amendment." The dissent reasoned that the first two requirements
of the Supreme Court's three-part test were not met by the rule. Al-
though the banning of employment discrimination would be a valid
secular purpose, the dissent argued that the reasonable accommoda-
tion rule did not promote that purpose. Instead, it required em-
"Id. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
" 516 F.2d at 553, 10 FEP Cas. at 982.
"Id. See, e.g., Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v: Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756, 771-72 (1973).
" 516 F.2d at 553, 10 FEP Cas. at 982.
84 Id.
88 Id. at 554, 10 FEP Cas. at 982.
"Id. See Wale v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674-76 (1970), where the Court
ruled that there was no excessive entanglement between government and religion where
the state must determine whether a purported church qualifies for a property tax exemp-
tion.
" 516 F.2d at 554, 10 FEP Cas. at 982-83. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961).
88 516 F.2d at 554, 10 FEP Cas. at 983.
"Id. at 556, 10 FEP Cas. at 984 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting).
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ployers to engage in religious discrimination by giving preferential
treatment to persons because of their religion. The dissent reasoned
that the purpose behind the reasonable accommodation rule was to
protect and advance particular religions whose practices conflict with
employers' schedules." In contrast, the constitution would not be of-
fended by a "hands-off" policy, allowing employers and employees to
come to terms on their own."
The dissent also found that the reasonable accommodation rule
lacked a "primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion."
Judge Celebrezze reasoned that the rule discriminates between reli-
gion and non-religion and among religions since only those with reli-
gious "practices" would benefit from the rule, thus negating a possible
neutral impact." Since the first two parts of the Supreme Court test
were not met, the dissent found it unnecessary to consider whether
excessive government entanglement was festered by the rule."
An establishment clause challenge was also made and rejected in
Hardison. The employer contended that the reasonable accommoda-
tion rule lacked the required neutrality between religious believers
and nonbelievers. 94 In application of the Nyquist three-fold test, the
court of appeals agreed with the lower court's findings. First, the stat-
ute was found to reflect a secular purpose of assuring employees that
they will not be discharged because of their religion. Second, it was
found that the primary effect of the rule was to guarantee job se-
curity. Third, the court ruled that excessive government entanglement
would not result. 95 The court also cited Cummins and agreed that the
reasonable accommodation rule required far less government inter-
ference than the Sunday closing laws sanctioned by the Supreme
Court. 96
It is suggested that rejection of an establishment clause challenge
to the reasonable accommodation rule is appropriate since the rule
appears to meet the three requirements of Nyquist. Although the dis-
sent in Cummins stated that the purpose of the rule was to give pref-
erence to certain religions," the majority in Cummins, and the court in
Hardison, seem more persuasive in their finding the purpose to be
prevention of employment discrimination, particularly where the Su-
preme Court has upheld the desire to respect conscientious action as a
valid secular purpose." Furthermore, in light of the fact that no fi-
nancial support for any religion results from the rule," the primary
99 Id. at. 558, 10 FEP Cas. at 986 (Celebrezze, j., dissenting).
" Id. at 556, 10 FEP Cas. at 984 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting).
92 Id. at 558-59, 10 FEP Cas. at 986 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting).
93 Id. at 559, 10 FEP Cas. at 987 (Celebrezze, J.. dissenting).
" 527 F.2d at 43, 11 FEP Cas. at 1128.
93 Id. at 43-44, 11 FEP Cas. at 1128-29.
'6 /d. at 44, 11 FEP Cas. at 1129. See text at notes 87-88, supra.
"516 F.2d at 588, 10 FEP Cas. at 986 (Celebrezze, 3., dissenting).
9 " See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 453 (1971).
"See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 668 (1970)
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effect seems to be to inhibit discrimination'm rather than to advance
religion."' Finally, under current Supreme Court. decisions, "pro-
scribed government entanglement" entails conduct such as "comprehen-
sive, discriminating, and continuing [governmental} surveillance."'" 2
Since the reasonable accommodation rule results in little or no contact
between religious institutions and government agencies, any government
entanglement should not he considered impermissibly excessive.
'" See Cummins, 516 F.2d. at 553, 10 FEP Cas. at 982.
101 Id. at 559, 10 FEP Cas. at 986 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting).
1°2 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
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